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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines competing explanations for weak post-apartheid industrial 
performance through the lens of the restructuring of steel and engineering and the 
three private and public conglomerates – Iscor, Anglo American and Rembrandt – 
that dominated these sectors over South Africa’s transition to democracy. The 
twentieth-century evolution of these groups is illustrative of apartheid 
accumulation processes rooted in mining and heavy industries like steel, and their 
exertion of increasing control across the economy. Confined to a subordinate role, 
conglomerate engineering subsidiaries developed significant but truncated 
industrial capabilities. Orthodox explanations for weak post-apartheid industrial 
performance, based primarily on the persistence of market distortions and skills 
deficits, are found to be unsatisfactory. Rather underperformance is better 
understood through a political economy framework emphasising the influence of 
ideology and interests. Advocacy by the largest conglomerates for orthodox policies 
amenable to unfettered restructuring were legitimated by ideological claims and 
asset transfers to politically influential black individuals. Unguided by national 
strategies and performance requirements, industrial restructuring was undertaken 
by the conglomerates themselves in concert with increasingly influential 
institutional investors. This process resulted in widespread destruction of 
engineering industrial capabilities; the foreclosure of opportunities to develop 
globally competitive engineering firms; underinvestment and ultimately crisis in the 
steel sector; and weakened manufacturing linkages and multipliers with the rest of 
the economy. Furthermore, efforts since 2007 to mobilise industrial policy at scale 
to promote diversification from heavy industry has been impeded by these lost 
opportunities and the political economy conditions that spawned them.  
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Chapter One 
South African post-apartheid industrialisation: an introduction 
 
South Africa’s transition to democracy in 1994, after a decade of declining per capita 
incomes and social crisis, came with high hopes for economic revival. There was a 
broad consensus that revitalisation of the economy required the reorientation of 
industry from a historical reliance on mining and mineral-processing to more 
diversified and labour-intensive manufacturing sectors. A dominant orthodox 
consensus solidified interpreting the failure of apartheid industrialisation primarily 
as a consequence of product and factor market distortions compounded by the 
deleterious effects of apartheid’s racially discriminatory legacy, particularly on 
skills development.1 This market distortions consensus, in conjunction with the 
influences of ideology and interests, has profoundly shaped post-apartheid policy 
orientation. Liberalisation and deregulation processes initiated in the 1980s, with 
the particularly notable deregulation of the financial sector, were accelerated over 
the 1990s. Macroeconomic stabilisation measures were combined with expedited 
trade and capital account liberalisation. Despite this attack on market distortions, 
post-apartheid manufacturing performance has been mediocre, with considerable 
continuity of apartheid-era weaknesses. These include inadequate diversification of 
output and exports from mining and heavy industries; rising import penetration of 
final and intermediate goods and a weak capital goods sector; and declining 
manufacturing employment. The post-apartheid economy has become increasingly 
dominated by non-tradable service sectors with a particularly rapid growth of the 
                                                        
1 Although strictly speaking Apartheid as a policy was formally introduced by the National Party 
government upon its accession to power in 1948, the term is used in this thesis to refer to the entire 
period of legislative and institutionalised racist discrimination over the twentieth century prior to 
democracy in 1994.  
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financial sector. Moreover, recently introduced industrial policy measures aimed 
explicitly at diversification of manufacturing outside of heavy industry, has made 
limited progress in achieving this objective and reversing deindustrialisation. 
 
1.1 The contours of post-apartheid industrial performance 
 
Capitalist development since the Second World War has ushered in historically 
unprecedented rates of capital accumulation and structural change in the world 
economy (Maddison 2007). Fast and sustained episodes of capitalist accumulation 
have been linked to far-reaching increases in wage employment, labour 
productivity, and health and educational welfare outcomes (Sender 2016). Whereas 
a handful of developing countries have achieved rapid catch-up with levels of per 
capita income of their advanced counterparts, progress between and within 
countries has been deeply uneven (Amsden 2001; World Bank 2008; Szirmai 2013). 
Episodes of rapid and sustained late industrialisation have been strongly associated 
with three stylized empirical factors in particular: a high share of manufacturing in 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP); a high rate of fixed investment in GDP, particularly 
of machinery and equipment; and rapid growth in the value and sophistication of 
manufactured exports (Akyüz and Gore 1996; Thirlwall 2002; Hausmann et al. 
2005; World Bank 2008; Sender 2016). These stylised empirical facts support a 
theoretical tradition of cumulative causation that singles out manufacturing as the 
“engine of growth” due to its unique potential for stimulating rapid labour 
productivity growth throughout the economy via a range of inter- and intra- sectoral 
 24 
linkages. 2  Hirschman’s conceptualisation of linkages and development of the 
concept to embody not only various economic relationships, but the interaction 
between the economic and the political-institutional has been particularly 
important (Hirschman 1958, 1968, 1981). Relative to a number of middle-income 
developing country peers, South Africa has not managed to mobilise its resources 
for rapid capitalist accumulation either over the last two decades of institutionalised 
racial discrimination under apartheid or over the two decades following South 
Africa’s first democratic election in 1994.  
 
After initially growing relatively rapidly during the post-war period, South Africa’s 
economic performance weakened considerably from the mid-1970s in absolute 
terms and relative to middle-income peers. This deterioration was associated with 
declining investment rates, weakening manufacturing growth, rising 
unemployment and a lack of diversification of manufacturing output and exports 
from an historic reliance on mining and capital-intensive mineral processing (Gelb 
1991; Fallon and de Silva 1994; Joffe et al. 1995; Fine and Rustomjee 1996; Feinstein 
2005; Hirsch 2005). Deindustrialisation, defined as a declining share of 
manufacturing in the economy, began to set in by the early 1980s whether measured 
in terms of manufacturing’s share in employment or GDP (Figure 1.1). 
 
                                                        
2 As exemplified by Lewis’ 1954 two sector model, developed theoretically by economists such as 
Kaldor (1966, 1967, 1977) and Hirschman, and empirically documented including by Kuznets (1957, 
1973), Chenery and Syrquin (1975) Chenery et al. (1986) and more recently Szirmai et al. (2013). 
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Figure 1.1: Share of manufacturing value added in gross domestic product 
(current Rm) and of manufacturing in total employment (%), 1970–2015 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the South African Standardised Industry Indicator Database 
(Quantec Research n.d.) 
 
Post-apartheid South African growth has fallen short of upper middle-income and 
developing country peers (Figure 1.2). Fixed investment levels have been below 
comparators (Figure 1.3) reflecting similarly weak savings rates while 
unemployment has been an order of magnitude higher (Figure 1.4).  
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Figure 1.2: South African gross domestic product per capita growth relative 
to middle-income peers (local currency units) (%), 1975–2014  
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Development Indicators database (World Bank n.d.-a) 
Note: In Figures 1.2 to 1.7, and unless otherwise indicated, Middle-income comparators comprise an 
unweighted average of: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Philippines, the Russian Federation, Thailand and Turkey. The Russian Federation is 
excluded for the 1975–1984 period in all of these figures, due to data unavailability. 
 
Figure 1.3: South African gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP 
relative to middle-income peers(local currency units) (%), 1975–2014 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Development Indicators database (World Bank n.d.-a) 
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Figure 1.4: South African unemployment rate relative to middle-income 
peers (%), 1985–2014  
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Development Indicators database (World Bank n.d.-a) 
 
South Africa’s manufacturing growth has been lower than peers (Figure 1.5) and 
consequently its share of manufacturing in GDP has deteriorated far more rapidly 
(Figure 1.6). Although machinery has grown faster than the manufacturing average 
over the post-apartheid period (particularly during the mining boom of the 2000s), 
the machinery and transport equipment industries constitute a significantly smaller 
part of manufacturing than amongst peer economies, reflecting both weaknesses 
and lost opportunities (Figure 1.7). 
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Figure 1.5: Manufacturing value added growth relative to middle-income 
peers (local currency units) (%), 1975–2014 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Development Indicators database (World Bank n.d.-a) 
Note: Middle-income comparators exclude China and the Russian Federation for all periods and 
Brazil from1975–1984, due to data unavailability. 
 
Figure 1.6: Manufacturing value added as a share of GDP relative to middle-
income peers (local currency units) (%), 1975–2014 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Development Indicators database (World Bank n.d.-a) 
Note: Middle-income comparators exclude the Russian Federation for both the 1975–1984 and 
1985–1994 periods, due to data unavailability. 
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Figure 1.7: Machinery and transport equipment as a share of manufacturing 
relative to middle-income peers (local currency units) (%), 1975–2014 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Development Indicators database (World Bank n.d.-a) 
Note: Middle-income comparators exclude, due to data unavailability, Brazil and the Russian 
Federation from 1975–1984, Chile from 1995–2004, and Chile and Argentina from 2005–2014. 
 
Relatively rapid post-war GDP growth between 1947 and 1974 was associated with 
manufacturing growing faster than the economy (Table 1.1). Subsequent periods of 
anaemic GDP growth, both 1975-1994 and 1995-2015, have been associated with a 
far slower growing manufacturing sector. This is suggestive of the operation of 
Kaldor’s “growth laws” that associates rapid GDP and employment growth with a 
rate of growth of manufacturing in excess of that of GDP. A number of studies have 
found econometric evidence in support of the Kaldorian hypothesis that 
manufacturing acts as the “engine of growth” in the South African economy 
(Wittenberg 1997; Wells and Thirlwall 2003; Millin and Nichola 2005; Tregenna 
2008). By implication the long-term weakening of manufacturing growth and its 
declining relative share in value-added and employment have “pulled down” rather 
than “pulled up” overall growth and employment over the post-apartheid period.  
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Table 1.1: Annual average growth of real gross domestic product, 
manufacturing value added (constant Rm 2010) and employment (%),  
1947–2015 
 GDP MVA Employment 
1947-1974 4.8 7.4 - 
1975-1994 1.8 1.9 2.0 
1995-2015 3.0 2.3 0.5 
Source: Author’s calculations based on South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin (South African 
Reserve Bank n.d.) 
 
In sharp contrast to the labour-intensive and export-oriented manufacturing 
pattern predicted by post-apartheid’s most influential policy document, the Growth 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) framework (Department of Finance 1996), 
growth since 1994 has been dominated by non-tradable services. Very rapid growth 
of the finance, insurance and business services sectors has been accompanied by 
large-scale credit extension to increasingly indebted households. A credit-fuelled 
consumption-led boom boosted the wholesale and retail sectors and has been 
associated with rapidly rising imports. Mining, heavy industry and electricity 
continue to exert a considerable weight in the economy and have grown more 
rapidly than manufacturing sectors falling outside of heavy industry (Figure 1.8) 
(Mohamed and Roberts 2008; Newman 2010; Ashman et al. 2013a; Zalk 2014a). It 
is argued in this thesis that the steel and engineering sectors have been broadly 
reflective of these bifurcated patterns of manufacturing development. 
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Figure 1.8: Value added by broad sector grouping (Rm 2010), 1970-2015  
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on South African Standardised Industry Indicator Database (Quantec 
n.d.). 
Note: In this and the following figures Mining, heavy industry and electricity comprises: mining and 
quarrying; wood and paper products; coke and refined petroleum products; basic chemicals; other 
chemicals and man-made fibres; glass and glass products; non-metallic minerals; basic iron and steel; 
basic non-ferrous metals. Excludes: general government and water supply. 
 
Generally weak employment growth, accompanied by extremely high 
unemployment, has taken place mostly in service sectors, notably in wholesale 
retail, catering and accommodation; finance, insurance and business services and 
transport, storage and communication sectors. Net employment declines in mining 
(predominantly due to the long-term decline of gold mining) and in non-commodity 
manufacturing (by labour-intensive sectors like clothing) accelerated over the post-
apartheid period. There has been a particularly large slump in employment in the 
slow-growing agricultural sectors (Figure 1.9).  
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Figure 1.9: Employment by broad sector grouping, 1970-2015 
  
Source: Author’s calculations based on South African Standardised Industry Indicator Database (Quantec 
n.d.). 
 
 
Although savings and investment rates have been low fixed capital stock since 
apartheid has become increasingly concentrated in the finance, insurance and 
business services sectors. Fixed investment in tradable sectors remains 
concentrated in mining, heavy industry and electricity. The large increase of fixed 
capital stock in transport and communications reflects both increasing import 
intensity of the economy and a rapid rise of cellular telephony (itself heavily 
dependent on imported handsets and equipment) (Figure 1.10). Foreign direct 
investment inflows have been tepid and dominated by acquisitions rather than net 
new additions to fixed investment (Chabane et al. 2006). 
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Figure 1.10: Fixed capital stock by broad sector grouping (Rm 2010), 1970-
2015 
  
Source: Author’s calculations based on South African Standardised Industry Indicator Database (Quantec 
n.d.). 
 
In the context of generally tepid export performance, reliance on mining and 
mineral-processing exports has not declined over the post-apartheid period. 
Buoyed by a slew of capital-intensive mineral-processing projects in the 1990s – 
including further large investments in carbon and stainless steel –exports of 
minerals and semi-processed manufactures continued to dominate merchandise 
exports (56.8% in 2015) (Figure 1.11). Whereas the steel sector has consistently 
generated significant net exports, the engineering sectors continue to exhibit a large 
trade deficit (Figure 1.12). Engineering has also experienced a rapidly rising 
intensity of imports in both final demand and intermediate inputs. Rising import 
intensity of manufacturing has in turn been associated with a weakening of the 
multiplier effect it transmits to the rest of the economy (Tregenna 2008, 2012; 
Burrows and Botha 2013). 
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Figure 1.11: Export composition by sector grouping (%), 1988-2015 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on South African Standardised Industry Indicator Database (Quantec 
n.d.). 
Note: The sharp increase from 1993 to 1994 in the contribution of mining and heavy industry 
exports, and corresponding decline in other manufacturing exports, reflects statistical revision 
rather than a change in real export activity. Prior to this around 35 per cent of trade was classified 
by the apartheid government under “Special Categories” or “Unclassified Goods” predominantly to 
mask trade in armaments, petroleum and gold (Rustomjee 1991) 
 
Figure 1.12: Steel and Engineering trade balance (US$), 1990-2015 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on South African Standardised Industry Indicator Database (Quantec 
n.d.). 
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1.2 Research questions and core contribution 
 
South Africa’s failure to mobilise a more dynamic process of industrialisation over 
the post-apartheid period casts doubt upon the appropriateness of the policy 
orientation and choices made, above all the adoption and continued influence of the 
1996 Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) Strategy (Department of 
Finance 1996). Similarly this failure calls into question the appositeness of an 
overwhelmingly orthodox body of scholarship that has served both ex ante to inform 
and ex post to validate orthodox elements in post-apartheid policy. This orthodox 
consensus interprets the failures of both apartheid and post-apartheid 
industrialisation chiefly in terms of product and factor market distortions. It has 
afforded particular prominence to import tariffs in product markets and the 
allegedly high cost of labour compounded by weak skills formation institutions. 
Primary emphasis on market distortions has prevailed notwithstanding the limited 
admission of selected market imperfections and elements of neoclassical 
institutional economics. The core research questions that are posed in this study 
are: 
 
 If the failure of apartheid industrialisation was indeed primarily due to 
widespread product and factor market distortions, compounded by weak skills 
provision to black workers, why has the extensive post-apartheid attack on 
distortions been associated with such disappointing manufacturing 
performance, particularly limited manufacturing value-added, employment and 
export growth outside of heavy industries? 
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 To what extent has the adaptation of orthodox scholarship in the face of 
disappointing post-apartheid manufacturing performance, in its limited 
admission of market imperfections and conceptualisation of political economy 
relations along new institutional economics lines, enhanced our understanding 
of post-apartheid industrialisation? How credible are claims that manufacturing 
continues to be held back primarily by distortions, particularly in labour 
markets, compounded by skills deficits? 
 
 How have the political economy bargains forged over and into South Africa’s 
transition to democracy coalesced to shape post-apartheid institutions of 
industrial restructuring and the strategic orientation of historically white 
conglomerate groups and emerging black capitalists? How have these 
institutions and corporate orientation in turn impacted on industrial capabilities 
and consequent linkages and multipliers transmitted through the economy? 
 
 What light can be shed by a detailed examination of how these bargains have 
unfolded in the steel and engineering sectors on a broader understanding of 
post-apartheid industrialisation and the difficulties of recently mobilised 
industrial policies in gaining sufficient traction to achieve meaningful structural 
transformation? 
 
The core contribution of this thesis is to attempt to answer these questions through 
a detailed examination of the manner in which post-apartheid political economy 
bargains have shaped the restructuring of steel and engineering, with a particular 
emphasis on the role of the three large conglomerate groups that dominated these 
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sectors at the end of the apartheid era: Iscor, Anglo American and Rembrandt. This 
frame of study is justified on the following grounds. 
 
In contrast to a rich political economy tradition of detailed examination of the 
influence and agency of large private conglomerate groups and state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) on apartheid industrialisation (e.g. O’Meara 1983; Innes 1984; 
Lipton 1986; Clark 1994; Fine and Rustomjee 1996) there has been a paucity of such 
studies in post-apartheid scholarship despite pervasive corporate restructuring 
(with Chabane et al. 2006 being a notable exception).  
 
Steel is the most widely used metal, serving as an essential input into infrastructure, 
construction, mining and agriculture. It accounts for more than double the annual 
international sales value and ten times the volume of all other metals combined 
(Jourdan 2012: 8). Countries undergoing sustained industrialisation thus exhibit 
rapid increases in per capita consumption of steel, peaking upon the attainment of 
high levels of per capita income (Figure 1.13). 
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Figure 1.13: Relationship between apparent steel consumption (kg per 
capita) and GDP per capita 
 
Source: Ernst & Young (2014: 24), based on World Steel Association and IMF data 
 
A number of development theorists have singled out the development of the 
domestic steel and engineering sectors as critical for industrialisation. These sectors 
embody the “pincer-cum-feedback” effect of both backward and forward linkages 
that Hirschman identified as so important to focus developmental strategy on 
(Hirschman 1958). Development of engineering, particularly the capital goods 
sector, is necessary to mobilise increasing returns, embodies various technological 
spillovers and helps to relieve the balance of payments constraint (Hirschman 1958; 
Kaldor 1966; Chang 1993; Toner 1999; Storm 2015). Thus policy makers across a 
range of developing countries have emphasised the strategic nature of steel and 
engineering and the role of the state in supporting and guiding the development of 
these sectors (Mahalanobis 1953; Amsden 1989; Woo-Cumings 1999; Nolan 2001).  
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Empirically the steel and engineering sectors (comprising basic iron and steel, 
machinery and equipment, metal products and transport equipment) represent 
around one fifth of South African manufacturing: 19.4% of manufacturing value 
added and 22.8% of manufacturing employment in 2015. Steel and engineering are 
not only important due to their weight in manufacturing. The development of these 
sectors have been argued to be emblematic of a uniquely South African pattern of 
accumulation around a “Mineral-Energy-Complex” (Fine and Rustomjee 1996) 
centred on mining and energy which is argued to continue, albeit in an increasingly 
financialised form, to exert a profound influence over South African industrialisation 
(Ashman et al. 2013a). 
 
This thesis argues that the heavy influence exerted by the large conglomerate 
groups over post-apartheid economic policy, as manifested by the corporate and 
industrial restructuring of the steel and engineering interest of the three historically 
dominant business groups, has had profoundly damaging consequences for post-
apartheid industrialisation. Eschewing any compromise with labour these groups 
favoured the “benign disciplines” of a rising shareholder value movement and 
sought political legitimation for policies as amenable as possible to unfettered 
restructuring through narrow Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) ownership 
transfers. The resultant bargains and policies gave rise to a particular set of 
institutional arrangements whose outcomes have been at odds with the virtuous 
predictions of the architects of orthodox post-apartheid policies. Both the deepening 
of Anglo-American style capital market institutions and the form BEE has taken have 
given rise to large-scale rents without meaningfully raising fixed investment or 
promoting structural transformation of manufacturing. Low public investment, 
sweeping trade liberalisation and a de-emphasis until recently of the need for large-
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scale and co-ordinated industrial policy combined with the limitations of post-
apartheid competition policy to undermine engineering development without 
eroding damaging patterns of monopolistic behaviour in steel. Rather than giving 
rise to the putative benefits uncritically ascribed to foreign direct investment, the 
introduction of foreign ownership in steel has been associated with net capital 
extraction, monopolistic rents and rising inefficiencies. The rising influence of the 
shareholder value movement has impelled a destructive process of unbundling of 
the major engineering subsidiaries with a severe loss of industrial capabilities and 
foreclosure of opportunities to develop engineering groups of globally competitive 
scale. 
 
Some important aspects of the restructuring of steel and engineering were not 
included in the frame of study. Engineering comprises an extremely wide and 
diverse range of (often overlapping) manufacturing and services activities and 
associated disciplines related to sectors including manufacturing, mining, 
construction and architecture (Rustomjee 2007). This study deals exclusively with 
engineering as a manufacturing activity and those engineering sectors which 
involve significant conversion of steel and other metals into intermediate or final 
goods. This relatively narrow focus was chosen because it reflects the scope of the 
major engineering subsidiaries of the three largest conglomerate groups, whose 
restructuring is traced in this study. The trade-off of breadth for depth of focus, did 
however preclude deeper examination of the evolution of major engineering 
companies that had developed outside of the conglomerate group structure under 
apartheid. Similarly, a more detailed study of the post-apartheid emergence of the 
large BEE groups, and the manner in which they have engaged with engineering, 
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would have been desirable but proved beyond the scope of what was possible for 
this study.  
 
1.3 Methodological considerations 
 
This study has drawn upon a diverse range of primary and secondary sources within 
a mixed methods approach. These sources include national and international official 
statistics, corporate documents, published and unpublished government reports, 
purposive semi-structured interviews, news and industry publications and 
previously published research. Various methodological considerations and 
constraints arising during the course of the research need to be highlighted. 
 
Analysis of empirical trends were subject to significant limitations with South 
African manufacturing statistics. Steel and engineering sector statistics are derived 
from production data collected by Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) and trade data 
collected by South African Revenue Services (SARS). Steel and engineering 
production is categorized by StatsSA in terms of the Standardised Industrial 
Classification (SIC) system, as reflected in  
Table 1.2. Steel production is readily located within SIC categories 351 (Basic Iron 
and Steel) and 353 (Casting of Metals) while engineering production involves a 
diverse range of manufacturing straddling three main SIC groupings: Fabricated 
Metal Products (354 and 355), Machinery and Equipment (356, 357 and 358) and 
Other Transport Equipment (384, 385 and 386) as reflected in  
Table 1.2. 
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Table 1.2: Steel and engineering sectors by Standardised Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code 
Manufacture of Basic Metals (351, 352 and 353) 
351 Manufacture of Basic Iron and Steel 
3510 Manufacture of basic iron and steel 
35101 Basic iron and steel industries, except steel pipe and tube mills  
35102 Steel pipe and tube mills 
353 Casting of Metals 
3531 Casting of iron and steel 
 
Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products (354 and 355) 
354 Manufacture of Structural Metal Products, Tanks, Reservoirs and Steam Generators 
3541 Manufacture of structural metal products 
35411 Manufacture of metal structures or parts thereof 
35419 Other structural metal products, e.g. metal doors, windows and gates 
3542 Manufacture of tanks, reservoirs and similar containers of metal 
3543 Manufacture of steam generators, except central heating hot water boilers 
355 Manufacture of Other Fabricated Metal Products; Metalwork Service Activities 
3551 Forging, pressing, stamping and roll-forming of metal; powder metallurgy 
3552 Treatment and coating of metals; general mechanical engineering on a fee or 
contract basis  
35521 Treating and coating of metals 
35522 General mechanical engineering on a fee or contract basis 
3553 Manufacture of cutlery, hand tools and general hardware 
3559 Manufacture of other fabricated metal products n.e.c.  
35591 Manufacture of metal containers, e.g. cans and tins 
35592 Manufacture of cables and wire products 
35593 Manufacture of springs (all types) 
35594 Manufacture of metal fasteners 
35599 Manufacture of other metal products n.e.c. 
3551 Forging, pressing, stamping and roll-forming metal, powder metallurgy 
3552 Treat and coating of metals and mechanical engineering on fee basis 
3553 Mfg of cutlery, hand tools and general hardware 
3559 Mfg of other fabricated metal products n.e.c. 
 
Manufacture of Machinery and Equipment N.E.C. (356, 357 and 358) 
356 Manufacture of General Purpose Machinery 
3561 Manufacture of engines and turbines, except aircraft, vehicle and motor cycle 
engines 
3562 Manufacture of pumps, compressors, taps and valves 
3563 Manufacture of bearings, gears, gearing and driving elements 
3564 Manufacture of ovens, furnaces and furnace burners 
3565 Manufacture of lifting and handling equipment 
3569 Manufacture of other general purpose machinery 
357 Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery 
3571 Manufacture of agricultural and forestry machinery 
3572 Manufacture of machine tools 
3573 Manufacture of machinery for metallurgy 
3574 Manufacture of machinery for mining, quarrying and construction 
3575 Manufacture of machinery for food, beverage and tobacco processing 
3576 Manufacture of machinery for textile, apparel and leather production 
3577 Manufacture of weapons and ammunition 
3579 Manufacture of other special purpose machinery 
358 Manufacture of Household Appliances N.E.C. 
359 Manufacture of office, Accounting and Computing Machinery 
 
Manufacture of Other Transport Equipment (384, 385 and 386)   
384 Building and Repairing of Ships and Boats  
3841 Building and repairing of ships 
3842 Building and repairing of pleasure and sporting boats 
385 Manufacture of Railway and Tramway Locomotives and Rolling Stock 
386 Manufacture of Aircraft and Spacecraft 
Source: Statistics South Africa (1993) 
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However, a number of shortcomings and limitations, particularly with StatsSA’s 
production statistics, are evident. Whereas the apartheid-era Central Statistical 
Service (CSS) conducted regular censi of manufacturing, publishing data 
disaggregated to the four digit SIC level, StatsSA has shifted to more limited large 
sample surveys (LSS’s), with the last manufacturing census published in 1996 
(Statistics South Africa 2001). Furthermore, official estimates of variables such as 
value-added within manufacturing sectors are not regularly published, with gaps of 
four or five years between the publication of revised input-output or supply-use 
tables, which themselves report on production structure with a lag of three or more 
years. This has introduced three main limitations with official post-apartheid 
manufacturing production statistics. Firstly, the shift from censi to surveys and long 
lags between the publication of value-added estimates may not adequately capture 
changing patterns of production over a period of intense structural change. 
Secondly, limitations in discerning which sub-sectors of engineering have driven 
aggregate levels of change are compounded by a reduction in the level of detail at 
which StatsSA reports. As reflected in  
Table 1.2 above a sector such as Machinery and Equipment contains a diverse range 
of three, four and five digit sub-sectors. Thirdly, as the level of detail of Stats SA 
manufacturing statistics has declined, it appears to have withdrawn from providing 
sectoral estimates to UNIDO’s Industrial Statistics databases, the major 
international source of cross country comparisons of subsectoral manufacturing 
performance (Zalk 2014b). 
 
Trade statistics, based on the Harmonised System (HS) are available on a far more 
detailed and frequent basis. However, trade data is also subject to limitations, albeit 
not necessarily unique to South Africa. Firstly, trade misinvoicing, often linked to 
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transfer pricing and profit shifting of transnational corporations, distorts trade 
statistics. Primary mineral commodities, and semi-processed commodities such as 
steel, have been identified as a major site of transfer pricing (Ashman et al. 2011; 
Ndikumana 2016). Secondly, as discussed in Chapter 5, estimates of ratios of both 
export to output and of imports to domestic demand appear to be exaggerated, 
reflecting the apparent inclusion imports destined for re-export. 
 
Private data providers have stepped into the breach, most notably the company 
Quantec which uses various available official, albeit intermittent, statistical sources 
to "standardise" industry data. That is to scale estimates of sectoral production to 
national accounts aggregates and estimate variables, such as sectoral value added, 
based on intermittently published input-output and supply-use tables and more 
limited but regular official data releases. Although Quantec provides some detail of 
the data series employed to undertake these extrapolations, they do not place their 
methodology for doing so in the public domain. The resultant South African 
Standardised Industry Indicator Database (SASIID) (Quantec, n.d.) has become the 
mainstay for many researchers and has been used for the purposes of this study, 
mindful of its limitations.  
 
This study made extensive use of annual reports, financial statements and a range 
of other corporate material in piecing together the evolution and post-apartheid 
restructuring of the three large business groups that dominated the steel and 
engineering sectors at the end of apartheid: Iscor, Anglo American and Rembrandt. 
Collating this material proved a major undertaking. Whereas various reports were 
accessible electronically a number had to be manually retrieved and copied. Anglo 
American Industrial Corporation (AMIC) annual reports were sourced from the 
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Anglo American library in Johannesburg. Dorbyl, Iscor and Metkor annual reports 
were sourced from the Cape Town branch of the National Library of South Africa. 
Because Scaw and Boart were not publically listed, but wholly owned subsidiaries 
of AMIC their evolution and restructuring had to be pieced together from a range of 
sources including references in AMIC annual reports, interviews, commissioned 
corporate histories, media reports. Legal proceedings sometimes also revealed 
important insights, such as the remarkable arrangement amongst major 
shareholders to reward management for the dismantling of South Africa’s largest 
ever engineering firm: Dorbyl. Corporate histories and bibliographies were 
consulted, albeit with scepticism in relation to hagiographical representations of 
founding families and leading executives often contained in these accounts. 
 
Official corporate material was supplemented with purposive semi-structured 
interviews, predominantly with current and former directors or executives of steel 
and engineering firms or their parent companies. The choice of semi-structured 
interviews was informed by a number of considerations. As the research focussed 
on a small number of firms, formerly conglomerate subsidiaries, a quantitative 
survey was not appropriate. Furthermore the interviews encouraged informants to 
provide their own account of the development of the firm, the nature of capabilities 
it developed and supply and demand conditions it faced, as distinct for instance from 
requesting some ranking of a preconceived list of constraints determined in advance 
as characteristic of many quantitative firm surveys. A record of the interview was 
emailed to informants, inviting them to amend any aspect they felt did not 
accurately reflect their views. My own positionality as a Department of Trade and 
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Industry official was pertinent. 3  In some cases this positionality meant that 
interviews were not possible, informants sometimes agreed to meet apparently to 
try establish my own level of information, before withdrawing permission or 
providing very little meaningful information. My own specific role in advancing 
policy aimed at tackling monopolistic pricing in steel and other heavy industries 
largely foreclosed the possibility of interviewing executives of the largest primary 
steel producers.4 Conversely, my professional positionality may have sometimes 
assisted in securing interviews, inter alia via through introductions by industry 
professionals with potential interviewees. 
 
The overarching methodological approach to the study has been one of 
“triangulation” across multiple and mixed information, particularly corporate, 
sources to check for consistency or inconsistency. The approach to corporate 
narratives was inter alia informed heuristically by Froud et al.’s (2006) 
methodology of contrasting corporate “narratives” with corporate “numbers”. For 
Froud et al. (2006) corporate management, subject to demands to deliver 
unrealistically high levels of shareholder returns, have adopted “shareholder value” 
as an ephemeral narrative to convince shareholders that their strategies will deliver 
dramatic returns. Detailed interrogation of the “numbers”, that is actual financial 
performance and measures of financial sustainability, are used to test management 
narratives, often revealing disappointing financial performance. The contrast 
                                                        
3 Prior to commencing the PhD research I was intensively involved in the design and implementation 
of industrial policy in senior managerial positions within the Department of Trade and Industry as 
Chief Director: Industrial Policy and Deputy Director-General of Industrial Development Division of 
the DTI, between 2003 and 2012 
4  See for instance Paton (2012) ‘ArcelorMittal SA fumes over state's policy snub’, 
http://www.arcelormittalsa.com/Portals/0/ArcelorMittal%20SA%20fumes%20over%20state%2
7s%20policy%20snub.pdf 
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between narrative and reality has been assessed at two levels. First, the thesis 
considers the extent to which the narrative mobilised by the largest conglomerates 
for policies as amendable as possible to unfettered restructuring has given rise to 
the promise of higher fixed investment, particularly in manufacturing diversified 
beyond heavy industry. Second, the thesis examines what the impact has been of the 
policies advocated by the conglomerate groups as well as the evolution of their 
primary legitimation mechanism, the introduction of Black Economic 
Empowerment asset transfers, on the restructuring of their steel and engineering 
interests in particular. 
 
1.4 Structure of the study 
 
Chapter 2 sets out the political economy framework adopted for this study. I argue 
that a “golden thread” of cumulative causation theory runs through much classical 
and structuralist development economics which remains relevant to the analysis of 
contemporary industrialisation. However, the primary weakness of this canon, is 
that its conceptual and empirical strengths were not matched with an adequate 
conceptualisation of the political-institutional conditions necessary for its 
recommendations of state-led industrialisation. This contributed to mounting 
difficulties amongst a range of developing countries in sustaining industrialisation 
and paved the way for a “neoliberal revolution” in economics and associated 
“Washington Consensus” policies. Disappointing results from the latter and 
evidence that the “east Asian miracle” involved extensive intervention by 
“developmental states” in turn prompted limited rethinking of orthodox economic 
and institutional assumptions as heterodox economics sought a more generalisable 
theory of a “developmental state”. A resource or capabilities based tradition of 
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conceptualising the firm and its application to late industrialisation is contrasted 
with theories within the neoclassical tradition, emphasizing their implications for 
industrialisation and the role of the state. The limitations of both circumscribed 
rethinking within orthodox economics and the heterodox developmental state 
literature forms the basis for a three-pronged political economy framework 
stressing the continued relevance of cumulative causation theory; a capabilities-
based understanding of the firm emphasising market and state-constructed 
compulsions shaping its strategic orientation and the industrial capabilities it 
develops; and modern theories of political economy that forge a link between the 
economic and the political-institutional. 
 
Chapter 3 traces the development of the steel and engineering interests of three 
dominant business groups from the early twentieth century to the end of apartheid 
with the mining roots of racially exclusive industrialisation shaped by the economic 
dominance of English mining capital amid rising Afrikaner economic ambitions, and 
the emergence of state-owned enterprises as central to subsequent 
industrialisation. Post-war development of steel and engineering is presented as 
illustrative of processes of conflict and increasing compromise between Afrikaner 
political and English economic power. It reflects how control over both the steel and 
engineering sectors solidified by the end of the 1980s around a nexus of three large 
business groups: state-owned Iscor and the two biggest private conglomerates: 
Anglo American and Rembrandt. The failure to develop the engineering sector more 
fully under is attributed to the subordinate role of engineering subsidiaries in large 
business groups’ accumulation strategies; the failure of the state to deploy 
instruments such as tariffs as part of any broader national strategy to develop and 
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diversify engineering, and the permissive role of competition policy in easing 
conglomerate growth through acquisition rather than net new investment. 
 
Chapter 4 deals with the emergence of post-apartheid economic policy as a 
confluence of the influences of scholarship, ideology and the bargains initiated by 
the largest conglomerate groups in the advancement of their interests. It traces the 
emergence of two alternate interpretations of the failure of apartheid 
industrialisation and associated visions of post-apartheid industrial restructuring. 
The first, ultimately solidifying as the dominant consensus, locates the failure of 
apartheid industrialisation in product and factor market distortions compounded 
by racially discriminatory skills provision, with trade and labour market policies 
elevated as the primary causes of failure. The second locates failure in the context of 
a uniquely South African “system of accumulation” around a “mineral-energy-
complex” group of sectors in which state-owned enterprises played the dominant 
role in underpinning private accumulation. The chapter reflects how the liberalising 
policy thrust of the dominant orthodox consensus was amplified by ideological 
claims and rhetoric of the large conglomerate groups, even as the state was 
intervening extensively in their favour. With the primary objective of securing 
policies as favourable as possible to unrestricted restructuring, and eschewing a 
bargain with labour, the conglomerates initiated Black Economic Empowerment 
asset transfers as a tactical legitimation mechanism while embracing the “benign 
disciplines” of the increasingly influential shareholder value movement. The co-
evolution of post-apartheid policy and orthodox scholarship is traced, arguing that 
limited theoretical adaptations prompted by disappointing economic performance 
and developments in economics itself have proved inadequate and misleading, 
serving primarily ex post to inform and ex ante to validate orthodox elements of 
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policy. Rather industrialisation is better understood through the lens of the 
alternate three-pronged political economy framework, emphasising how South 
Africa’s post-apartheid bargains have involved a collusive alliance between 
conglomerates and institutional investors to secure maximum freedom of 
movement to restructure and pursue shareholder value, legitimated for a period of 
time through the introduction of Black Economic Empowerment. This has shifted 
corporate orientation towards finance and other non-tradable sectors and even 
further away from building industrial capabilities outside of mining and heavy 
industry. 
 
Chapter 5 traces the impact of post-apartheid political economy bargains on the 
institutions shaping industrial restructuring and performance, in the context of the 
international rise of a shareholder value movement and global sectoral 
consolidation dubbed the “Global Big Business Revolution”. It reflects how the 
adoption of Washington consensus polices and Anglo-American capital market 
institutions have catalysed increasing financialisation of the economy. That is the 
rapid growth of the financial sector and associated large-scale flow of rents to 
institutional investors without corresponding increases in savings and fixed 
investment. Low levels of fixed capital formation have been channelled increasingly 
to non-tradable services (much to finance itself) with significant continuity of 
apartheid patterns of a concentration of fixed investment in mining, electricity and 
heavy industry. The evolution of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) is traced 
from a tactical conglomerate legitimation mechanism to a cornerstone of public 
policy and practice, supported by government licencing, procurement and public 
finance institutions. Large rents have flowed to beneficiaries of BEE without 
meaningfully contributing to fixed capital formation in general and manufacturing 
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investment in particular. The evolution of trade, industrial and competition policy is 
sketched reflecting how sweeping trade liberalisation has not been associated with 
predicted industrial dynamism while the Industrial Development Corporation has 
continued to support investment mining and mineral-processing sectors. Recent 
attempts to mobilise meaningful industrial policy for structural change have been 
caught between orthodox policy on the one hand and the elevation of narrow BEE 
ownership transfer imperatives over industrialisation objectives, compounded by 
weaknesses in the design and implementation of industrial policy on the other. Poor 
manufacturing performance has flowed from South Africa’s post-apartheid bargains 
and concomitant institutional arrangements, characterised by low manufacturing 
investment outside of heavy industry, rising import penetration, weak export 
growth, limited linkage formation and weakening multipliers. Outside of pockets of 
export dynamism linked to mining, restructuring of engineering has reflected the 
dismantling rather than reorientation and development of capabilities built up 
under apartheid. Furthermore, underinvestment in the steel sector, hitherto 
reflective of the strengths of apartheid’s skewed industrialisation, has led to a deep 
crisis in the sector. 
 
Chapter 6 illustrates how these institutions of industrial restructuring have 
manifested themselves in the restructuring of the two largest private conglomerate 
groups, Anglo and Rembrandt, within the context of the global restructuring of the 
steel, iron ore and engineering sectors. It traces Anglo’s extensive restructuring as 
it secured the domestic political conditions for its offshore listing on the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE). Anglo’s primary industrial subsidiary, the Anglo American 
Industrial Corporation (AMIC), was reabsorbed into Anglo in the face of sliding 
profits of its steel and engineering operations amid low fixed investment, trade 
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liberalisation, the absence of a national strategy for engineering, and managerial 
ineptitude. Multiple rounds of restructuring prompted by the demands of global 
institutional investors led to the destructive unbundling of Anglo’s steel and 
engineering assets and ultimately Anglo’s own decline. After securing its lucrative 
tobacco holdings offshore, Rembrandt shifted decisively to a far greater financial 
orientation as a “pure investment holding company” in the context of a bargain with 
institutional investors for the delivery of high returns in exchange for continued 
Rupert family control, and the careful cultivation of BEE partners. Remgro’s 
restructuring, reflective of broader post-apartheid patterns, involved consolidation 
of ownership and control in sectors where possible, while shedding less profitable 
businesses. The latter is starkly reflected in its destructive unbundling of South 
Africa’s largest ever engineering group, Dorbyl, undertaken in the context of 
unfavourable policies for engineering and managerial maladroitness and self-
interest. The chapter also briefly touches on the influence of Remgro’s investment 
holding company model favoured by many emerging BEE groups involving growth 
through the acquisition of stakes in existing businesses, rather than net new fixed 
investment. 
 
Chapter 7 details the fundamental post-apartheid restructuring of the South African 
steel sector in the context of a global consolidation of iron ore and steel that saw 
ArcelorMittal emerge as the world’s largest steel group in a process of debt-fuelled 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As). It deals with the consequences of Iscor’s 
transition to foreign ownership as a subsidiary of ArcelorMittal and more briefly 
with the unbundling of Anglo’s Highveld subsidiary. It reflects how the attainment 
by Iscor management of the objective of privatisation led to mounting post-
privatisation inefficiencies compounded by the hubristic Saldanha expansion. 
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Unbundling of Iscor to “unlock shareholder value” became an attractive escape 
route from mounting financial difficulties amid rising iron ore prices and the 
introduction of foreign ownership to assist with its troubled steel operations. The 
chapter illustrates that few if any of the putative benefits of privatisation and foreign 
ownership, predicted by orthodox analyses, have materialised. ArcelorMittal has 
engaged in monopolistic pricing practices notwithstanding cost advantages derived 
inter alia from low cost iron ore and electricity. Rather than introducing greater 
efficiencies there has been a striking pattern of underinvestment, plant failure and 
rising costs of production. Similarly destructive patterns are evident from Anglo’s 
sale of its Highveld subsidiary Systemic underinvestment by foreign owners has 
been the primary cause of deep crisis in the South African carbon steel industry 
following the global financial meltdown. By contrast foreign ownership of Columbus 
stainless steel has proved more responsible and sustainable. The chapter also deals 
with the significance of a process of contestation that erupted in 2009 over claim to 
iron ore rents embedded in the concessional supply arrangement afforded Iscor 
upon its unbundling. The battle over who should benefit from these rents: Anglo and 
its shareholders; a controversial politically connected third party claiming to 
advance BEE; or downstream steel consuming sectors are highlighted as indicative 
of broader patterns within South Africa’s post-apartheid political economy. 
 
Chapter 8 deals with the unbundling of the three major engineering subsidiaries that 
had developed under Iscor, Anglo and Rembrandt control: Scaw, Boart and Dorbyl 
It traces the impact of post-apartheid bargains struck and consequential policies in 
the context of the long term decline of gold mining, conglomerate managerial 
ineptitude and complacency, low public investment expenditure and the lack of a 
co-ordinated national strategy for reorientation and development of engineering. As 
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Anglo and Remgro faced increasing pressure to maximise and “release” shareholder 
value, they engaged in the destructive unbundling of their engineering subsidiaries. 
Unbundling occurred in the context of global consolidation and specialisation in 
engineering and declining domestic profitability under conditions of low public 
investment and trade liberalisation. The chapter reflects how Scaw responded to 
weak domestic demand by developing and internationalising its grinding media 
business into the largest in the world, albeit without securing the underlying 
technology involved. However, shareholder pressure on Anglo to narrow focus and 
raise returns saw it dispose of Scaw’s international operations while heavily 
indebting and then selling the South African business to the IDC. A similar pattern of 
destructive unbundling ensued with Boart, amid longstanding conglomerate 
complacency with respect to technological developments in rock drilling and 
plummeting sales to South Africa’s declining domestic gold mines. Rembrandt’s 
(subsequently Remgro’s) control of Dorbyl saw a brief effort over the early 1990’s 
to make a shift from heavy to light engineering amid weak domestic investment. 
However, management was neither able to turnaround Dorbyl’s domestic 
manufacturing operations or to viably run its import-intensive automotive parts 
and steel trading businesses. An opaque process of unbundling ensued as Remgro 
sought to “release value to shareholders” through a collusive compact between 
major shareholders and a handful of senior executives. It also reflects how BEE has 
unfolded in mining and SOE procurement practice in a form that introduces favours 
imports rather than domestic manufacturing and employment. 
 
In conclusion Chapter 9 argues that South Africa’s post-apartheid bargains have 
given rise to a process of corporate and industrial restructuring at odds with the 
promise of higher and more productive fixed investment in the post-apartheid 
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economy, supported by a mixture of interests, ideology and selective appeals to 
scholarship. Rather a process of destructive unbundling and restructuring has 
ensued. Not only has it failed to address the weaknesses of apartheid 
industrialisation, reflected by a substantial but inadequately competitive 
engineering sector. It has also led to a profound weakening of some of inherited 
strengths, manifested by underinvestment and crisis in the steel sector. A number 
of areas are identified for further research. One particularly useful area may be 
comparisons with countries that have significant political economy similarities, 
such as Malaysia. The research also has important implications for policy. It reflects 
how the scope for mounting industrial policy is constrained by two broad capitalist 
groupings, neither particularly oriented towards advancing accumulation through 
long term fixed investment in a more diversified manufacturing sector: a 
traditionally white corporate sector oriented to short-term shareholder value, and 
an aspirant emerging black capitalist class growing chiefly through transfers of the 
existing capital stock of the economy. If industrialisation is to meaningfully proceed 
it would appear to require the crafting of new bargains, and the political conditions 
that make the crafting of such bargains possible. 
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Chapter Two 
A political economy framework 
 
This chapter sets out a political economy framework for interpreting South African 
industrialisation in the context of major shifts in development economics. It briefly 
traces a “golden thread” of cumulative causation theory running through classical 
and structuralist economics as well as the limitations of this canon, which opened 
the door for a “neoliberal revolution”. It critically assesses major developments in 
both neoclassical market-imperfections and institutional economics, and the 
heterodox Developmental State literature in response to the challenges posed by the 
East Asian ‘miracle’ experience, concluding that both suffer from significant 
weaknesses. Rather it heuristically invokes Hirschman’s concept of “micro-
Marxism” emphasising the need for context-specific analysis that recognises the 
dynamic interaction between economic and political-institutional forces. In the 
process it seeks to concisely link major shifts in development economics to their 
influence on South African scholarship, policy and institutions which are in turn 
elaborated more fully in subsequent chapters. In doing so it emphasises that while 
broad shifts in development economics have exerted a significant influence over 
South African industrialisation debates and policy, this influence has been uneven, 
and sometimes characterised by the superimposition of inappropriate conceptual 
models over South African reality. A three-pronged political economy framework is 
set out stressing the continued relevance of cumulative causation theory; a 
conception of the firm in late development emphasising the compulsions from both 
markets and states that shape its strategic orientation and the nature of industrial 
capabilities it develops; and modern theories of political economy that forge a link 
between the economic and the political-institutional. 
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Section 2.1 briefly traces a “golden thread” running through post-war classical and 
structuralist literature that conceptualises late industrialisation as a process of 
circular and cumulative causation with the state co-ordinating structural change 
from low-productivity to increasing return sectors. This rich economic analysis of 
structural transformation was not matched however by a correspondingly 
sophisticated political-institutional analysis. Section 2.2 reflects the rapid neoliberal 
revolution of the 1980s and associated Washington Consensus policies, bolstered by 
slowdown and crisis amongst many developing countries considered to be pursuing 
inward-oriented structuralist strategies, which were contrasted with faster growth 
of ostensibly free market export-oriented east Asian economies. This neoliberal 
revolution unevenly but increasingly influenced South African scholarship and 
policy from the mid-1980s, despite mounting evidence that east Asian export-
oriented industrialisation involved extensive intervention by “Developmental 
States” and disappointing results from Washington Consensus reforms. Section 2.3 
discusses how both orthodox and heterodox economics responded to the challenges 
posed by the east Asian experience. While orthodox economics was compelled to 
relax its more unrealistic assumptions and recognise the presence of extensive 
market imperfections and the importance of institutions, the heterodox 
Developmental State paradigm was challenged to develop a more generalizable 
theory of such a state. Drawing on the latter paradigm the post-apartheid South 
African state was to belatedly and inappropriately seek to cast itself as 
“Developmental”. The limitations of both the orthodox market imperfections and 
new institutional economics, and the Developmental State literature are considered. 
Informed heuristically by Hirschman’s concept of “micro-Marxist” analysis section 
2.4 sketches discusses three relevant modern theories of political economy. Section 
2.5 draws together a three-pronged political economy framework stressing the 
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continued relevance of cumulative causation theory; a conception of the firm in late 
development emphasising the compulsions from both markets and states that shape 
its strategic orientation and the nature of industrial capabilities it develops; and 
modern theories of political economy that forge a link between the economic and 
the political-institutional. 
 
2.1 The strengths and weaknesses of classical and structuralist 
development economics 
 
A dominant consensus that established itself in South African economic history, as 
elaborated in Chapter 4, is the claim that apartheid industrialisation represented a 
case of import substituting industrialisation (ISI) that faltered and ultimately failed. 
This reading has had consequences both for policy and scholarship. In policy circles 
it has been drawn upon to support extensive post-apartheid trade liberalisation and 
deregulation, while serving to marginalise a rich body of classical and structuralist 
thinking from orthodox scholarship. This section briefly assesses both the strengths 
and weakness of classical and structuralist development economics, arguing that a 
“golden thread” of cumulative causation theory remains relevant to contemporary 
industrialisation. 
 
2.1.1 Catch-up, structural change and industrialisation 
 
The Industrial Revolution ushered in an era of unprecedented growth in human 
history (Maddison 2007; Szirmai et al. 2013) with the first industrialiser, Britain, 
followed by a range of European countries and subsequently the United States 
(Chang 2002; Reinert 2008). Economic development has thus long been 
conceptualised as a process of industrial catch-up by less developed countries with 
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levels of per capita income of their more advanced forerunners. Thus for Marx, 
writing in the preface to the first German edition of Capital, Volume One:  
 
“The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the 
less developed, the image of its own future.”  
(Marx 1992: 91).  
 
The emerging discipline of “classical” post-war development economics began to set 
out an understanding of what rendered low-income countries underdeveloped with 
a view to assisting in mounting strategies to overcome such contingencies. It drew 
inspiration from the intolerability of a repeat of mass unemployment of the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, which in turn created fertile conditions for the war and 
from the apparent success of the Keynesian revolution in avoiding a resurgence of 
high unemployment in the advanced economies (Toye 2003).  
 
Classical post-war development economics emphasised that catch-up involved a 
fundamental change of both the structure of the economy and the institutional 
arrangements necessary to facilitate such change (Myrdal 1957; Gerschenkron 
1962; Kuznets 1973). Gerschenkron’s (1962) seminal work emphasised that the 
relative “backwardness” of a country provides the potentiality for rapid catch-up 
with, or even “leap-frogging” ahead of, more technologically advanced economies. 
Lead economies provide followers with a picture of what is possible and a potential 
source of technologies that have already been developed and commercialised, with 
these technologies embodied in readily purchasable capital equipment. Follower 
countries can buy and install these capital goods and enjoy the added advantage that 
they have the opportunity do so at a more efficient scale than their more advanced 
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counterparts (Gerschenkron 1962; Abramovitz 1986; Amsden 1989; Amsden and 
Hikino 1994). Thus “backwardness” generates a positive tension between what is 
and what might be. However, catch-up is an extremely discontinuous process, with 
the discontinuity rising with the degree of backwardness of an economy. The greater 
the degree of backwardness, the larger the scale of resource mobilisation required 
for modernisation (Gerschenkron 1962). Hence, the state would be required to play 
a correspondingly large role to generate new institutional arrangements which 
mobilise investable resources and deploy them to large-scale investments. Thus, the 
scale and scope of state intervention required to facilitate catch-up rises in 
proportion to the level of “backwardness”.  
 
This deeply contingent view of catch-up stands in stark contrast both to subsequent 
neoclassical theories of “unconditional convergence” of per capita incomes based on 
factor-price equalisation (Samuelson 1948) or a mechanistic progression from one 
stage of industrialisation to the next (Rostow 1960). Thus, in a Gerschenkronian 
sense, development is likely to proceed very unevenly. For those countries that can 
rapidly develop the institutional mechanisms to mobilise its productive forces, 
catch-up is likely to proceed in a rapid spurt. However, such a process was unlikely 
to happen automatically with the potential for backward economies to be stuck in 
“low level development traps” (Myrdal 1957; Nelson 1957; Leibenstein 1957; Myint 
1967). 
 
Evolving post-war theories of development emphasised structural change as a 
dynamic process whereby labour is transferred from low productivity “traditional” 
sectors and activities (typically subsistence agriculture and “petty services”) to 
higher productivity “modern” sectors (typically but not always manufacturing) 
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(Lewis 1954; Syrquin et al. 1986). Because of high levels of disguised unemployment 
in traditional sectors, it is argued that the transfer of labour to the modern sector 
will raise labour productivity in both (Lewis 1954). Conceptual arguments in favour 
of industrialisation were cast in both “positive” and “negative” terms. The former 
emphasised the productivity enhancing properties of manufacturing, as elaborated 
in the discussion of cumulative causation theory 2.1.3 below. The latter emphasises 
the pitfalls of sustained reliance on primary production (and more recently on a 
“premature” reliance on services and on the rapid development of financial services 
in particular) (Prebisch 1950; Singer 1950; Palma 2005; Reinert 2008).  
 
However, the emerging classical development economics, and subsequent 
structuralist analysis, manifested a major. That is, it lacked an adequate theory of 
the relationship between society and the state, particularly in the light of the 
emphasis of economists such as Gerschenkron (1962) and Kuznets (1955) on the 
profound institutional change required for catch-up. Thus Gerschenkron 
paradoxically paid: 
 
too little attention to the domestic classes and groups whose interests the 
interventionist state must adequately incorporate if it is to play the central role 
required. Backwardness too easily becomes an alternative, technologically 
rooted explanation, distracting attention from the state rather than focusing 
upon its opportunities and constraints. 
(Fishlow 2008) 
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2.1.2 Structuralism and the role of the state in promoting industrialisation 
 
The role of the state in actively promoting industrialisation has long been 
intertwined with the concepts of infant industry protection and import substituting 
industrialisation (ISI) strategies. Protection, typically through tariffs, is required to 
allow nascent industries in relatively backward or developing countries the time to 
develop until they are able to compete against foreign rivals. The lineage of these 
arguments goes at least as far back as proponents of the need to protect domestic 
industries in order to catch up with Britain as the leading industrial economy of the 
19th century: Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List in the cases of the United States 
and Germany respectively. Substantial historical evidence has been amassed to 
demonstrate the extensive use of tariffs and other forms of state intervention in 
these cases of “early” catch-up with Britain by many of the now-industrialised North 
Atlantic economies (Chang 2002; Reinert 2008).  
 
An influential school of thought that emerged out of the Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) conceptualised the challenge of late 
industrialisation in terms of structural rigidities that straddled both the domestic 
and international division of labour. These structuralist economists highlighted the 
higher income elasticity of demand for manufactured products than for primary 
products, based on the well-known Engels curve. Whereas advanced economies 
specialised in manufacturing, developing economies were allegedly locked into an 
international division of labour in which they specialised in production of 
commodities for export. Developing countries thus faced a foreign exchange 
constraint to industrialisation with the imports of capital, intermediate and 
consumption goods required outweighing commodity exports. Furthermore, large-
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scale commodity exports led to currency appreciation which made manufactured 
exports less competitive: the “Dutch Disease” effect. In order to overcome these 
structural constraints developing countries such as those in Latin America required 
infant industry protection and other forms of industrial policy. ISI as a strategy for 
industrialisation was not conceptualised as import protection at all costs but 
envisaged a progression from import-replacement of consumer goods back to 
intermediate and capital goods followed by an export-oriented stage (Hirschman 
1968; Fine and Rustomjee 1996). 
 
A further limitation to reliance on primary commodity exports was a predicated 
long-term secular deterioration in their terms of trade relative to manufactures, as 
well as shorter periods of substantial instability (Prebisch 1950; Singer 1950). A 
“dependency” school took this line of reasoning further, questioning whether 
industrial development was indeed possible at all within this bifurcated 
international division of labour in which commodity producers were in a (possibly 
permanent) peripheral relationship to the core advanced nations (Blankenburg et 
al. 2008). The Prebisch-Singer thesis has been the subject of substantial debate. 
Whether and over what periods agricultural and other commodities demonstrate 
declining terms of trade relative to manufactures is an empirical question. 
Simplistically interpreted, the Prebisch-Singer thesis may have contributed to the 
neglect of agricultural output and exports in Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, 
which undermined their rural development, industrialisation and macro-economic 
stability in these countries Sender and Smith (1986)5. Over the 2000s there has been 
                                                        
5  While agricultural development in its earlier stages may represent diminishing returns under 
conditions of “disguised unemployment” anticipated by Lewis and Kaldor, there is statistical 
evidence that agricultural productivity at later stages is high (Szirmai et al. 2013) and indeed this is 
 64 
a long and sustained period of deterioration of the terms of trade of manufactures 
relative in particular to primary mineral and metal products over the “commodity 
super-cycle” largely due in particular to China’s massive demand for commodities 
induced by her export-led growth strategy (Kaplinsky 2006). More recently, the 
Engels curve has been raised as an argument against industrialisation, namely that 
services enjoy a higher income elasticity as incomes rise, relative to manufactures 
(Kaplan 2015a). A simplistic appeal to the Engels curve and Prebisch-Singer 
relationships thus provides only limited support for the primacy of industry “over” 
other sectors such as agriculture.  
 
From roughly the late 1970s, countries across a range of regions, including Latin 
America, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, experienced increasing difficulties in 
sustaining manufacturing growth, generating more rapid manufactured exports and 
deepening the capital goods sector. Structural limitations in delivering more rapid 
growth and socio-economic gains and associated macro-economic imbalances were 
criticised by both orthodox and heterodox critics (Khan and Blankenburg 2009). 
Macro-economic imbalances, particularly in relation to the balance of payments, 
rendered a range of developing countries particularly vulnerable to a series of 
external shocks from the late 1970s onwards. For a number of them that had 
accrued large-scale external debt, oil price and interest-rate shocks pushed them 
into debt crises. Difficulties in sustaining industrial growth in turn reflected a 
number of deficiencies with the classical and structuralist development economics 
on at which at least some countries had based their catch-up strategies. 
 
                                                        
consistent with Lewis’ hypothesis that transfer of labour from industry to agriculture will raise 
productivity in both sectors. 
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First, was a tendency to undue “export pessimism” both in relation to manufactures 
and primary commodities in the context of balance-of-payment constrained growth 
(Sender and Smith 1984, 1986; Thirlwall 2002). Second, industrial catch-up by 
developing country firms has been characterised as a process of expedited learning 
involving financing on the one hand and compulsions on the other, for firms to 
rapidly acquire intangible production, managerial and marketing skills (Amsden 
1989; 2001; Lall 1992). Successful cases of catch-up therefore involved a “reciprocal 
control mechanism” which provided conditional rents for learning (Amsden 1989, 
2001; Khan and Sundaram 2000; Lall 2004; Khan 2009). However, in the light of 
catch-up conceptualised as a process of expedited learning, there was an inadequate 
treatment of the relationship between the state and capitalist groups in the critical 
role of disciplining rents for catch-up. Thus: 
 
[S]tructuralist thinkers never properly addressed the issue that it is one thing 
to use trade and industrial policies to create rents to divert resources towards 
more ‘dynamic’ activities, but quite another for the state to have the 
institutional capabilities necessary to ensure that the capitalist elite uses those 
rents effectively. 
(Blankenburg et al. 2008: 6) 
 
As elaborated in Chapter 4, a dominant and enduring claim in scholarship is that 
apartheid industrialisation, drawing strong parallels with Latin America, reflected a 
case of ISI that had failed. This is notwithstanding a paucity of evidence of the 
influence of structuralist thinking on apartheid economic policy the coherent 
mobilisation of ISI as strategy in practice (Fine and Rustomjee 1996). This view has 
a powerful influence over post-apartheid trade and industrial policy and turned 
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scholarly attention away from the breadth and depth of a tradition of cumulative 
causation theory synthesised below. 
 
2.1.3 Cumulative causation theory 
 
The important yet overlooked theoretical tradition of cumulative causation theory, 
embodying both classical and structuralist insights, links the irreplaceable role of 
industrialisation in development to the dynamic productivity gains associated with 
manufacturing (Storm 2015). For Adam Smith (1776) manufacturing embodied a 
unique potential for realising increasing returns to scale due to its susceptibility to 
increasing specialisation of productive tasks, that is an increasing “division of 
labour”. However, increasing specialisation is itself subject to the extent to which 
there is sufficient demand for the disproportionate increases in outputs relative to 
inputs arising from an increasing division of labour (Smith 1776; Young 1928; 
Thirlwall 2002). Hence for Smith (1776: 7) “the division of labour depends on the 
size of the market but the size of the market depends on the division of labour”. 
Increasing returns are constrained by the extent of demand which in turn depends 
both on levels of domestic per capita income and the productivity levels necessary 
to tap the “autonomous” demand of export markets. Domestic per capita income is 
in turn an important influence on the economies of scale required to achieve 
increasing returns and to achieve productivity levels necessary to tap demand in 
export markets.  
 
Young (1928) resuscitated Smith’s insight arguing that increasing returns in 
manufacturing would initiate a non-equilibrating process of cumulative growth 
through increasing labour specialisation. Increasing returns is most likely in 
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manufacturing because, unlike primary sectors, it is subject both to scale economies 
in production and elastic demand for its output (Thirlwall 1983). Myrdal (1957) 
coined the term “circular and cumulative causation” to convey the tendency of 
unalloyed market forces to reinforce rather than narrow unequal development 
between regions. Relatively developed regions would benefit from pre-existing 
increasing returns arising from economies of agglomeration or “spread” effects, 
while underdeveloped regions’ backwardness would be reinforced by negative 
“backwash” effects leading to divergence rather than convergence. Drawing on 
Young (1928), Rosenstein-Rodan (1943, 1957) advocated a “big push” strategy, 
predicated on the idea that the combination of technological and pecuniary 
externalities would render increasing returns in a single industry unviable due to 
inadequate demand. Therefore, there would be a need to co-ordinate the 
establishment of multiple industries concurrently in order to internalise both 
technological and pecuniary externalities.  
 
Kaldor (1966, 1967) also gave pride of place to the role of the manufacturing sector 
as the “engine of growth” due to three “empirical regularities” accounting for 
differential growth rates across advanced economies, but also relevant to 
developing economies (Thirlwall 2002). First, the faster the rate of growth of 
manufacturing output, the faster the rate of growth of GDP due to a range of 
characteristics of manufacturing including strong backward and forward linkages, 
its unrivalled scope for capital accumulation and technological acquisition, and the 
realisation of economies of scale. Second, there is a strong causal relationship 
between the growth of manufacturing output and manufacturing labour 
productivity, also known as Verdoorn’s Law. This is posited to occur through 
processes including specialisation through the deepening of the division of labour, 
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investment in new technologies and learning by firms with domestic production of 
capital goods considered particularly important for technological progress and 
economies of scale (Storm 2015). Third, and echoing the Lewis (1954) model, rising 
manufacturing productivity raises productivity in other sectors as labour is 
transferred to the former without productivity loss in the latter. 
 
As summarised by Thirlwall: 
 
Increasing returns provides the basis of a cumulative process of 
economic growth based on trade, whereby increasing returns leads 
to greater competitiveness which leads to faster export growth. 
This in turn leads to faster output growth and faster productivity 
growth through the stimulus that faster output growth gives to 
capital accumulation and technical progress (including scale 
economies and learning by doing).  
(Thirlwall 1994: 63) 
 
A number of empirical studies are supportive of the cumulative causation 
hypothesis that manufacturing operates as the “engine of growth” through 
increasing returns. This is found for developing countries in general (Dasgupta and 
Singh 2005; Szirmai et al. 2013), African countries (Wells and Thirlwall 2003) and 
for South Africa specifically (Wittenberg 1997; Millin and Nichola 2005).6  
                                                        
6 Dasgupta and Singh (2005) also find that India’s software industry displays similar increasing 
returns to manufacturing and Szirmai et al. (2013) find evidence to suggest a relatively recent 
increase in agricultural productivity. This suggests that Kaldor’s laws should not be applied 
mechanistically and that parts of primary production and services may also embody increasing 
returns. 
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Albert Hirschman introduced wide-ranging and eclectic contributions to cumulative 
causation theory, most notably his concept of linkages. Hirschman’s (1981) method 
discouraged reliance on “high” theories of economic development processes based 
on “prime movers”, criticising both the assumption of emerging neoclassical growth 
theory that predicted convergence of per capita income through trade, and the lack 
of realism of “big push” models of state-led development. Rather he emphasised the 
identification of “efficient sequences” which had the potential to crowd in both 
technological and pecuniary externalities most notably the heuristic concept of 
linkages (Hirschman 1958). Backward linkages arise when domestic demand for a 
particular input or product is large enough to justify the minimum efficient scale of 
investment required. Forward linkage arises from the potential to stimulate 
investment using the inputs of a new investment project. For Hirschman, forward 
linkage was a weaker and more uncertain inducement. The strongest inducement 
would be provided by a “combined linkage effect” of both backward and forward 
linkage. Thus industrialisation could be spurred on by targeting intermediate and 
capital good sectors which had a strong mix of both forward and backward linkage, 
such as the steel and engineering sectors. For both Young and Hirschman, 
underdevelopment reflects the lack of dense networks of inter- and intra-industry 
linkages found in advanced economies. Thus the role of development policy is to 
“fill-in” these missing linkages, internalise externalities in production (increasing 
returns) and demand (pecuniary externalities) and in turn induce new ones that 
prompt further rounds of investment (Toner 1999).  
 
Hirschman further extended the notion of linkages beyond the initial 
conceptualisation of “production linkages” represented by backward and forward 
linkages. Of these “consumption linkages” would likely be the slowest and least 
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purposive, with encouragement to further economic activity more dispersed than 
production linkages and also embodying the potential to transmit effects that might 
slow further industrialisation, such as the encouragement of luxury imports 
(Hirschman 1981). “Fiscal linkages” can also arise, for instance where the state taxes 
certain sectors (like enclave mining) in order to promote others. Hirschman further 
developed the concept to reflect that linkages involve interlocking “economic” and 
“political” relationships. Thus Hirschman (1981) articulated a “generalized” or 
“micro-Marxist” approach to linkages. Using “staples” or commodities as the unit of 
analysis he argued that particular types of commodity production may be less or 
more viable or developmental depending on the prevailing “sociopolitical 
environment”, while the specificity of the commodities being produced will 
themselves condition social relations and hence the prospects for the types of 
economic linkage formation possible. Hirschman’s “generalized linkage” or “micro-
Marxist” approach thus reflects a shift from understanding cumulative causation 
largely in terms of economic multiplier and spillover effects to cumulative causation 
as a process involving a constant interaction between evolving “forces” and 
“relations” of production. It thus foreshadows more recent theories of political 
economy, discussed in Section 2.4, which by various routes have similarly arrived at 
the need for an integrated analysis of the economic and the political-institutional, 
located in the historical and material specificities of the economy being analysed. 
 
2.2 The neoliberal counter-revolution and contestation over the East 
Asian ‘miracle’ 
 
The difficulties experienced by a range of developing countries in sustaining 
industrialisation and raising manufacturing exports, uniformly dubbed import 
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substituting industrialisation (ISI), was increasingly contrasted by the ascendant 
neoliberal movement with an ostensible market-led export-oriented 
industrialisation (ESI) unfolding amongst the East Asian “‘miracle” economies. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, this narrative of virtuous market-based ESI contrasted with 
failed ISI was superimposed onto debates over South Africa’s transition, 
notwithstanding limited evidence of any coherent ISI strategy having been mounted 
under apartheid. 
 
Mounting neoclassical criticisms of inward-oriented development patterns 
identified extensive market distortions as the primary cause of these difficulties. 
Within this “market distortions” framework, it was contended that a range of 
policies that diverted product and factor markets from their market-determined 
outcomes created a series of systematic and anti-developmental biases. Tariffs, 
quotas and licences on imports acted as distortionary departures from static 
allocative efficiency. They discouraged more intensive use of abundant resources 
and factors of production, such as labour, and encouraged a disproportionately 
capital-intensive industrial structure (Little et al. 1970; Krueger 1974, Balassa 1982; 
Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1982). Capital markets were said to be subject to similar 
distortions known as “financial repression” the practice of keeping real interest 
rates artificially low and directing credit to sectors deemed strategic by state 
planners, preventing capital from being allocated to its most productive uses 
(Mckinnon 1973; Shaw 1973). Bolted on to this economic analysis was a crude set 
of “political economy” assumptions that distortions gave rise to widespread 
“directly unproductive” or “rent seeking” activities (Krueger 1974; Bhagwati and 
Srinivasan 1982). In the face of limited empirical evidence of large welfare losses 
due to static resource allocative inefficiency from rents, it was argued that the 
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magnitude of social waste represented by rents are magnified by the resources 
expended to secure them (Krueger 1974). To the extent that any “market failures” 
existed, these were likely to be outweighed by “state failures” (Kreuger 1974, 
1990a). Hence, for policy purposes “directly unproductive” activities or rents could 
be assumed to arise almost exclusively from state interventions in markets, be of 
significant scale and be axiomatically damaging to the economy.  
 
The emergence of a range rapidly growing East Asian economies, exhibiting 
particularly high rates of export growth, were initially trumpeted as successful 
examples of market-oriented policies in general and export orientation in particular. 
Virtuous East Asian economies were contrasted with the import substituting 
regimes of other regions with a particular contrast drawn with Latin America 
(Kreuger 1990b). Similar comparisons were drawn between South Africa (assumed 
to be much like Latin America) and East Asia (Holden 1992; Fallon and de Silva 
1994). 
 
However, mounting evidence from detailed studies of individual East Asian 
countries began to demonstrate that unprecedentedly high rates of growth and 
manufactured exports, far from being textbook examples of free-market policies, 
involved extensive state intervention. East Asian success reflected not the 
superiority of undistorted export-oriented markets, but the successful culmination 
of overlapping strategies of import replacement and promotion of exports (Amsden 
1989, 2001; Chang 1993; Wade 1990; Woo Cummings 1999). More generally, a 
range of countries that experienced rapid post-war progress with industrialisation 
and GDP growth over a sustained period of time were characterised by extensive 
state intervention (Amsden 2001).  
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Market versus state-based explanations for success and failure were brought to a 
head in the World Bank’s 1993 “East Asian Miracle” report, which sought to 
reconcile evidence of extensive intervention with market-oriented policies in 
general and export-oriented policies in particular (World Bank 1993). This involved 
intellectual gymnastics that sought to demonstrate that, rather than being a product 
of extensive state intervention, East Asian export-led success was a product either 
of non-interventionist policies or policies which “cancelled out” anti-export biases. 
The resulting argument that policy “simulated” non-distortionary market 
conditions represented an attempt to preserve a deeply compromised paradigm 
(Wade 1996). Despite mounting questions about the credibility of its scholarly basis, 
the international financial institutions continued to advocate a package 
“Washington Consensus” policies (Williamson 2009), whose key features included 
macro-economic stabilisation, liberalisation of product and factor markets, 
deregulation (especially of finance), privatisation and opening up to foreign direct 
ownership. 
 
The East Asian “miracle” debate posed challenges for both orthodox and heterodox 
scholarship. Neoclassical economics was compelled to revisit its extremely narrow 
economic assumptions centred on a market distortions framework, and to begin to 
engage with the importance of institutions in the economic development process. 
While cases of rapid catch-up involved extensive state intervention, this was only 
achieved by a relatively small number of countries. Heterodox economists, having 
demonstrated the extensive role of the state in successful catch-up in a range of east 
Asian economies in particular, were left with the problem of explaining how the 
introduction of, often formally similar, policy instruments in one context could have 
 74 
such vastly different outcomes in others. Shapiro argues that this indeterminacy was 
more damaging for heterodox than orthodox economics: 
 
The lack of a theory of the state was less problematic for 
neoclassical theory, which at least assumed that markets function 
and presupposed a minimal role for government. In contrast, the 
omission of the state as an explicit actor is a fundamental flaw in 
the development theorists’ argument, since they relied upon the 
state as an agent of change and presumed that it had the requisite 
political autonomy and administrative tools to carry out the task 
(Shapiro 2007: 2–3). 
 
2.3 Developments in orthodox and heterodox economics 
 
This section traces selected developments in orthodox and heterodox relevant to 
post-apartheid industrialisation, highlighting where these developments have 
influenced post-apartheid industrialisation debates and outcomes. First, it assesses 
the extent to which efforts within neoclassical economics to recognise the presence 
of selected market failures and imperfections and to incorporate the role of 
institutions has adequately addressed weaknesses in the canon. Second, it critically 
reviews the heterodox Developmental State paradigm. Third, it concisely reviews 
influential perspectives on the firm in late development. It contrasts the profound 
influence of the “principal-agent” theory of the firm in underpinning a “shareholder 
value revolution” that swept South Africa over the post-apartheid period with a 
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“capabilities-based” conceptualisation of the firm intrinsic to industrial catch-up 
through learning. 
 
2.3.1 From market distortions to market imperfections 
 
In response to both theoretical and empirical challenges “revisionist” neoclassical 
economists began to elaborate a “non-generalizable ‘second-best’ world full of 
market failures and replete with multiple equilibria” (Storm 2015: 686). Market 
failures or imperfections which might justify industrial policy intervention ranged 
over areas such as increasing returns to scale, Marshallian externalities, knowledge 
spillovers, coordination failures and information asymmetries. The existence of 
various market imperfections introduced, at least in theory, the case for state 
intervention in markets often seeking to reprise classical or structuralist arguments 
in neoclassical form. Information asymmetries may induce banks to ration credit to 
particular classes of borrowers (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). The existence of 
externalities and coordination failures was used to revive Rosenstein-Rodan’s Big 
Push argument (Murphy et al. 1989). Scale economies and imperfect competition 
create a potential rationale for strategic trade policy (Krugman 1987). Market 
imperfections have served to underpin a “post-Washington consensus” proposed by 
Stiglitz (1998) as a progressive theoretical advance while exerting a questionable 
impact on policy alternatives and advice by international financial institutions such 
as the World Bank (Fine 2001).  
 
There has been an influential application of market imperfections economics to 
industrial policy debates. Within this perspective industrial policy is cast as a 
reluctant but necessary choice with the state “doomed to choose” certain activities 
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rather than others due to circumscribed market failures (Hausmann and Rodrik 
2006). Industrialisation may be impeded by various appropriability problems, 
information asymmetries and coordination failures. There may be suboptimal 
investment in feasible new production opportunities due to the inability of the first 
investor to fully appropriate the gains form a newly identified market opportunity 
as new entrants rapidly erode profits. Thus temporary subsidisation may be 
required to overcome this appropriability problem analogous to time-bound rents 
embodied in patent protection. An asymmetric information problem arises between 
entrepreneurs with knowledge of a feasible production opportunity which may 
require such subsidisation or a complementary public good. To maximise prospects 
for success industrial policy should be conducted through processes of “self-
discovery” that reduce information asymmetries between potential investors and 
state officials, ideally freed from political interference (Hausmann and Rodrik 2003; 
Rodrik 2004, 2008, 2009). In a similar vein, albeit on a weaker conceptual footing, 
Lin’s (2012) “New Structuralist Economics” has added to this literature The 
recasting of old structuralist ideas in the new neoclassical garb of market 
imperfections represents an advance on the restrictive assumptions of the 
preceding market distortions framework. However, it remains subject to and 
reproduces major weaknesses of the neoclassical paradigm.7 These limitations are 
discussed in greater detail in relation to South African industrial policy debates in 
Chapter 4. 
 
                                                        
7 See Fine and Van Waeyenberge (2013) for a comprehensive critique of Lin (2012), and Wade 
(2012) for a more sympathetic reading of the “door-opening” impact of Lin’s contribution. 
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2.3.2 The New Institutional Economics 
 
A second major area of development in orthodox scholarship has been an evolving 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) effort to theorise links between the economic 
and the political-institutional in the economic development process. The NIE has 
drawn heavily on neoclassical economic assumptions applied to formal and informal 
institutional arrangements with a strong emphasis on the stability of property 
rights, individual rationality and optimisation, and market determined outcomes 
which minimise economic rents (Gray 2016). Coase’s theory of transaction costs has 
been transposed from firms to institutions, with economic development 
conceptualised as the transition from high to low transaction cost institutional 
arrangements, allowing for the more effective operation of markets in the process 
(Coase 1937, 2013; Williamson 1998). However, the transition from high to low 
transaction costs institutions is subject to fundamental problems of collective action 
in which organisations, often comprised of elites, may threaten the stability required 
for economic activity and prevent the transition to more politically inclusive 
institutional arrangements said to generate greater economic efficiency through 
processes of economic and political competition and innovation (North 1990, 1993; 
Olson 1993). 
 
While low political inclusivity, often characterised by collusive bargains between 
elites, may be important to ensure social stability and prevent the outbreak of 
violent conflict at low levels of development, it is an obstacle to higher growth 
(North et al. 2009). Thus development involves the transition from Limited access 
orders to Open access orders (North et al. 2009) or from Extractive (or Absolutist) to 
Inclusive (or Pluralistic) institutional arrangements (Robinson and Acemoglu 2012). 
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Open access or inclusive institutions are associated with western liberal democratic 
capitalism and conceptualised as both the cause and the consequence of economic 
development. Thus the NIE has thus served to underpin the idea that institutions 
associated with western liberal capitalist democracy are necessary for growth to 
take place (Gray and Khan 2010; Gray 2016).  
 
The conceptual framework provided by the NIE has in turn been used as the 
scaffolding for the policy prescriptions embodied in the “Good Governance” agenda 
advanced by the World Bank and other international development institutions. 
Three elements of the good governance agenda stand out. First, it emphasises the 
importance of the stability of property rights for a market economy to function. 
Second, it draws on old theories of rent seeking which asserts that state or politically 
created rents are necessarily likely to be welfare-reducing. Third it argues that 
democratic rights and institutions lower transaction costs through greater 
accountability (Gray and Khan 2010).  
 
Whereas a positive link between measures of good governance and growth have 
been asserted in a number of econometric studies these studies have been subject 
to substantial criticism on both empirical and conceptual grounds. The most 
fundamental critique is the direction of causation between “good” institutions and 
growth. Ostensibly poor institutions are manifest in both high and low growth 
developing countries. However, it is at least as plausible that the attainment of 
institutions associated with good governance in higher income countries, are the 
consequence rather than the cause of growth rather than the reverse (Gray and 
Khan 2010; Khan 2010; Sundaram and Chowdhury 2012). 
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A related “Varieties of Capitalism” (VOC) paradigm also takes on a number of the 
assumptions adopted by the NIE (Allen 2004), initially directed towards 
distinguishing institutional differences between advanced economies (Hall and 
Soskice 2001). The original distinction drawn by the VOC was of two distinct forms 
of capitalism amongst advanced economies, manifested by differences in 
institutional arrangements in industrial relations, corporate governance, firm 
rivalry, and forms of innovation. Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) such as the 
United States and the United Kingdom are said to be characterised by arms-length 
market oriented arrangements compared to the more co-operative relations said to 
prevail under Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) such as Germany and Japan 
(Hall and Soskice 2001). The VOC paradigm has been adopted with respect to 
developing countries with an associated proliferation of sub-categories and in turn 
specifically to South Africa (Nattrass and Seekings 2010; Nölke and Claar 2013). The 
VOC approach has been criticised on the grounds of its neglect of the generalised 
increase in influence of the financial sector, lack of attention to the state and non-
firm social actors, a limited appreciation of the manner in which developments in 
global capitalism influence the national, and excessive reliance on taxonomies of 
VOCs rather than detailed analysis of causation within specific economies (Ashman 
and Fine 2013).  
 
As argued in Chapter 4 the VOC and elements of the NIE have been inappropriately 
applied, either explicitly or informally, to characterise post-apartheid 
industrialisation as a collusive corporatist arrangement between business, labour 
and government “insiders” that prevents the entry of “outsiders” thus impeding 
markets from moving to a closer approximation of perfect competition. 
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2.3.3 The Developmental State paradox 
 
Evidence of the success of state-led industrialisation, particularly in a range of East 
Asian economies (Johnson 1982, Amsden 1989, Wade 1990, Woo-Cummings 1999), 
appeared at first to “solve” the heterodox problem of the absence of an explicit 
theory of state-society relations. For Amsden (1989, 2001) the defining feature of a 
Developmental State to systematically intervene to get relative prices “wrong” in 
relation to market-determined outcomes to advance industrialisation through 
“learning”. That is the expedited acquisition by firms of the managerial, production 
and logistical capabilities required to import, adapt and adopt existing commercial 
technologies. Central to disciplining the expedited acquisition of these capabilities 
was a “reciprocal control mechanism” that used various forms of rents both to 
reward success and punish failure. For Evans (1995) the ability of the state to 
credibly wield these instruments involves the cultivation of an “embedded 
autonomy” combining close relations between the state and industrialist groupings 
on the one hand with independence of the state to impose long term developmental 
policies. Institutional arrangement said to typify a Developmental State include the 
cultivation of a meritocratic elite and coordination if not imposition of a national 
plan by a pilot agency that sits at the apex of state decision making (Johnson 1999).  
 
These features said to define a Developmental State reflect an unresolved tension in 
the Developmental State literature between an “economic” school that focuses on 
the policies pursued in order to forge particular linkages in the economy and a 
“political” school that focuses on the characteristics of the state necessary to assert 
itself “autonomously” over social groupings (Fine and Rustomjee 1996; Fine 2010). 
However, the putative “autonomy” of the state lies at the heart of the weakness of 
 81 
the Developmental State paradigm as it conceives of the state as separable from 
class relations in society (Radice 2008). For instance, Chibber (2003) demonstrates 
how attempts by the post-independence Indian government to mobilise a 
programme of state-led industrialisation were vigorously and successfully opposed 
by domestic industrialists, notwithstanding the presence of a capable bureaucracy 
and a national planning agency. A primary cause of failure of state-led strategies of 
industrialisation hence arises from a mismatch between the balance of political 
forces in society and the mechanisms through which the state seeks to advance 
industrialisation (Di John 2009; Khan and Blankenburg 2009). 
 
As Fine and others argue (Fine 2010; Ashman et al. 2013a) there has been a 
particularly inappropriate rhetorical claim to Developmental State status in South 
Africa towards the end of the Mbeki presidency even as the state was in practice 
acting most unlike a Developmental State. 
 
2.3.4 Perspectives on the firm in late industrialisation 
 
Despite being the fundamental unit of capitalist development the nature and role of 
the firm in late industrialisation has often been neglected or relegated to implicit 
assumptions (Chandler 1992). Neoclassical economics assumed firms embodied 
some production function, without any initial theory of the firm or indeed why firms 
should exist as distinct from economic activity taking place through a mass of arm’s 
length transactions between individuals. Coase’s (1937) answer to this puzzle was 
that firms existed to minimise transaction costs and would form when it was 
cheaper to bind factors of production together than to procure them from the 
market. 
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Penrose (1959) initiated a paradigm for understanding the firm, entirely different 
from a neoclassical perspective. Contrary to the neoclassical assumption that firm 
size is determined by an underlying production function, she argued that firms 
comprise a bundle of productive resources which are mobilised by managers who 
perform both a coordination and entrepreneurial function, with no theoretical limit 
to the size of the firm. Chandler (1994) argues that large firms led the “third 
industrial revolution” in the North Atlantic economies and the US in particular.  
 
Building on the tradition of a resource-based or capabilities conception of the firm 
Amsden formulated a more complete theory of the firm in late development. Firms 
in late development are fundamentally engaged in a process of expedited learning 
in relation to existing technologies rather than the development of frontier 
technologies, until fairly late in a developing country’s development (Amsden 1989, 
2001). This involves the acquisition of capabilities or “knowledge-based assets” 
(Amsden 2001: 2). These knowledge-based assets comprise “a set of skills that 
allows its owner to produce and distribute a product at or above prevailing market 
prices (or below market costs)” (Amsden 2001: 3) straddling three main categories: 
 
… production capabilities (the skills necessary to transform inputs into 
outputs); project execution capabilities (the skills necessary to expand 
capacity); and innovation capabilities (the skills necessary to design entirely 
new products and processes). 
(Amsden 2001: 3 original emphasis) 
 
Despite the emphasis of neoclassical economics on small firms as the benchmark of 
economic activity, the large firm has been identified as a primary agent of expedited 
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late industrialisation. Large firms have played a fundamental, albeit far from 
identical, role in all cases of East Asian catch up: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Singapore and even in Hong Kong the ostensible “laisez faire” outlier and more 
recently China (Johnson 1982; Amsden 1989, 2001; Wade 1990, Nolan 2001, 
Studwell 2013; Milhaupt and Zheng 2014). Two important forms of large firms 
identified are large private diversified conglomerates (in Japan and South Korea in 
particular) and large public enterprises (in Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and 
China in particular). For Amsden (2009) there is also an innate superiority of 
domestic over foreign owned large firms for reasons ranging from policy 
sovereignty to their putative greater entrepreneurialism. A substantial literature 
has thus developed emphasising that the orientation and strategies of large firms 
are a major determinant of form and pace of growth in development (Chandler et al. 
1999; Amsden 2001; Chabane et al. 2006; Milhaupt and Zheng 2014) 
 
This raises the question of why large firms in particular countries and at particular 
conjunctures have played a central role in driving rapid catch up whereas in others 
(like South Africa) they have been associated with weak industrial performance and 
limited diversification. Late industrialisation associated with rapid technology 
acquisition by large firms have been linked to institutional arrangements that are 
very different from the “maximum competition” espoused by orthodox economics. 
Important factors have been a combination of state support or rents which help 
underpin the costs of technology acquisition, domestic rivalry in the form of 
dynamic oligopolistic competition combined with strong pressures to export 
(Amsden 1989, 2001; Amsden and Singh 1994; Nolan 2001; Chabane et al. 2006).  
The conceptualisation of firm as embodying a principal-agent “problem”, emerging 
from the finance literature, was said to arise from the separation of ownership and 
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control in modern joint stock companies. Inadequate incentives on management to 
make the most efficient investment decisions arose because of information 
asymmetries and the often dispersed nature of shareholders in turn inefficient 
capital allocation within the firm, and suboptimal returns which should flow to 
shareholders, allowing them to make more efficient investments elsewhere in the 
economy (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983). This principal-agent 
based theory of the firm has had a profound influence by providing the intellectual 
scaffolding for the “shareholder value revolution” and driving a shift in non-financial 
firms from a “productionist” focus on improving processes and products to a 
“financialised” orientation focussed on meeting the short-term expectations of 
shareholders (Froud et al. 2006). In a shift from an “antiquated” model of the 
diversified conglomerate, firms were pressed by institutional investors to focus on 
their “core competencies” and divest “non-core” businesses. The “market for 
financial control” needed to be deepened to allow for easier takeover of firms 
deemed to be financially underperforming, if necessary via hostile takeover. The 
interests of shareholders and managers were to be aligned through remuneration 
mechanisms that linked executive pay to share price performance and proportion 
of free cash flow that could be directed back to the shareholders. New “good 
corporate governance” arrangements emphasised mechanisms that would increase 
the information flow from investee firms to institutional investors and their 
influence through the ability to appoint non-executive directors. The shareholder 
value revolution, enjoying intellectual support from the principal-agent theory of 
the firm, has been deeply criticised as a fundamental part of the phenomenon of 
financialisation, involving the siphoning of potentially investable funds out of 
companies to shareholder across developed and developing economies alike (Singh 
1997; Lazonick and O’ Sullivan 2000; Krippner 2005; Crotty 2006; Singh et al. 2005; 
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Epstein 2006; Froud et al. 2006; Milberg 2008; Mohamed 2010; Studwell 2013; 
Lazonick 2015). 
 
The literature on alternate and evolving perspectives on the firm has important 
implications for industrialisation and specifically for this study. It suggests that large 
firms are a fundamental institution, if late industrialisation is to be expedited. There 
is substantial evidence to suggest that large firms in general and often large 
diversified conglomerates have been irreplaceable agents of rapid late 
industrialisation through economies of scale and scope (Johnson 1982; Amsden 
1989, 2001; Wade 1990, Nolan 2001, Studwell 2013; Milhaupt and Zheng 2014). 
However, it by no means follows that large firms automatically foster expedited 
catch-up or that there is any ideal form of the firm as an institution independent 
from the specific political economy in which it operates. Whereas the large 
diversified conglomerate was central to Japanese and South Korean 
industrialisation at a particular conjuncture, the “Global Big Business Revolution” 
has encouraged both scale and specialisation along value chains (Nolan 2001). This 
suggests that appeals to some or other “ideal type” of firm, other than emphasising 
the importance of scale, such as narrowly focussed versus diversified conglomerate 
or domestic versus foreign owned should not be applied mechanistically. Rather the 
impact on industrialisation of the agency of the firm in general, and large firms in 
particular, should be understood as depending on compulsions from product and 
factor markets in combination with those constructed by the state, in shaping its 
strategic orientation and the nature of industrial capabilities it develops under 
specific domestic and global conditions. 
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2.4 Modern theories of political economy and the dynamic relationship 
between the economic and the political-institutional 
 
The purposive review of the evolution of relevant elements of both orthodox and 
heterodox literature above, suggests that neither the New Institutional Economics 
nor the Developmental State Paradigm provide an adequate conceptualisation of the 
dynamic interaction between the economic and the political-institutional in the 
industrial development process. Rather an appropriate starting point for forging 
such a conceptual link can be traced from Marx’s emphasis on the dynamic 
interaction between the development of both the “forces of production” and 
“relations of production” in the emergence and evolution of capitalism. Thus Sender 
and Smith (1986) construe capitalist development in Africa in the following terms:  
 
The most significant of the long-term changes in sub-Saharan Africa … 
are the emergence of capitalist social relations of production and the 
development of the productive forces. The focus on relations and forces 
of production is derived from Marx’s analysis of the origins and 
development of capitalism, an analysis which stresses the interaction of 
social, political and economic processes. 
(Sender and Smith 1986: 1) 
 
As conveyed, arguably in excessively optimistic terms, by Hirschman: 
 
If one replaces—and this does not do undue violence to Marx’s thought—his 
“productive forces” and “relations of production” by economic and political 
factors, respectively, the representation of this process [of economic 
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development] is somewhat as follows: at any one historical stage, the economy 
functions within a given political and institutional framework; on the basis of 
and owing to this framework, economic forces left to themselves can achieve 
some forward movement, but beyond a certain point further development 
becomes more difficult and eventually is held back by the unchanging political 
framework which from a spur to progress turns into a “fetter”; at that point, 
political-institutional change is not only necessary to permit further advances, 
but is also highly likely to occur, because economic development will have 
generated some powerful social group with a vital stake in the needed changes. 
(Hirschman 1971: 13) 
 
However, the scope of analysis needs to be transposed from “the huge canvas on 
which Marx painted” such as the transition from feudalism to capitalism, “to smaller-
scale processes of economic-political development”, namely capitalist development 
itself (Hirschman 1971: 14). What is of relevance here, rather than Hirschman’s 
optimistic assumption that the “fetters” of a particular political-institutional 
configuration to economic progress would be likely to galvanise influential social 
groups to overcome these constraints, is the emphasis on the dynamic 
interdependency between them. Hirschman called this analysis of the detailed 
interaction between the economic and the political-institutional a “micro-Marxist” 
or “generalized linkage” approach (Hirschman 1981: 183)  
 
I argue that a group of modern theories of political economy, each emphasising the 
dynamic interdependency between Marx’s “forces” and “relations” of production, 
echo Hirschman’s advocacy of a “micro-Marxist” or “generalized linkage” approach 
and provide more meaningful insights than those articulated by either the New 
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Institutional Economics or the Developmental State paradigm. Three modern 
theories of political economy are concisely elaborated: a “systems of accumulation” 
approach; a “political settlements” framework and related “elite bargains” model 
including a critical assessment of the manner in which they have been taken up in 
practice. In doing so the objective is less to seek out a single framework with a 
perfect explanatory “goodness of fit” than to identify aspects of prevailing 
approaches that may be useful for accounting for disappointing post-apartheid 
industrialisation.  
 
A systems of accumulation framework has emerged as a more generalised 
exposition of Fine and Rustomjee’s (1996) characterisation of a unique South 
African form of industrialisation as a Minerals-Energy-Complex (MEC). The MEC 
comprises a set of sectors spanning mining, energy and various heavy industries 
with strong input-output linkages between them and weaker linkages with other 
manufacturing sectors. It concurrently reflects an evolving set of relations between 
large-scale private capital, the state, state-owned enterprises and increasingly over 
the post-apartheid period: finance. This evolving sectoral structure and set of social 
relations is said to have impeded the development of a more dynamic and 
diversified manufacturing sector (Fine and Rustomjee 1996; Ashman and Fine 
2013; Ashman et al. 2013a). The conceptualisation of the MEC, as elaborated in 
Chapters 3 and 4, as part of a broader but loosely articulated systems of 
accumulation approach, emerged in part from a critique of the appropriateness of 
the rapidly proliferating Developmental State literature as a suitable frame for 
analysing apartheid industrialisation and post-apartheid policy options. It also 
emerged from a rejection of the projection onto the South African economy of 
inappropriate generalising templates whether of orthodox or heterodox origin. In 
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particular, the characterisation of apartheid industrialisation as a case of “failed 
import substituting industrialisation” and associated exaggeration of the role of 
trade policy has crowded out a more detailed historical analysis demonstrating that 
state owned enterprises (SOEs) played a more determining role in shaping 
apartheid industrialisation (Fine and Rustomjee 1996; Ashman et al. 2013a).  
 
Relatively recently some more generalised features of a systems of accumulation 
approach have been set out. 
 
We seek to marry abstract laws and tendencies of capitalist development with 
the analysis of specific class relations, social formations, and their many 
concrete determinations. Whilst capital has powerful tendencies which 
universalise features of development, these never settle nor are they 
reproduced in exactly the same way in concrete social formations. Analysis 
needs therefore to trace the particular historical development and articulation 
of capitalist relations.  
(Ashman et al 2013: 245) 
 
Particular emphasis is placed on the need to integrate: 
 
1. different spatial scales of analysis in a manner which recognises that 
national capital relations are conditioned by global capital relations, but 
that they also contribute to and are constitutive of the global whole; 
2. economic and political analysis (including the state) through emphasis 
on evolving class relations and conflicts and how these are reflected in 
patterns of accumulation and economic and social reproduction; 
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3. the role played by finance and its impact on class formation; 
4. labour into the analysis through foregrounding understanding of capital 
as a social relation. 
(Ashman et al 2013: 245) 
 
The MEC has established itself as the primary understanding within economic 
historiography of how apartheid industrialisation took place and the leading 
alternative conceptual framework to orthodox approaches to the post-apartheid 
economy (Freund 2010). However, its use has sometimes slid into uncritical, 
contradictory or even otiose adoption. One remarkable conclusion drawn by a long-
standing advocate of the MEC paradigm, particularly in the light of the emphasis of 
its more financialised post-apartheid form, is Padayachee’s assertion that industrial 
diversification is not an appropriate strategy for South Africa, but rather that the 
country should pursue a strategy based on the further development of both finance 
and its minerals and energy sectors (Hart and Padayachee 2013)!8 For Bond the 
minerals-energy-complex is reflective of a “sub-imperialist” form of an “eco-
destructive, consumerist-centric, over-financialised, climate-frying 
maldevelopment model” (Bond 2013: 266).  
 
A political settlements approach has arisen in significant part as a response to the 
“Good Governance” agenda with its intellectual roots in the New Institutional 
Economics (NIE). It has also, however, been critical of the Developmental State 
paradigm. “Good Governance”, that is a generalised set of institutions regardless of 
                                                        
8 “Rather than return to a mid-century model of industrial development, South Africa’s (and Africa’s) 
economic future lies with services, including finance, along with communications, transport, 
construction, energy and minerals” (Hart and Padayachee 2013: 81). 
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a country’s level of development, is advocated based on the NIE idea that 
competitive institutions associated with the developed western economies led to 
competitive markets and hence to economic development. By contrast Khan and 
others argue that late industrialisation was expedited by institutions of “Growth-
enhancing Governance” (Khan and Sundaram 2000; Khan and Blankenburg 2009; 
Khan 2009, 2010; 2013; Gray and Khan 2010; Gray and Whitfield 2014). While late 
industrialisation is not an automatic process and requires active involvement of the 
state to promote structural transformation from low to high productivity sectors 
“Growth-enhancing Governance” parts way with the Developmental State Paradigm 
on the grounds that formally similar state policies and institutions (in countries such 
as Pakistan and South Korea) have had manifestly different outcomes.  
 
Late industrialisation involves the expedited acquisition of capabilities to master the 
often tacit knowledge embodied in pre-existing technologies and capital equipment, 
that is to say it is a process of learning. For Amsden such capabilities involve the 
acquisition of “knowledge-based assets” (Amsden 2001: 2). These knowledge-based 
assets comprise “a set of skills that allows its owner to produce and distribute a 
product at or above prevailing market prices (or below market costs)” (Amsden 
2001: 3) straddling three main categories: 
 
… production capabilities (the skills necessary to transform inputs into 
outputs); project execution capabilities (the skills necessary to expand 
capacity); and innovation capabilities (the skills necessary to design entirely 
new products and processes). 
(Amsden 2001: 3 original emphasis) 
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Rents, provided in various forms by the state, are necessary to finance this process 
of expedited learning or acquisition of capabilities. However, these rents need to be 
embodied in a “reciprocal control mechanisms” in order to enforce and discipline 
firm effort in the expedited acquisition of the necessary capabilities (Amsden 1989; 
2001). Critical determinants of whether the state is able to mobilise credible and 
effective reciprocal control mechanisms are the prevailing “political settlement” and 
the consistency of industrial policy with this settlement. A political settlement is 
effectively the distribution of power amongst various groups within society, 
reflected in both formal and informal institutional arrangements (Khan 2010). The 
distinguishing feature of countries that have managed to achieve expedited 
industrialisation has been the compatibility of their industrialisation strategies with 
their prevailing political settlements (Khan and Sundaram 2000; Khan and 
Blankenburg 2009).  
 
The primary concern of the political settlements framework, as originally conceived 
by Khan, are the processes through which rents accrued as part of the accumulation 
process are channelled towards productive investments and acquisition of 
technological capabilities in manufacturing, that is to say industrialisation. (Khan 
and Sundaram 2000; Di John 2009; Khan and Blankenburg 2009; Gray and Whitfield 
2014). However, much subsequent adoption of the concept has profoundly watered 
down the centrality of industrialisation to development. For instance, very 
substantial research output of two research programmes which use the concepts 
political settlements and elite bargains extensively: the Political Settlements 
Research Programme (PSRP) and the Developmental Leadership Program (DLP) 
numbering some 177 combined publications contains virtually no reference to 
industrialisation. Industrialisation is also largely absent from major surveys of the 
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burgeoning political settlements literature (Ingram 2014; Sen 2013; Laws 2012). 
This de-emphasis of industrialisation is similarly evident in recent, and I argue 
severely limited, applications of a political settlements framework to South Africa 
(Levy 2014; Levy et al. 2015). 
 
The effectiveness of state strategies and associated rents to foster technological 
learning is also intimately bound up with two additional processes: securing 
political stability and processes of primitive accumulation. Stable political 
settlements are said to be dependent on bargains between elites with state 
formation emerging as coalitions of elites (Di John and Putzel 2009). 
 
Looking at the political settlement focuses attention on intra-elite 
contention and bargaining … on contention and bargaining between 
elites and non-elites … inter-group contention and bargaining … and on 
contention and bargaining between those who occupy the state and 
society more widely.  
(Di John and Putzel 2009: 4) 
 
Securing political stability and associated processes of primitive accumulation 
mediated by the state often involve rents and income transfers which may fall on 
either side of the boundary of legality. These processes are subject to varying forms 
of clientelist networks which may render certain types of strategies to foster 
technological learning extremely difficult or even impossible (Di John 2009; Di John 
and Putzel 200). 
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2.5 Conclusions 
 
This Chapter has sketched out a number of major shifts in post-war development 
economics with two main objectives. Firstly, to highlight how shifts in development 
economics have influenced South African industrialisation debates and policies. 
This influence has been uneven and sometimes involved the projection of 
inappropriate and even caricatured ideas onto South African reality. Secondly, to 
identify an appropriate conceptual lens through which to understand the post-
apartheid corporate and industrial restructuring of the steel and engineering 
sectors and their broader implications. 
 
Informed heuristically by Hirschman’s approach of “micro-Marxist” or “generalized 
linkages” analysis, a three-pronged political-economy framework is set out. It 
identifies a “golden thread” of cumulative causation theory that remains relevant to 
contemporary industrialisation, but mindful of its weaknesses. A conception of the 
firm in late development is advanced that emphasise the compulsions from both 
markets and states in shaping its strategic orientation and the nature of industrial 
capabilities it develops. Modern theories of political economy are drawn upon that 
forge a link between the economic and the political-institutional. This framework is 
applied to illustrate how the bargains struck over South Africa’s transition from 
apartheid to democracy have shaped post-apartheid economic policy and 
institutions in ways that have fundamentally undermined fixed investment and 
industrial dynamism and diversification.   
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Chapter Three 
The skewed development of steel and engineering under 
apartheid 
 
By 1989 South Africa had developed a steel industry of global scale. Iscor was the 
15th largest steel group internationally in production terms, excluding the socialist 
economies, accounting for 1.3% of global steel exports (Iscor 1989). However, the 
South African engineering sector entered the 1990s underdeveloped and 
vulnerable, having failed to overcome long-standing weaknesses notably to 
meaningfully develop exports. Engineering value added and employment in 1990 
were respectively 23% and 30% lower than the sector’s peak in 1981 (Quantec 
Research n.d.). Steel and engineering production had become increasingly 
consolidated under a nexus of control of three business groups. State-owned Iscor 
and the two largest private conglomerates: Anglo American and Rembrandt 
accounted for over 90% of steel production, 32% of engineering turnover and 38% 
of engineering assets by 1990 (Rustomjee 1993). As elaborated in Chapter 4, 
apartheid industrialisation has conventionally been linked to structuralist economic 
thought as a specific case of a more general pattern of failed post-war import 
substitution industrialisation (ISI). The development of steel and engineering under 
apartheid set out in this chapter is, however, more consistent with the contention 
that conglomerate growth reflected a strategic orientation towards fixed investment 
in mining and heavy industries such as steel with SOEs such as Iscor playing a 
dominant role. Tariff and competition policy served to promote the growth of 
conglomerate engineering subsidiaries through acquisition rather than net new 
investment, rather than to develop engineering sector growth and exports. This 
reading implied the need for a post-apartheid strategy for the re-orientation and 
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development of engineering, rather than faith that a more dynamic engineering 
sector would automatically arise from extensive trade liberalisation and a freer 
operation of the “market for corporate control”. 
 
This chapter outlines the development of South African steel and engineering from 
the early twentieth century to the end of the apartheid era. Section 3.1 traces the 
mining roots of South Africa’s nascent steel and engineering industry and the 
emergence of state-owned enterprises such as steel-maker Iscor as fundamental to 
subsequent industrialisation in the context of economic dominance by English 
mining capital amid rising Afrikaner political and economic ambitions. It also 
describes the war-time boost to engineering. Section 3.2 sketches the post-war 
development of the steel and engineering sectors, highlighting developments in 
steel as illustrative of broader processes of conflict and compromise between 
Afrikaner political and English economic power that gave rise to increasing 
integration of private capitals and of these private capitals with state-owned 
enterprises. Section 3.3 reflects how the steel and engineering sector became 
increasingly concentrated under the control of a nexus of three business groups –
Iscor, Anglo American and Rembrandt – by the early 1980s. It describes Iscor’s 
growth highlighting its increasing autonomy from the state over the 1980s. Anglo 
American’s growth through fostering and absorbing investments in heavy 
industries like steel and other ferrous metals and growth through acquisition in 
sectors like engineering is traced. So too is Rembrandt’s growth through acquisition, 
including in engineering, as it shifted towards an increasingly financial orientation 
from the late 1980s. The development of three major conglomerate engineering 
subsidiaries: Scaw, Boart and Dorbyl are indicative of both the acquisition of 
significant technological capabilities as well as fundamental weaknesses reflected in 
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a particular failure to diversify and more fully develop exports. Section 3.5 attributes 
this failure to the subordinate position occupied by engineering subsidiaries within 
conglomerate accumulation strategies, the failure or inability of the state to deploy 
instruments such tariffs as part of any broader strategy for the development and 
diversification of engineering, and the permissive role of competition policy in 
easing growth through acquisition rather than net new investment. Section 3.6 
concludes however, that these weaknesses were not reflected in the outcome of the 
battle of ideas and articulation of interests, as discussed in Chapter 4, that shaped 
post-apartheid policy. 
 
3.1 Development of the steel and engineering sectors over the first half 
of the twentieth century 
 
3.1.1 The inter-war development of the steel and engineering sectors 
 
The discovery of diamonds near Kimberley in 1870 and gold on the Witwatersrand 
in 1886 initiated a process of mining and mining-linked capitalist development that 
has fundamentally shaped South African industrialisation (Innes 1984, 2007; Clark 
1994, Fine and Rustomjee 1996; Chabane et al. 2006). Demand from mining 
provided the major stimulus to manufacturing in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, with a range of backward linkages formed to supply the mining 
sector (Innes 1984; Fine and Rustomjee 1996; Chabane et al. 2006). Privately owned 
steel operations emerged for the processing of steel scrap, of which the South 
African Railways (SAR) was the largest source. The United Steel Corporation (Usko) 
was established in 1911 as a consequence of being awarded a contract for 
processing rail scrap (Clark 1994). Mining also generated a range of consumption 
linkages for the provision of consumer goods.  
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Organic development of nascent steel and engineering production gave way to South 
Africa’s first state-led efforts to promote industrialisation in the mid-1920s, with 
two related objectives. First to diversify the economy from its overwhelming 
reliance on gold mining. Second to address the “poor white problem”, namely to 
stimulate the creation of “civilised” jobs for a pool of rapidly urbanising, unskilled 
whites who were being displaced from agriculture (Clark 1987, 1994). Substantial 
prominence has been given to the role of tariffs in this industrialisation drive, 
embodied by the introduction of the 1925 Tariff Act by the recently formed Pact 
government (for example Lipton 1986; Feinstein 2005), in place from 1924 to 1933. 
However, the establishment of state-owned enterprises were at least as important 
and arguably more decisive in shaping the long-term trajectory of South African 
industrialisation (Clark 1994; Fine and Rustomjee 1996). The state-owned South 
African Railways and Harbours had been established in 1910 and an “electric kick-
start” given to mining and heavy industry by the establishment in 1923 of the state-
owned Electricity Supply Commission (Escom) (Christie 1984). 
 
Under the South African Party government of 1919 to 1924, President Jan Smuts had 
actively sought to promote the establishment of modern large-scale steel 
production. English mining capital resisted such a step on the grounds that it would 
raise costs relative to imported British and continental steel. So too did established 
British trading and engineering interests. This mirrored the opposition by the 
private electricity producer, the British-owned Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power 
Company (VFTPC), to the establishment of a state-owned electricity company (Clark 
1987, 1994). Ultimately the failure to attract private investors to such a costly 
project strengthened the case for state investment. Thus the Pact government 
passed the Iron and Steel Act in 1928, enabling the establishment of the South 
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African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation: Iscor. Iscor’s first plant came into 
production in Pretoria in 1934 becoming the leading supplier of rails for South 
Africa's rapidly growing railroad network and producing 17% of the country's steel 
requirements by 1935 (Clark 1994). 
 
However, the establishment of Iscor proved to be less supportive of either of the two 
objectives upon which it was justified to a white electorate: to provide low cost steel 
to boost industrialisation and as a major source of direct employment for white 
“civilised” labour. Iscor’s first chairman Hendrik Van der Bijl, who was also chairman 
of Escom, was compelled to enter into market-sharing agreements with the 
dominant British and European steel trading cartel. This arrangement guaranteed 
the cartel high profits in exchange for securing Iscor around one-third of the South 
African market, but failed to deliver low cost steel hindering engineering 
development. Van der Bijl also pursued a policy of employing black instead of white 
labour as far as politically possible to offset Iscor’s very high capital costs. Joint 
ventures between Iscor and private engineering and trading interests, and later with 
Anglo, would form the basis for deepening collaboration over the post-war period 
(Clark 1994; Fine and Rustomjee 1996). 
 
3.1.2 The rise of Afrikaner economic ambitions over the 1930s and the 
wartime boost to engineering 
 
The dominance of the economy by English capital was a source of deep resentment 
amongst white Afrikaner elites and working classes. By the end of the Great 
Depression most Afrikaners were “poor white” urban workers or small-scale 
farmers while mining and industrial ownership was concentrated in the hands of 
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English capital (Lipton 1986; O'Meara 1983, 1996). A number of significant 
Afrikaner capitalist groups emerged over the inter-war period including Anglovaal 
in mining and Sanlam and Santam in finance, but remained weak relative to English 
capital. From 1934, the secretive Afrikaner Broederbond (Fraternity) began to 
promote a twin-pronged strategy of securing both “Afrikaner economic 
empowerment” and political power. This movement culminated in an Ekonomiese 
Volkskongres (Economic People’s Congress) in 1939 to generate a strategy for the 
upliftment of white Afrikaners, under the slogan of Reddingsdaad (Act of rescue) 
with an increasing emphasis on the need to build up large-scale Afrikaner capital to 
countervail the weight of English oligopolies in mining, finance and industry 
(O’Meara 1983). The economic consequence of the Reddingsdaad movement was 
“the expansion of Afrikaner investment companies led by Sanlam, and including 
Santam, Federale Volksbelegings, Saambou, Bonuskor and Rembrandt, as well as the 
growth of Afrikaner business in manufacturing, commerce and trade” (Innes 1984: 
55). The apex of the Reddingsdaad movement was to mobilise Afrikaners to deliver 
a whites only post-war electoral victory to the National Party in 1948.  
 
The Second World War provided a significant boost to manufacturing. Engineering 
benefited in particular from disruptions to British and European imports which 
encouraged both import replacement and exports. Demand for South Africa’s 
primary minerals and agricultural products grew as did exports of armaments and 
steel products. Between 1939 and 1945 manufacturing overtook mining and 
agriculture for the first time as the largest sector of the economy contributing 17% 
to GDP (Innes 2007: 56). Iscor’s new Pretoria steelworks fed into a large-scale 
expansion of engineering oriented to wartime production needs. 
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Out of these wartime facilities came aircraft hangars, bridges, 
travelling cranes, barges, rock drills, pumps and valves, electric 
motors, transformers, field hospital equipment, ships’ stores for 
the British Admiralty, thousands of kilometres of telephone and 
telegraph wire for the signal services  
(Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa 
2003: 7). 
 
Iscor continued to expand during the course of the Second World War. It 
commissioned a heavy plate mill in 1943 and began construction of a greenfield 
integrated steel works and flat products mill at Vanderbijlpark in 1947 which would 
be the largest site of its future expansion (South African Iron and Steel Institute n.d.). 
 
3.2 Steel and engineering as a site of conflict and compromise between 
English economic and Afrikaner political power 
 
3.2.1 The 1940s and 1950s: rising Afrikaner economic power increasingly 
intertwined with English capital  
 
The National Party (NP) electoral victory in 1948 formally ushered in apartheid and 
established the political conditions to give far greater effect to Afrikaner economic 
ambitions.  
 
Now that the Afrikaner movement had control of the state, its 
leaders were able to use state power, not only to subdue black 
political opposition, which was mounting, but also to break the 
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economic domination of the English oligopolies, especially in 
mining, finance and industry (Innes 2007: 55–56). 
 
Black political resistance to the legal entrenchment of racist discrimination and 
white privilege was bolstered by the rapid growth of a black urban proletariat and 
black trade unions during the Second World War and increasing radicalisation 
within the African National Congress (ANC). The mass resistance movement that 
emerged over the 1950s was subjected to brutal suppression, exemplified by the 
Sharpeville massacre of 1960 and subsequent banning of the ANC and the Pan 
Africanist Congress (PAC), creating conditions amenable to accumulation based on 
further mining and industrial expansion (Innes 2007). 
 
A consolidation of Afrikaner capital and increasing interdependence between the 
state and English capital was forged over the 1950s. The state promoted Afrikaner 
financial capital inter alia through placing virtually all state financing with Afrikaner 
financial institutions with three large private Afrikaner groups in particular 
emerging over the post-war period: Volkskas, Sanlam and Rembrandt. The 
expansion of Escom’s electrical capacity was used to bolster Afrikaner capital in 
mining. Federale Mynbou, a subsidiary of Sanlam was a major beneficiary of state 
support through awards of rail capacity, export licences and coal contracts to supply 
newly built Escom power stations. Federale Mynbou subsequently gave rise to 
Gencor, one of the largest conglomerate groups by the end of apartheid (O’Meara 
1983). 
 
Over most of the post-war period, Afrikaner interests in the steel sector were 
represented chiefly by state owned enterprises: initially by Iscor, supplemented 
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over later decades by the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) established in 
1939. In addition to Iscor’s immediate post-war expansion completed in 1953, 
major expansions were undertaken at Vanderbijlpark between 1964 and 1968 
(South African Iron and Steel Institute n.d.). These expansions overlapped with the 
establishment and expansion of a range of other state owned enterprises including 
Sasol (petrochemicals) and Foskor (phosphates), both established in 1951 (Clark 
1994). 
 
The establishment and expansion of state-owned enterprises from the 1950s served 
the overlapping roles of advancing the interests of Afrikaner capital and white 
labour while deepening the interdependency between English mining capital and 
the state. By 1950 extensive linkages between state-owned enterprises and private 
capital had already been established, including between Iscor and Anglo. The 
English-dominated mining industry was already reliant on Escom for the provision 
of cheap electricity, with Anglo having funded Eskom’s acquisition of its erstwhile 
rival the Victoria Falls Power Company in 1946. By 1960 Eskom’s two largest 
customers were Anglo and Iscor, while Anglo was Eskom’s largest coal supplier. 
Anglo had also been Iscor’s largest coal supplier since 1946 upon acquiring the 
African and European Investment Corporation. Joint ventures between Iscor and 
Anglo included co-investment in the Union Steel Corporation, African Metals and the 
Vanderbijl Engineering Corporation (Vecor) heavy engineering joint venture (Clark 
1994, 2014). The establishment of the National Finance Corporation (NFC) in 1949 
by the state, channelling short-term funds into long-term debt, was essential for the 
massive Orange Free State goldfields expansion spearheaded by Anglo (Fine and 
Rustomjee, 1996). 
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3.2.2 The 1960s: steel and engineering as the site of conflict and 
compromise between English economic and Afrikaner political 
power 
 
However, resentment simmered amongst Afrikaner elites over the control of the 
economy by English capital, particularly the dominant role of Anglo. The steel and 
engineering sectors became a primary site of these tensions as Anglo entered the 
1960s seeking opportunities to invest the large cash surpluses it had derived over 
the 1950s from its lucrative expansion into the Orange Free State goldfields. The 
manner in which Anglo and other corporates redeployed their profits in the South 
African economy from the 1960s would be instrumental in the industrial and 
corporate structure that emerged by the end of apartheid, and was shaped by a 
confluence of factors. The state had put in place capital controls to deal with 
intermittent balance of payments crises of both a political and economic nature. 
Notwithstanding these restrictions conglomerates found mechanisms to build up 
significant offshore holdings such as Anglo’s Minorco and Rembrandt’s external 
tobacco interests. However, the bulk of its capital was “trapped” in South Africa, 
compelling the private conglomerates to seek out domestic investment 
opportunities. In addition to fixed investment expansions in mining and heavy 
industry in particular, opportunities arose to acquire the interests of exiting foreign 
direct investors as global opprobrium towards apartheid mounted (Fine and 
Rustomjee 1996). 
 
Anglo’s decision in 1964 to establish its large-scale Highveld Steel and Vanadium 
project was seen as deeply threatening to Iscor. As part of its efforts to contest 
Anglo's influence in steel-consuming engineering industries and promote Afrikaner 
private ownership in the sector, Iscor established an investment company, Metkor, 
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in 1969 which in turn established holdings in a range of engineering companies.9 
The planned Highveld project precipitated a 1965 state-sanctioned enquiry into the 
influence of Anglo on the South African economy under President Verwoerd (Innes 
1984; Feinstein 2005). Cross (1994) demonstrates that this enquiry was both 
initiated by, and conducted through, the offices of Iscor itself led by its commercial 
manager, Piet Hoek.10 In a deeply symbolic gesture to placate mounting Afrikaner 
antagonism, Anglo sold a controlling share in its General Mining and Finance 
Corporation in 1966 to Sanlam subsidiary, Federale Mynbou. Verwoerd’s successor 
Vorster also compromised, rejecting the recommendations of the “Hoek Report” in 
favour of strengthening ties between the internationally embattled apartheid state 
and English big business (Giliomee1992; Cross 1994).11 This was in part because 
the apartheid state felt it needed Anglo’s support to further its ambitions for defence 
investment through Armscor, established in 1967 to counteract international 
sanctions on arms sales to South Africa (McCarthy 1999). The accommodation 
between Iscor and Anglo is reflective more broadly of an understanding forged 
between, and intertwining of, large-scale English and Afrikaner private and public 
capital which inter alia reflected the side-lining of smaller scale Afrikaner capital 
and its potential voice in advocating policies more favourable to the development of 
sectors outside of heavy industry (Fine and Rustomjee 1996; O’Meara 1996). 
 
The “collusive alliance” between Iscor and Anglo had fundamental implications for 
the further development of the steel and engineering sectors (Cross 1994). In steel 
                                                        
9 These included Wispeco, African Gate and Tube & Pipe Industries (Cross 1994: 92). 
10 Hoek was a member of the secretive Afrikaner Broederbond (Brotherhood) society and stood on 
the verkrampte (conservative) side of Afrikaner nationalism with a deep suspicion of the dominant 
role of Anglo in the economy (Cross 1994). 
11 Ultimately the “Hoek Report” was shelved and whatever recommendations it made never released 
to the public (Cross 1994; Innes 2007). 
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Anglo agreed to focus Highveld’s capacity on product lines complementary to rather 
than in competition to Iscor’s, that is, heavy sections rather than plate. These 
developments formed the basis for oligopolistic control of the domestic steel 
industry that would subsequently be deepened. The intertwining of Iscor and Anglo 
interests in engineering were further stimulated by government concerns over the 
future of South African subsidiaries of the British Steel Corporation (BSC) after the 
latter was renationalised by the incoming Labour Government in 1967. Anglo was a 
major shareholder in a number of BSC's South African engineering subsidiaries. A 
joint venture – International Pipes and Steel Investment South Africa (IPSA) – was 
established between Anglo and Iscor (via Metkor) to take over BSC's South African 
subsidiaries “which in turn controlled roughly 60 other companies” (Cross 1994: 
94) representing many of the country’s major steel-consuming engineering 
companies.  
 
These included major shareholdings in some South African companies, 
including a 100% holding in Baldwins, the second largest steel merchant 
in South Africa, a 49% holding in Stewarts & Lloyds, the biggest South 
African manufacturer of tubes and pipes, and a 43% interest in Dorman 
Long (Africa), South Africa’s biggest structural engineering company. 
(Cross 1994: 93)  
 
Thus, by the late 1960s, Iscor and Anglo had established their overwhelming 
dominance over the domestic steel industry and jointly represented the largest 
single presence in steel-consuming engineering companies. This nexus, in which 
Rembrandt would become a major participant, would be strengthened over the 
subsequent decades.  
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Other independent steel and ferrous metals companies also emerged or grew over 
the 1960’s. They included the Cape Gate Group, producing a range of wire products, 
the RMB Alloys ferrochrome project and Southern Cross Steel producing stainless 
steel (Fine and Rustomjee 1996; South African Iron and Steel Institute, n.d.). With 
the exception of Cape Gate these would subsequently be absorbed into 
conglomerate structures involving Anglo shareholding. 
 
3.3 The evolution of Iscor, Anglo and Rembrandt’s over the 1970s and 
1980s  
 
3.3.1 Evolution of Iscor 
 
Iscor embarked on a massive expansion programme between 1973 and 1977, 
introducing tensions with the state over how this expansion would be financed. It 
expanded its Vanderbijlpark works, erected a new integrated steel plant at 
Newcastle and simultaneously embarked on a massive expansion of its largest iron 
ore mining deposits located in Sishen in the Northern Cape. This source of high 
quality iron was to be unlocked both for Iscor’s own steel production and to boost 
foreign exchange through the export of iron ore. National steel production, driven 
preponderantly by Iscor and Highveld expansions, more than doubled between 
1967 and 1989 from under 4 million tonnes per annum (mtpa) to over 9mtpa 
(Figure 3.1). 
 
 108 
Figure 3.1: South African and Iscor crude liquid steel production (millions of 
tonnes per annum), 1967–1989 
Sources: Author’s calculations based on International Iron and Steel Institute (various years), Iscor 
Annual Reports (various years), World Steel Association (various years). 
 
The estimated costs of Iscor’s expansion programme represented about 7.7 times 
its annual average sales revenue (of R323m) and 227 times its average profit (of 
R11m) over the three-year period 1971-1973. This excluded the cost of constructing 
over 800km of rail line to transport the iron ore from Sishen in the northern Cape to 
the western Cape port of Saldanha and associated port expansions. However, Iscor 
also took on the project execution and financing responsibility of these rail and port 
expansions. Thus fixed investment represented around 72% of Iscor’s turnover 
between 1972 and 1974 and 45% between 1975 and 1979 (Iscor various years).  
 
However, Iscor’s ability to increase prices was regulated by the Price Control Act of 
1964. For the state, as conveyed by JFW Haak, Minister of Economic Affairs 
“(i)nexpensive high quality steel [is] an indispensable requirement for the 
development of a country’s factories” (Iscor 1969: 9). State regulation of steel 
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pricing was thus a source of significant and ongoing tension between Iscor and the 
state. In virtually every annual report between 1969 and 1985, when the price 
control system was finally abolished, Iscor bemoaned the adverse impact of the 
system on its ability to fund investment and remain financially viable (Iscor various 
years).  
 
In order to make such large-scale investment viable the state was compelled to 
provide financial support in a range of ways. First, the Iron and Steel Industry Act 
was amended to remove any ceiling on the share capital Iscor could issue. Second, 
government made an open-ended commitment to guarantee whatever debentures 
Iscor issued, enabling Iscor to access both domestic and international debt markets, 
the latter largely in Europe. Third, Iscor was designated in terms of the Insurance 
and Pension Funds Act as an “institution” which formed part of the public 
“prescribed assets” system in place between 1956 and 1989 that required every 
pension fund to minimum investments in government debt and “prescribed assets” 
such as state owned enterprises.12 Fourth, the state made periodic direct equity 
injections into Iscor. 13  Fifth, government waived its rights to any dividend 
payments until shortly before Iscor’s privatisation in 1989. An additional source of 
capital were loans from suppliers of capital equipment, predominantly from 
Germany and Japan (Iscor various years). 
 
                                                        
12 Over this period every pension fund was required to place a prescribed minimum of its total 
investments in both government bonds and prescribed assets. These minima ranged between 10% 
for government bonds and 40% for prescribed assets in 1956 and peaked at 22.5% and 55% 
respectively. “Prescribed assets’” included “National Defense Bonds, Iscor, Sasol, various water 
services, economic development, and homeland development corporations” (Pollin et al. 2006: 102) 
13 Iscor describes some of these injections as if the state were purchasing more shares, despite being 
its sole shareholder: “Over the past four years, the Government has contributed appreciable amounts 
in share capital to augment Iscor's [loan] redemption needs … to bring some relief to the Corporation 
with regard to its financing cost” (Iscor 1978: 5) 
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One way in which Iscor financially protected itself was through a “defensive” 
accounting measure. From 1952, it implemented a provision on its income 
statement for future replacement of old or obsolete machinery. This reinforced the 
onus on government to make good investment funding shortfalls. As discussed 
below, the removal of this provision was used to boost the appearance of Iscor’s 
profitability leading up to privatisation (Iscor various years). 
 
Notwithstanding price controls, Iscor found a range of mechanisms to exert 
substantial influence over steel pricing and supply conditions within South Africa. 
Its concurrence was required for the importation of steel and during periods when 
domestic steel demand outstripped supply it acted as the main conduit for steel 
imports and was authorised to levy a surcharge on steel sales to cover the costs of 
importation. Similarly, Iscor was authorised to levy a surcharge on domestic steel 
sales to cover the costs of its steel exports (Iscor various years). This pattern of 
control over pricing was to be strengthened following the abolition of price 
regulation and after privatisation (Roberts and Zalk 2004).  
 
Sustained losses at Iscor saw it capping its capacity at 8.5mtpa and the 
establishment of a “committee of enquiry” into Iscor’s financial affairs by the 
Minister of Economic Affairs. Indicative of Iscor’s increasing influence on policy, the 
resultant “Theron Committee” was comprised jointly of senior civil servants and 
members of Iscor management itself. Reporting to parliament in 1979 its primary 
recommendation was that Iscor be awarded “more realistic” double-digit price 
increases (Iscor 1979). 
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In 1979 the apartheid government privatised Sasol, which listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). Privatisation formed part of a broader, yet 
uneven and stumbling, shift of the apartheid state over the 1980s to overcome 
mounting economic stagnation through the adoption of greater “free market” 
principles (Marais 2011). Iscor management began to advocate and prepare for 
privatisation and anticipate investor expectations a stock exchange listing would 
bring. In 1983, Iscor’s board pronounced itself in favour of privatisation arguing that 
the corporation had been run along commercial lines for many years (Iscor 1983). 
It committed itself to greater “capital discipline”, stating in 1984 that no new 
primary steelmaking or coal mining capacity would be developed for the next ten 
years, in order to stabilise its debt-to-equity ratio (Iscor 1984). Its longstanding 
opposition to price controls finally bore fruit with government’s abolition of the 
mechanism in 1985. Although the precise circumstances leading to the removal of 
price controls on steel the repeal of the Price Control Act (Government of South 
Africa 1964) was consistent with a shift, however halting, of policy orientation 
towards liberalisation, and sustained lobbying by Iscor for the removal of price 
controls. However, Iscor’s schizophrenic approach to “free market” conditions was 
reflected by it simultaneously criticising the state’s abolition of quantitative 
controls in favour of a customs tariff system (Iscor 1985). In 1986 the state took 
over the bulk of the outstanding debt on the Sishen-Saldanha railway line, which 
the South African Transport Services (SATS) (successor to South African Railway 
and Harbours) had taken over from Iscor, enabling Iscor to secure lower rail tariffs 
from SATS for its exports of iron ore.  
 
Iscor’s privatisation involved exaggeration of its profitability. It artificially boosted 
its apparent profitability by abandoning its longstanding provision for asset 
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replacement.14  Whereas previously Iscor had been a loss-making enterprise, in 
terms of its revised financial statements it appeared to have been profitable since 
1985 (Iscor 1989). In 1988 Iscor paid out its first dividend (to the state as its 
shareholder) in over a decade. Although a token R65m, this signalled Iscor’s intent 
to pay out dividends to future private investors. Furthermore, its announcement in 
1988 of having made a major technological breakthrough in relation to the 
successful introduction of a world first industrial scale Corex iron and steel making 
technology at its Pretoria works proved to have grossly overstated progress, with 
the project abandoned within a few years (Iscor various years).  
 
Iscor was privatised in 1989 and listed on the JSE, with management securing 
generous benefits for themselves. In terms of a Management Share Scheme 16 
million shares were issued to management at a cost of R2 per share (Iscor 1989). 
With Iscor’s market price running at R198 per share in 1990 this meant 
management were able to purchase shares for around 1% of the listed share price. 
Over subsequent years shares and share options were offered to management on 
similarly concessional terms. In 1991, a further 1.55 million shares were sold to 
management and 675,000 options offered at R1.69 relative to the year-end share 
price of R212. In 1992, a further 950,000 shares and options were bought by 
management on 2,130,000 shares at a price of R2.06 per share relative to the year-
end share price of R137. In 1993, 6,969,100 shares were repurchased under the 
management share scheme and 900,000 options granted at R0.79 per share (Iscor 
various years).  
                                                        
14 Although there were undoubtedly sound reasons for updating what had become an outdated 
accounting practice, the timing of the change and the fact that Iscor had hitherto vigorously defended 
the practice strongly suggests the primary motivation was to exaggerate the appearance of 
profitability. 
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Iscor was privatised as an effective monopoly on flat steel products and the single 
largest producer of long products in the absence of a regulatory regime to discipline 
its pricing power or much state direction over its industrial and technological 
trajectory and linkages with downstream development of steel-consuming 
engineering sectors (Roberts and Zalk 2004). 
 
3.3.2 Evolution of the Anglo American Industrial Corporation’s steel and 
engineering interests 
 
Anglo American’s emergence from the 1950’s with large cash surpluses derived 
from its Orange Free State gold expansions set the stage for its diversification into 
the financial and industrial sectors (Innes 1984). Anglo established the Anglo 
American Industrial Corporation (AMIC) in 1964 to undertake large capital-
intensive industrial investments with long lead times and to consolidate a wide 
range of industrial holdings already held by Anglo. AMIC inherited subsidiaries 
straddling a wide range of sectors: Building; Iron, Steel, and Engineering; Industrial 
Diamonds; Metals and Minerals; Chemical Finance; Paper and Packaging; Breweries; 
Food and Produce; and Textiles (Anglo American Industrial Corporation 1964). 
Over the 1960s Anglo’s industrial investments grew rapidly both in absolute terms 
and relative to its mining interests (Anglo American various years; Anglo American 
Industrial Corporation various years). 
 
The Highveld Steel and Vanadium (Highveld) integrated iron, steel and vanadium 
project was Anglo’s largest industrial investment of the 1960s (Cross 1994). In 
anticipation of the project Anglo acquired Scaw Metals, both to acquire technological 
and managerial experience in steel and to secure a channel for output of Highveld’s 
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specialty metals in addition to acquisition of stakes in historically “British” steel 
traders Robor and Stewarts & Lloyds as well as Union Carriage and Wagon and Hall 
Longmore (Innes 1984; Cross 1994). Other Anglo stakes in steel and engineering 
included Boart and Hard Metal Products, Union Steel Corporation and African 
Metals Corporation. The Highveld plant was erected in 1965 and by 1970 was the 
fourth largest industrial firm listed on the JSE (Innes 1984).  
 
Anglo’s increasing cooperation with Afrikaner private capital was evident when 
AMIC took a 12.5% stake in 1965 in Mainstraat Beleggings, a subsidiary of Sanlam-
owned Federale Mynbou (to whom it had sold General Mining) in order to jointly 
“invest principally in steel, engineering and heavy industry” (Anglo American 
Industrial Corporation 1965). Mainstraat Beleggings, correspondingly, took a 10% 
stake in Highveld and stakes in other steel and engineering companies including 
Stewarts & Lloyds, Union Carriage and Wagon and Hall Longmore (Anglo American 
Industrial Corporation 1965). 
 
Following the establishment of Highveld, Anglo and AMIC expanded into various 
other ferrous metal sectors. In 1964 it took a stake in Middleburg Steel and Alloys, 
parent of Southern Cross Steel created in 1964, which would later form the basis for 
the large-scale Columbus stainless steel project in 1991. In 1975 Samancor, a 
ferrochrome and ferromanganese producer, was formed through a merger between 
SA Manganese Limited and African Metals (a joint venture between Iscor and Anglo) 
with Gencor acquiring a majority stake by 1983. Highveld acquired Rand Carbide 
Limited in 1978, a producer of ferrosilicon and carbon-rich products. In 1985 
Highveld fully acquired manganese alloy producer Transalloys. Highveld also 
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acquired Rheem in 1985, a manufacturer of drums, pails and crown closures. (South 
African Iron and Steel Institute n.d.). 
 
The 1980s saw AMIC increasingly absorbing a range of capital-intensive 
investments that had been gestated across a broader shareholder base. Over this 
period AMIC acquired, partially or fully, the stakes held by other investors in 
Highveld, Mondi (paper and pulp), African Explosives and Chemical Industries 
(AECI) (chemicals) and African Products (maize products). A major development 
was the merger of the De Beers industrial subsidiary, Debincor, with AMIC, which 
brought both AECI and Boart under full AMIC ownership. Notwithstanding the 
increased contribution of a range of other investments the combined contribution 
of Highveld, Boart and Scaw’s to AMIC earnings averaged 45.2% between 1980 and 
1989. AMIC also engaged extensively in the acquisition spree that accompanied 
deteriorating economic conditions over the 1980s and spurred by disinvesting US 
foreign investors of their South African subsidiaries. In 1980 Scaw took a 36% stake 
in mining rope and chain producer Haggie which in turn formed a joint venture with 
Iscor: Consolidated Wire Industries (CWI). In 1984 AMIC subsidiary Samcor 
acquired the South African subsidiaries of divesting US car producers Amcar and 
Ford (Anglo American various years; Anglo American Industrial Corporation 
various years).  
 
3.3.3 Evolution of Rembrandt 
 
Rembrandt developed out of a tobacco company Voorbrand (“fire-path”) established 
in the 1940s by founder Anton Rupert. Rembrandt was one of the first beneficiaries 
of small-scale funding from the Federale Volksbeleggings (FVB), one of the finance 
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houses established at the Ekonomiese Volkskongress of 1934. Rupert, a young 
participant at the Volkskongress, rapidly moved into the liquor trading industry and 
from there into tobacco products (O’Meara 1983). In 1948 Rembrandt began 
manufacturing cigarettes and was incorporated and listed on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange in 1956. Rembrandt shifted from its initial reliance on the “extensive 
use of Afrikaner nationalism and its cultural symbols” (Feinstein 2005: 179) to rapid 
international expansion of its tobacco business over the 1950s and 1960s through a 
series of joint ventures with domestic partners in a wide range of countries 
(Rembrandt various years; Dommisse and Esterhuyse 2009).  
 
These joint ventures and subsequent patterns of co-investments are conveyed in 
official corporate mythology as part of a philosophy of respectful collaboration 
known as “industrial partnership” (Rembrandt various years; Dommisse and 
Esterhuyse 2009). Virtually no detail is provided in Rembrandt’s annual reports of 
how this international growth took place. However, a rare interview given by Rupert 
to Fortune magazine in 1981 highlights the shrewd purposes these low profile joint 
ventures had served in building Rembrandt’s international tobacco empire: 
 
The smokescreen Rupert has blown around his company is no 
mere quirk of a proprietor’s personality. It is an essential 
ingredient of the business itself. The low profile discourages 
boycotts and so allows Rembrandt, alone among corporations, 
to be that near contradiction in terms – an international 
consumer-goods company based in South Africa … Some parts 
of Rupert’s empire have been concealed, notably operations in 
places like Malaysia, Singapore and Jamaica, where South 
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Africa’s racial policies are anathema. Also concealed is the 
group’s export trade from London to black African countries 
like Ghana, Zambia, the Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, and Nigeria that 
do not recognise South Africa and in many cases boycott its 
products and companies. 
(Kinkead 1981: 194) 
 
“Industrial partnership” in the context of secretive and opaque reporting thus 
served multiple objectives: building up offshore capital in the context of exchange 
controls; expansion into markets not hospitable to a South African company in the 
context of the growing momentum of an international anti-apartheid movement; 
cost-effective and rapid expansion into new markets; and preventing competitors 
from gaining greater insight into the intentions of the group (Kinkead 1981). 
Leading up to and over South Africa’s democratic transition, Rembrandt’s past 
practice of “industrial partnership” was invoked by the company as part of its 
mythology of historical sensitivity to domestic interests across a range of countries 
in which it operated and its willingness to reach an accommodation with a post-
apartheid administration and aspirant black capitalist interests (Rembrandt various 
years). 
 
In 1972 Rembrandt’s international tobacco interests were consolidated into 
Rothmans International, a firm listed on the London Stock Exchange. Rupert 
“transformed Rothmans from a small mail-order concern into the world’s fourth-
largest cigarette company” with an $8.5bn annual turnover (Kinkead 1981: 194). 
Tobacco products have been by far the largest and most profitable part of 
Rembrandt’s (and its successor Remgro’s) operations, until they were unbundled 
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directly to shareholders in 2009, and have continued to be so for the Rupert family 
itself until recently. The surplus that had been accumulated through tobacco 
operations in the form of cash and liquid assets was used to expand Rembrandts’ 
non-tobacco investments (Rembrandt various years; Remgro n.d.).15  
 
Much of Rembrandt’s subsequent growth in South Africa took the form of 
acquisition of stakes in existing entities, of which a sizeable proportion were in large 
Afrikaner groups that had emerged out of the Ekonomiese Volkskongres movement. 
In mining Rembrandt held 30% of Sanlam mining subsidiary Federale Mynbou by 
1981, 53% of diamond miner Trans Hex by 1984 and 10% of Gold Fields by 1987; 
in finance and insurance 30% of Volkskas by 1985, a 50% founding stake in Sagecor 
in 1985 and a 10% interest in Standard Bank Investment Corporation in 1987; and 
in industry 50% of Sanlam subsidiary Bonuskor by 1987. Existing liquor interests 
were expanded via Distell through an effective market-sharing agreement with 
Anglo subsidiary South African Breweries. A 34% stake in French petroleum group 
Total’s South African operations was accrued by 1987. Rembrandt also pioneered 
the establishment of private hospitals in South Africa, establishing the Medi-Clinic 
group in 1985. It also expanded its presence in a number of manufacturing sectors 
through the acquisition of stakes in existing companies and formation of joint 
ventures with multinational companies (Rembrandt various years). 
 
Whereas the post-war presence of Afrikaner interests in the steel and engineering 
sectors had been predominantly represented by Iscor, in 1980 Rembrandt acquired 
a 25% interest in Iscor’s industrial holding company Metkor and 10% of Stewart & 
                                                        
15 The 1981 sale of half of Rembrandt’s stake in Rothmans to Phillip Morris for $350 million left 
Rembrandt cash flush and in a position to make substantial acquisitions in other (Rembrandt 1982). 
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Lloyds. Metkor included a number of engineering subsidiaries, in addition to holding 
Iscor’s stake in the IPSA joint venture with Anglo. By far the largest company within 
the Metkor group was engineering giant Dorbyl. Other major subsidiaries included 
Wispeco, an aluminium extruder, and Air Products, an industrial and specialty gas 
supplier. By 1984 Rembrandt held 50% of Metkor, effectively stepping into Iscor’s 
shoes as shareholder (Metkor various years; Rembrandt various years). From 
Rembrandt’s perspective, its engineering holdings were never a significant part of 
its overall income and profit. Between 1982 and 1987 engineering accounted for 
between 2.6 and 4.3% of capital employed and only 2.9 and 3.0% of its sources of 
net income (Rembrandt various years). Conversely, however, Rembrandt’s interests 
in engineering represented a large proportion of South Africa’s engineering 
capacity, particularly its control of the largest engineering group in South Africa’s 
history: Dorbyl.  
 
3.4 The evolution of Iscor, Anglo and Rembrandt’s engineering 
subsidiaries over the 1970s and 1980s  
 
3.4.1 Origins and evolution of Scaw 
 
Scaw’s origins are reflective of the mining roots of early twentieth-century South 
African industrialisation. Steel and Ceilings Aluminium Works (Scaw) was 
established in the 1920s, producing steel castings and other parts for the mines, and 
expanding into cast steel grinding balls in the 1930s. In 1937 it listed on the JSE 
(Innes 1984). Also established in the 1920s was Haggie, Son & Love, subsequently 
to be absorbed into Scaw over the 1980s and 1990s, which opened the first steel-
wire rope making factory in the southern hemisphere to supply mining demand. 
Scaw expanded in the 1940s and 1950s largely to supply a variety of steel products 
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to the gold mining industry. Technical agreements with United States and English 
companies in the 1950s saw it move into more sophisticated and diversified 
engineering activities oriented towards the rapidly growing railways including cast 
bogies and freight car wheels, as well as earth-moving and heat-resistant castings 
(Innes 1984; Hannemann 2014; Scaw 2014). 
 
Scaw expanded further after its acquisition by AMIC in 1964, straddling both 
primary steel production and “downstream” engineering activities predominantly 
for the mining and rail sectors. By the 1980s Scaw was producing 12.5% of the global 
share of grinding balls. It became a significant exporter, including undercarriages 
for US railway freight cars (Innes 1984). In 1985 Scaw commissioned a high 
chromium grinding media (HCGM) line, producing more resilient and higher value-
added grinding balls based on technology licenced from Belgian specialist foundry 
group Magotteaux. Scaw added a second HCGM line in 1994 and a third in 2003 all 
dependent on Magotteaux technology (Hannemann 2014; Scaw 2014).  
 
In the face of weakening domestic demand over the 1980s responded acquisitions 
and joint ventures with existing firms rather than significantly expanding export 
markets, mirroring the behaviour of other conglomerate engineering subsidiaries. 
AMIC’s acquisition of a 36% stake in Haggie in 1980 was reflective of this pattern. 
Haggie, anticipating the peak and decline of the then booming gold mining industry, 
its major client, began to diversify through an aggressive programme of acquisition 
of engineering firms outside of its historical focus on wire and rope, a strategy which 
ultimately proved commercially unsuccessful (Gibson 1996; Hannemann 2014). 
Scaw's large stake (and ultimate outright purchase of Haggie in 1999) was chiefly to 
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secure an outlet for the output of its steel rolling mills, including through Haggie’s 
CWI joint venture with Iscor.  
 
Over the late 1980s and early 1990s Scaw’s rail-related foundry division producing 
wheels, bogies and frames came under severe pressure as public rail investment by 
South African Rail and Harbours (SARH) and its successors: South African Transport 
Services (SATS) and Transnet dried up (Figure 3.2). Limited success in developing 
export markets for cast products thus rendered Scaw increasingly dependent on 
demand from the mining sector. 
 
Figure 3.2: Number of locomotives purchased by national rail services, 1965 - 
1989 
Source: Transnet (n.d.) compiled from annual reports of South African Rail and Harbours (SARH), 
South African Transport Services (SATS) and Transnet. 
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3.4.2 Origins and evolution of Boart 
 
Boart and Hard Metals (Boart) was established by De Beer's in 1936 in response to 
the need to create a market for De Beer’s large accumulated stockpile of low grade 
diamonds known as boart. Boart drills and tips were used to drill blast holes for the 
placement of explosives in gold mining in particular and were used for this purpose 
until around the 1950s when they were replaced with an even harder material: 
tungsten carbide. Thus the establishment of Boart served the dual purpose of 
creating such a market for De Beer’s boart stockpiles and raising the productivity of 
Anglo American’s mining activities, particularly gold (Innes 1984; Howard 1996; 
Brunner 2014). 
 
Boart focused on hard rock diamond drilling and associated cutting and abrasive 
tools, with periodic shifts into related industries, albeit with varying degrees of 
success. It benefited initially from control by parent company De Beers over the 
global supply of natural industrial diamonds. However, it adapted to the 
introduction and rapid expansion of synthetic diamond production by companies 
such as General Electric in the 1950s with De Beers creating its own synthetic 
diamond production in Shannon, Ireland in 1963. From shortly after the Second 
World War, Boart developed tungsten carbide mining tools and also shifted into 
contract drilling services, soft rock and coal cutting machinery and later materials 
handling machinery (Rustomjee 1993; Howard 1996).  
 
Boart’s emergence out of De Beers and Anglo has been virtually unique: an 
internationally competitive manufacturing subsidiary outside of mining (albeit with 
strong links to it) or heavy industries. In 1967 an international holding company 
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was established to consolidate Boart’s 80 subsidiary and associated companies 
worldwide. By 1969 Boart had 100 subsidiaries and associates operating across 28 
countries. By the late 1970s it was earning a significant portion of its annual income 
from foreign sales and operations (Anglo American Industrial Corporation various 
years). 
 
However, Boart’s establishment and growth from the 1930s to the 1950s also 
appears to have marked its apogee in terms of its research and development efforts. 
In conjunction with the University of the Witwatersrand's Minerals Research 
Institute, Boart undertook its own proprietary research and development as early 
as the 1930s. It also benefited from research being conducted in the late 1940s and 
1950s by De Beers (Rustomjee 1993). A major breakthrough in the use of tungsten 
carbide-impregnated drill steel tips led to Boart’s transition to Boart and Hard 
Metals in 1955. However, Boart appears to have conducted little direct R&D after 
the 1950s, opting for technology acquisition achieved chiefly through the purchase 
of companies that had already developed relevant technologies. Thus a key strategy 
of Boart was to enter into technological association agreements with small 
international contract drilling competitors and to subsequently acquire them 
(Rustomjee 1993). From the early 1970s, Boart began a string of acquisitions in 
continental Europe acquiring chiefly German and Scandinavian firms. In the early 
1970s, Boart established an association with Longyear, a US company focused on 
mineral exploration drill rigs, exploration drilling tools and contracting for sample 
extraction. In 1974 Boart purchased all outstanding shares in Longyear (Anglo 
American Industrial Corporation various years; Howard 1996). 
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Over the 1980s Boart was consistently profitable, a significant albeit declining 
contributor to AMIC's earnings and virtually unique under Anglo ownership in 
having achieved significant international competitiveness outside of mining and 
heavy industry as reflected in both in its exports from South Africa and earning from 
its foreign subsidiaries. However, these achievements masked major weaknesses 
associated with AMIC’s ineffective management of its non-commodity subsidiaries 
and associated technological complacency (Anglo American Industrial Corporation 
various years; Howard 1996; Brunner 2014; Wood 2014). 
 
Globally a process of technological change was underway in which labour-intensive 
hand-held pneumatic drills were increasingly being replaced by more complex 
hydraulic drilling rigs. This trend was evident from at least the mid-1970s, as noted 
by a contributor to the Journal of the South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy: 
 
The greatly increased output of rockdrills has placed new demands 
on booms, carriers, and drill steels and bits. Limited scope for 
further improvement in pneumatic rockdrills has led to the 
development of hydraulic rockdrills, which compare favourably 
with their pneumatic counterparts: they are more efficient, more 
flexible in coping with variations in the working conditions, more 
economical in the consumption of drill steel, and less productive of 
noise and mist. 
(Marshall 1975: 181). 
 
Despite substantial earnings from exports and international operations, the South 
African market represented a large proportion of Boart’s demand until well into the 
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early 1990s but proved vulnerable to the rapid decline in South Africa’s gold mining 
industry. This was due to the large, but declining, demand for Boart's single biggest 
product line: hand-held pneumatic percussion drills used predominantly in South 
Africa gold mines which due to their thin veins deposits required labour-intensive 
hand-held drilling to place explosive charges. The long-term decline of South Africa's 
gold mining industry led to an accompanying decline in demand for pneumatic drills 
as well as for associated deep exploration drilling in the South African market (Anglo 
American Industrial Corporation various years; Brunner 2014).  
 
3.4.3 Origins and evolution of Dorbyl 
 
Dorman Long (Africa) was established in 1903 as a subsidiary of the English 
Dorman, Long & Co. and developed into South Africa’s largest structural engineering 
company. It undertook the structural engineering for the development of Iscor’s 
Vanderbijlpark plant in 1945 and subsequently worked on a range of mining and 
mineral-processing expansions including African Metals Corporation, Sasol and on 
the Orange Free State goldfields (De Beer 2003). During the Second World War it 
produced military vehicles, bridges and aircraft hangars using Iscor armoured plate 
(Clark 1984). Post-war shortages of steel in Europe presented the opportunity for 
Iscor Chairman Van der Bijl to renegotiate pre-war terms with British engineering 
subsidiaries that had been tactically necessary but deeply unfavourable to Iscor. 
Dorman Long was amongst the largest of these British engineering interests that 
Iscor renegotiated terms with (Clark 1984). From the 1950s to the 1970s Dorman 
Long was heavily involved in the supply of South Africa’s railway infrastructure, 
producing heavy steel structures and rolling stock, particularly freight wagons for 
the domestic market (De Beer 2003). 
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In 1945 Iscor established the Vanderbijl Engineering Corporation (Vecor) with 
Anglo American as co-investor (Clark 1984). Vecor was established to do 
maintenance on Iscor’s plant and to supply equipment to the mines with a heavy 
engineering focus in heavy foundry, fabrication, welding and machining operations. 
Vecor relied on foreign technology licences and know-how agreements, obtained 
chiefly from the US for steel-related activities and Europe for industries such as 
mining, cement and sugar (Clark 1994, Mostert 2014).  
 
Dorbyl was formed in 1973 through the merger of Dorman Long and Vecor. Dorbyl 
served two major overlapping functions under joint Iscor and Anglo ownership. 
First, Dorbyl was the preeminent provider of heavy engineering capabilities for the 
installation and maintenance of plant for Iscor, Anglo and more broadly across 
mining, heavy process industries and infrastructural expansions. Thus the primary 
driver of Dorbyl’s growth was fixed investment in large capital projects, the level of 
which peaked by the mid-1980s and subsequently went into decline (Figure 3.3). 
Between 1973 and 2003 major projects undertaken by Dorbyl included: Iscor, 
Highveld and Columbus steel expansions; work on the Sasol II and III petro-chemical 
plants; the establishment of Alusaf and subsequent aluminium smelting expansions; 
virtually every electrical power station built over the period; a wide range of 
equipment into gold, coal and platinum mining; work on cement; paper and pulp 
and other process engineering plants (De Beer 2003). Other Dorbyl divisions served 
the railway, marine, bus bodies and automotive markets. All but the last were 
heavily reliant on public expenditure in areas such as rail rolling stock, shipbuilding 
and buses for public transport. Thus Dorbyl served to “pull through” steel demand 
for supply into these various sectors (Dorbyl various years; Mostert 2014).  
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Figure 3.3: Gross domestic fixed investment in mining, heavy industry and 
electricity (Rm 2010), 1970-1989 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the South African Standardised Industry Indicator Database 
(Quantec n.d.). 
 
Dorbyl was also one of two major assemblers of rail rolling stock. It focused on 
provision of rolling stock for the freight requirements of SARH and its successor 
SATS, assembling locomotives and freight wagons. Union Carriage and Wagon 
(UWC) (majority owned by General Mining’s Mainstraat Beleggings with minority 
Anglo shareholding) focused on passenger rail. Dorbyl also had a specialist foundry 
to produce wheels in parallel with Scaw Metals rail wheel capacity. Ringrollers, a 
subsidiary of Dorbyl, made tyres for locomotives. All locomotives, wagons and 
carriages produced from approximately 1960 to 1990 were locally assembled based 
on licencing agreements of international technology partners (Dorbyl various years; 
Mostert 2014).  
 
The decline in fixed investment in large resource-processing mega projects over the 
1980s thus represented a major challenge for Dorbyl. In 1985, Dorbyl began a 
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programme of acquisitions aimed at insulating itself from the effects of declining 
demand and to attempt to diversify from heavy to light engineering (Rustomjee 
1993). The first of these was the acquisition of Stewarts & Lloyds in which IPSA held 
a 51% stake. Further acquisitions included Barlows Engineering Holdings (1985), 
Barlows Railway and Engineering Products (1985), Wolhuter Steel (1986), Afgate 
(1986) and Hulett Engineering (1986). In 1988, an ultimately unsuccessful, joint 
venture was established between Dorbyl (40%) and Iscor (60%) in a large new 
seamless tube and pipe mill project: TOSA (Dorbyl various years). The abrupt 
decline in fixed capital investment expenditure over the 1980s, in the absence of any 
coherent national strategy for reorienting the heavy engineering capabilities that 
had been built, saw considerable rationalisation and refocusing of the sector in the 
face of contracting domestic demand. Capabilities and skills were lost with the brunt 
of this restructuring felt by labour. Dorbyl’s employment fell from 25,000 in 1985 to 
23,200 in 1989 and in turn 15,500 by 1992 (Dorbyl various years; Rustomjee 1993). 
 
3.5 Apartheid industrial and trade policy: the failure to develop 
engineering 
 
As elaborated in Chapter 4 apartheid industrialisation is frequently represented in 
scholarship as a case of import substituting industrialisation that ultimately failed. 
This is not withstanding little evidence of any systematic influence of structuralist 
economic thought on apartheid policy, nor of instruments such as tariffs being 
mobilised by the apartheid state in any systematic or coherent manner, in 
conjunction with other instruments, to develop manufacturing sectors outside of 
heavy industry (Fine and Rustomjee 1996; Freund forthcoming). This is 
notwithstanding the recognition by both the state and the conglomerate groups of 
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the need for industrial diversification beyond a reliance on mining and heavy 
industry and an associated balance of payments constraints to growth, particularly 
as growth and conglomerate accumulation faltered over the 1980s.  
 
Various commissions of enquiry and official reports dating back to the 1950s 
reflected both a concern with the dependence of the economy on mineral and semi-
processed commodity exports and the need for the diversification of manufacturing 
production and exports. These include the Viljoen Commission (1958), Reynders 
Commission (1972), Van Huysteen Committee (1978), Kleu Report (1982) and 
Board of Trade and Industry (1988). These commissions recommended a mix of 
measures, typically with a narrow emphasis on changes to the tariff and trade 
regime (McCarthy 1988; Macroeconomic Research Group 1993; Fine and Rustomjee 
1996). 
 
There was a similar recognition by the conglomerates of the need to develop exports 
outside of mining and semi-processed commodities (Anglo American Industrial 
Corporation, various years; Dorbyl various years). However, even as manufacturing 
in general and engineering in particular underwent substantial decline from its 
peaks of the early 1980’s the conglomerates relied on periodic commodity price 
booms, the extension of uncritical tariff protection by the state to defend rather than 
develop engineering, and preservation of profitability in declining domestic markets 
through acquisition of competitors in the context of an extremely permissive 
competition policy (Macroeconomic Research Group 1993; Rustomjee 1993; Fine 
and Rustomjee 1996; Roberts 2004). 
 
 130 
For Rustomjee (1993) the most favourable point at which a strategy to diversify 
engineering from this GDFI focus would have been in the early 1980s when capacity 
utilisation in the sector was high and unit costs low. Both Kaplan (1991) and Meth 
(1990) highlight inadequate economies of scale in the capital equipment sector in 
the late 1980s as a significant problem. However, under conglomerate consolidation 
profitability was sustained at low capacity utilisation levels and declining levels of 
value-added and employment through increased vertical integration in two 
respects. Ultimately there was: 
 
… never a clear objective of using the nearly five decades of sustained, though 
lumpy, investments in infrastructure, mineral, energy and chemical mega-
projects to build up one or other segment of engineering.  
(Rustomjee 1993: 3). 
 
A last gasp attempt to develop strategies for manufacturing diversification came 
from the Board of Trade and Industries (BTI) in the late 1980s which sought to link 
lower tariff protection to competitiveness improvements, called without apparent 
sense of irony “Structural Adjustment Programmes” (SAPs) (Macroeconomic 
Research Group 1993). However, these SAPs were never implemented as the 
influence of the IDC increasingly overshadowed and ultimately eclipsed that of the 
BTI as the IDC drew closer to the private conglomerate groups. The IDC increasingly 
championed trade liberalisation, even as it downplayed its own historic role in 
building up heavy industries and was heavily engaged in supporting a range of 
capital-intensive mega-project expansion over the early 1990s. Thus: 
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[w]ith the demise of the [Board of Trade and Industry], the IDC is 
implementing the only significant industrial policy remaining, namely 
the promotion of an industrial trajectory around large-scale mega-
projects … The only difference is that the process is now driven by 
private-sector interests rather than the parastatals previously supported 
by the IDC.  
(Macroeconomic Research Group 1993: 215) 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
 
English dominated mining capital profoundly shaped a racially exclusive process of 
industrialisation since the late 19th century, amid rising Afrikaner political and 
economic ambitions. Despite the prominent role ascribed to tariffs, the emergence 
from the 1920s of SOEs, such as steel maker Iscor, proved more decisive in shaping 
post-war industrialisation with increasingly aligned with private capital.  
 
The steel and engineering sectors have been illustrative of post-war processes of 
conflict, compromise and the ultimate intertwining of historically English and 
Afrikaner capital on the one hand, and private and public capitals on the other. 
Anglo’s entry into the steel sector, after initial conflict with the state, catalysed a 
process of increasing accommodation with Afrikaner capital and effective joint 
dominance with Iscor of the primary steel industry and much of engineering. 
Rembrandt’s acquisition of Iscor’s engineering interests over the early 1980s 
consolidated a nexus of control over steel and engineering by these three business 
groups.  
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While substantial capabilities were built up in engineering subsidiaries, particularly 
in heavy engineering and linked to mining, the subordinate role they occupied under 
conglomerate control entrenched a range of weaknesses, particularly the difficulty 
in shifting to light engineering and developing exports. The inability of state and the 
conglomerates to mount strategies to develop engineering were impeded by 
periodic commodity price booms and the ease of corporate growth through 
acquisition, even as domestic demand weakened. In steel the strategic orientation 
of a privatised and unregulated Iscor was becoming increasingly intertwined with 
private interests. 
 
However, as elaborated in the next chapter, rather than leading to a coherent 
strategy for the reorientation and development of steel and engineering, a 
confluence of scholarship, ideology and interests placed the corporate and industrial 
restructuring of these sectors in the hands of the large business groups that had 
driven the skewed development of these sectors under apartheid in conjunction 
with increasingly influential institutional shareholders. 
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Chapter Four 
Post-apartheid economic policy: the role of scholarship, ideology 
and interests 
 
South Africa’s National Development Plan (National Planning Commission 2012) 
links disappointing post-apartheid manufacturing performance to continuity with 
the country’s apartheid past in the following way: 
 
Uncompetitive goods and services markets are a result of the pattern of 
economic growth under apartheid and sanctions-induced isolation. This 
has led to relatively high profit margins but little new investment or 
innovation. Profits are shared and then consumed by both existing 
owners of capital and existing workers. Uncompetitive markets for goods 
and services and low levels of investment mean that new firms are not 
entering the market and employment is low. Uncompetitive labour 
markets keep new entrants out and skew the economy towards high 
skills and high productivity sectors.  
(National Planning Commission 2012: 110–111). 
 
This diagnosis reflects a hegemonic consensus that solidified over the early 1990s 
that apartheid industrialisation failed primarily as consequence of a range of market 
distortions compounded by weak skills formation. Orthodox scholarship continues 
to place the alleged prevalence of widespread market distortions and (undeniably) 
defective post-apartheid skills institutions at the centre of weak post-apartheid 
industrial performance, even as it has adapted to a limited extent through the 
admission of circumscribed market imperfections. More recently there has been an 
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attempt to set these structural economic features within a loose political economy 
framework in which “insiders” comprising “big business”, “big labour” and “big 
government” have reached a corporatist bargain that excludes “outsiders” 
predominantly small businesses and the unemployed. 
 
Section 4.1 sets out how this dominant consensus arose, notwithstanding serious 
conceptual and empirical deficiencies, amid competing interpretations of the failure 
of apartheid industrialisation and associated implications for the direction of post-
apartheid policy. Section 4.2 details how an orthodox vision of industrial 
restructuring came to dominate post-apartheid policy orientation through the 
overlapping influences of scholarship, ideology and the interests of the large 
conglomerate groups. In order to secure conditions as amenable as possible to as 
unfettered restructuring, the conglomerate groups initiated the mechanism of Black 
Economic Empowerment asset transfers as a tactical legitimation mechanism which 
would subsequently become embedded in policy. Section 4.3 traces the co-evolution 
of policy and scholarship over the post-apartheid period, reflecting how orthodox 
scholarship has adapted in the face of disappointing economic performance 
notwithstanding the widespread post-apartheid attack on market distortions and 
developments within orthodox economics itself. Section 4.4 concludes that 
mainstream scholarship, notwithstanding some adaptation over the post-apartheid 
period has advanced a misleading understanding of both apartheid and post-
apartheid industrialisation serving ex ante to inform and ex post to validate orthodox 
elements in economic policy. 
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4.1 Contested interpretations of the failure of apartheid industrialisation 
 
After growing rapidly since the Second World War, relative both to prior and 
subsequent performance, the apartheid economy entered a sustained period of 
decline from the mid-1970s linked to the long term decline of the gold mining 
industry and mounting weakness of the manufacturing sector (Gelb 1991; Joffe et al. 
1995; Fine and Rustomjee 1996; Iliffe 1999; Feinstein 2005).2 Industrial growth and 
employment turned negative over the 1980s and early 1990s. Between 1981 and 
1994 real GDP per capita declined by 1.3%, GDP growth slowed to an annual average 
of 0.8% with negative output growth in both the manufacturing (-0.1%) and gold 
mining (-0.9%) sectors. Employment growth was negative in agriculture (-0.8%), 
mining (-1.9%) and manufacturing (-0.4%) with the narrowly defined 
unemployment rate rising to 12.7% by 1995 (Feinstein 2005: 201). Gross savings 
and investment rates as a share of GDP declined precipitously from 28.1% and 
29.1% respectively in 1981 to 17.7% and 16.1% in 1994. Real annual average fixed 
investment growth over the period was 2.3%, led by a decline in public investment.  
 
Particular structural weaknesses were reflected in the low rate of growth of 
manufactured exports and the composition of both exports and imports. South 
Africa’s long-standing reliance on mineral-based commodity exports intensified 
over the 1980s. Large-scale capital-intensive heavy industry investment over the 
1970s and 1980s, predominantly in mineral processing industries, increased the 
reliance of the economy on mining-linked exports. The share of combined mineral 
                                                        
2 Moll (1990, 1991a) suggested that there had been nothing exceptional in international comparative 
terms about South Africa’s relatively high growth period between the end of the Second World War 
and the mid-1970s. Similarly the economy’s subsequent slowdown simply reflected trends in the 
global economy overlaid with the impact of sanctions in the 1980s. Sender (2015) argues that this 
view is difficult to reconcile with long term cross country growth statistics. 
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and semi-processed mineral commodity exports rose from 69% in 1970 to 78% in 
1980 and 88% by 1988. The contribution of semi-processed raw materials to total 
exports rose from 32% in 1970 to 46% (Department of Finance Budget Review, 
1990 cited in Macroeconomic Research Group 1993: 241). The relative importance 
of diversifying and raising manufacturing exports increased as the gold industry, 
South Africa’s traditional source of foreign exchange earnings, underwent a process 
of long-term decline. However, the capital-intensive pattern of manufacturing 
investment combined with the underdevelopment of intermediate and capital goods 
sectors meant that expansion of investment, predominantly in mineral-processing, 
sucked in large volumes of imports. Thus each episode of mounting growth tended 
to be cut short by a rapidly rising balance of payments constraint. 
 
Accumulation by the conglomerate groups was sustained over the 1980s through 
corporate growth that favoured acquisition over new fixed investment. This process 
was fuelled by a confluence of factors including barriers to the export of capital in 
the form of exchange controls, the purchase of divesting foreign subsidiaries in the 
mid-1980s as sanctions and disinvestment campaigns gained traction, and the 
weakness of the competition institutions. Levels of corporate concentration had 
been rising since the 1970s with English mining groups and Afrikaner financial 
groups diversifying their holdings into a range of other sectors including various 
manufacturing industries. Six main diversified conglomerates, comprising a 
progressively “inter-penetrated” mix of historically English mining and Afrikaner 
financial capital, increasingly dominated private economic activity and the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) (Joffe et al. 2005; Fine and Rustomjee 1996; 
Chabane et al. 2006). By 1990 six corporate groupings commanded control of 84% 
of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange: Anglo American, Rembrandt, Sanlam, SA 
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Mutual, Liberty Life/Standard Bank and Anglovaal with Anglo alone accounting for 
44.2% (Table 4.1) (McGregor’s Who Owns Whom, various years; Chabane et al 
2006). 
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Table 4.1: Summary of Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) market capitalisation (%), 1983–1999 
 
Source: McGregor’s Who Owns Whom (various years) 
Note: Black groups includes all companies which have significant black influence 
 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
ANGLO AMERICAN CORP 52.5 54.1 53.6 54.1 60.1 49.5 45.3 44.2 42.4 33.7 38.2 43.3 37.1 27.5 22.6 17.4 22.3
SANLAM 9.4 10.7 12.2 11.3 10.7 10.8 9.5 13.2 13.2 15.6 12 10.5 12.4 11 10.6 9.9 12.5
S A MUTUAL 0.6 2.7 10.6 10.9 8 9.8 9.8 10.2 10.4 14.2 10.7 9.7 11.2 10.2 11.4 8.8 10.6
REMBRANDT (inc Riche and G/Fields) 2.1 2.8 3.8 4.4 4.3 7.6 16.1 13.6 15.2 14.6 15.5 13 7.8 10.6 9.9 9 10.4
DIRECTORS 9.1 8.1 8.1 8.1 7 6.5 7 6.7 5.4 5.4 5.6 5.8 8.8 7.4 7.3 8.9 7.3
LIBERTY LIFE/STANDARD BANK 1.1 2.1 2 2.3 2 2.6 3.4 2.6 3.7 4.7 6.2 7.2 7.3 11.1 11.9 9.5 7.1
BLACK GROUPS * see note below 6.3 9.3 9.6 6.8
FOREIGN 5.4 5.7 5.9 6.1 4.1 5.1 3.6 2.1 1.9 2.2 2.4 2.2 4.1 4.1 4 3.9 4
INSTITUTIONS/UNALLOCATED 18.1 12.1 1.7 0.7 1.4 5.9 3.1 4.9 4.9 6.7 6 0.9 1.7 0.8 0.7 4.2 3.6
RMB/NORWICH 0.5 1 1.7 1.8 4.8 3.6
SASOL 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.8 2.2 2.6
INVESTEC/FEDSURE 0.4 0.9 1.1 2.4 3.3 2.6
PEP/WIESE/BOE GROUP 1.3 1.5 1.9 3.4 2.4
BIDVEST 1 0.9
NASPERS 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.2 0.8
ANGLOVAAL - MENELL 0.4 0.7
DATATEC 0.6 0.5
JOWELL/CORONATION GROUP 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4 1 0.4
VENTER GROUP 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4
PICK N PAY 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4
ANGLOVAAL 1.5 3 2.9 3.6 3.4 2.9 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.1 2.1 1.7 1.7
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
NOTE: Top Five Groups control: 62.9 54.7 66.4 72.7 82.3 83.7 82.6 82.8 84.9 83.8 80.3 81.2 85.1 83 82.2 72.4 65.7
139 
 
As the prospects of a political settlement between the apartheid state and the 
African National Congress tentatively gained momentum over the late 1980s, the 
potential implications of scholarship for what might be appropriate post-apartheid 
economic policies became increasingly relevant. Three prominent themes emerged 
from scholarship over the transition, with associated implications for post-
apartheid policy.  
 
4.1.1 Late apartheid industrialisation as a case of failed import 
substituting industrialisation (ISI) 
 
A dominant and durable characterisation of the failure of apartheid industrialisation 
has been as a case of import substituting industrialisation (ISI) which had run out of 
steam by the end of the 1980s (McCarthy 1988; Gelb 1991; Belli et al. 1993; Lall 
1993; Fallon and de Silva 1994; Moritz 1994; Joffe et al. 1995). ISI as a strategy for 
industrialisation was conceptualised by structuralist economists in ideal type terms 
as a sequential process commencing with the replacement of imports in relatively 
“easy” sectors, typically consumer goods. Import replacement is then systematically 
deepened through the formation of backward linkages to promote the localisation 
of more challenging or “difficult” intermediate inputs and capital goods sectors, 
followed by a final stage of export orientation (Hirschman 1968; McCarthy 1988; 
Fine and Rustomjee 1996). With a heavy emphasis on the role of tariff policy it is 
argued that ISI commenced with the introduction of the Tariff Act in 1925, but had 
run into a dead-end by the 1980s (McCarthy 1988). However, not all who 
characterised the pattern of South African industrialisation as having followed an 
ISI path agreed that ISI had failed. Bell (1993, 1995) argued that the full scope for 
 140 
ISI had not been exhausted and that there remained considerable scope to pursue 
import replacement. 
 
Three main variants of the “failed ISI” hypothesis can be discerned. The first and 
most influential is the neoclassical view that trade policies, combined with other 
distortionary interventions in the operation of market mechanisms, encouraged a 
bias in favour of production for the domestic market over the export market and in 
favour of capital- over labour-intensive sectors and production techniques. Weak 
industrial diversification, output and export growth was attributed to an anti-export 
bias with much effort expended on computing measures of anti-export bias. The 
portrayal of South Africa as a putative case of failed ISI was linked to the evolving 
narrative that the superior performance of the export-oriented east Asian 
economies had been due to the absence of trade and other distortions (or policies 
which offset any anti-export bias) in contrast to the interventionist import 
substitution policies associated with less well performing Latin American 
economies, with South Africa often compared with the latter (Holden 1992; Belli et 
al. 1993; Moritz 1994). Further parallels were drawn between South Africa and 
Latin America with the latter’s inward industrialisation efforts linked, as part of a 
cautionary tale, to “populist” economic policies such as extensive redistribution of 
wealth through fiscal mechanisms, encouragement of large wage increases, and 
unsustainable macro policies such as monetisation of the public debt (Moll 1991b; 
Lipton and Simkins 1993). 
 
The failed ISI hypothesis was in turn linked to a broader market distortions 
perspective which argued that South African manufacturing was systematically 
skewed against those sectors in which it had a putative competitive advantage, 
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particularly its abundance of unskilled labour discussed below. Echoing a prominent 
theme emergent in the international literature that financial markets were being 
prevented by state intervention from working efficiently due to “financial 
repression”, although not specifically using the term, it was argued that South 
African real interest rates and credit allocation policies artificially lowered the cost 
of capital and hence contributed to the unduly capital intensive character of the 
manufacturing sector (Fallon and de Silva 1994). With industrial policy conveyed as 
having been overwhelmingly dominated by instruments of import protection, trade 
liberalisation was the obvious route forward in conjunction with the removal of 
other distortions. 
 
A second variant of the “failed ISI” hypothesis highlighted the negative impact of 
racial inequality on domestic demand as the major impediment to greater import 
replacement and industrial dynamism. Drawing on French regulation theory, Saul 
and Gelb (1981) and Gelb (1991) argued that apartheid South Africa represented a 
specific and deformed case of a more general “Fordist regime of accumulation” said 
to typify prevailing global capitalism. South Africa’s variant, “racial Fordism”, 
obstructed fuller development of import substitution because economies of scale 
arising from “Fordist mass production” were impeded by the lack of a corresponding 
“Fordist mass consumption” due to inadequate black disposable income as a 
consequence of apartheid’s discriminatory policies. In broad brush strokes policy 
should promote both redistribution of incomes and shift production towards 
provision of basic consumer goods. Fine and Rustomjee (1996) criticised this “racial 
Fordist” interpretation as an inappropriate overlaying of imported theory on South 
African realities.  
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Also using “Fordism” as a jumping-off point, the work of the Industrial Strategy 
Project (ISP) (Joffe et al. 1993, 1995) located South Africa’s “failed ISI” within a 
“post-Fordist” paradigm in which global manufacturing was said to have shifted 
away from old Fordist models of mass production of undifferentiated products to 
“flexible specialisation” and “mass customisation”. South Africa’s failed ISI reflected 
outdated production systems and the rigid and hierarchical management of the 
division of labour forged in a racially discriminatory context. The ISP drew 
significant inspiration from attempts to extrapolate a more generalisable 
development model from “clusters” of relatively small firms in specific locales such 
as the “Third Italy”, the appropriateness of which have been heavily contested.9 The 
major recommendations of the ISP comprised a combination of trade liberalisation, 
industrial policy support focussed on small and medium enterprises in niche 
sectors, stronger competition policy and a corporate governance regime including a 
broader range of stakeholders on company boards. 
 
4.1.2 Labour markets, skills and distributional battles over wages and 
profits 
 
A second significant and enduring neoclassical explanation advanced for late-
apartheid industrial stagnation, focuses on developments in relation to the “cost” 
and “quality” of the apartheid industrial workforce. Prior to the Second World War 
cheap black labour power had been functional to the development of South African 
                                                        
9 The argument that late twentieth century manufacturing required a shift from standardised mass 
production led by large firms to a “post-Fordist” model of small firm “flexible specialisation” emerged 
from Piore and Sabel’s (1984) efforts to extrapolate their interpretation of industrial organisation in 
the Emilia-Romagna region of Italy into a generalised industrialisation model. See Amin (1989) and 
Fine (1995) for historical and theoretical critiques of this model. 
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capitalism, notably in mining and agriculture. 16  However, post-war apartheid’s 
social controls over blacks’ physical and occupational mobility was said to have 
become an increasing fetter on capitalist industrial development with the costs, 
based on the migrant labour system and educational and occupational exclusion of 
blacks, progressively outweighing their benefits. 17  Post-war industrialisation 
increasingly required a stable, urban and better educated workforce. However, even 
as apartheid’s racist occupational strictures were gradually relaxed over the 1980s, 
the legacy of grossly unequal educational and skills provision to blacks resulted in 
an inadequate supply of skilled workers (Lipton 1986).  
 
Furthermore, labour market arrangements created in the 1920s under the Pact 
government’s “civilised labour” policy to privilege white over black workers were 
said to have been “excessively” extended to black unskilled workers over the 
1980s.18 From 1979 black workers won the right to join and form trade unions 
which over the 1980s increasingly became embedded in a pre-existing industrial 
council system with its major distinguishing feature being its ability to extend wage 
agreements between unions and participating firms across an entire industry (Moll 
1996). In short, black unskilled workers were said to be overpriced in the context of 
an undersupply of skilled workers.  
 
                                                        
16 Both mining and agricultural capital supported the introduction of the pass laws and the Land Act 
of 1913, aimed at the creation of a reserve army of black African rural labour to be drawn upon as 
required (Lipton, 1986). 
17 The nature of the relationship between apartheid and capitalism has been heavily contested by 
“liberal” and “radical” scholars, particularly the extent to which apartheid was functional or not to 
capitalist interests. See Freund (2010) for an overview and synthesis of this debate. 
18 Indeed Lipton (1984) makes a direct historical link between the “civilised labour” policy and the 
introduction of the 1925 Tariff Act by the Pact government, arguing that the latter was required to 
offset the cost disadvantages introduced by higher wages for white workers. 
 144 
Nattrass (1989) advanced this argument further, arriving at estimates that 
aggregate South African manufacturing profit rates had declined between 1960 and 
1986 due to the rising share of wages relative to the surplus accruing to 
manufacturers. Nattrass (2003) attributes this increase in the general 
manufacturing wage share specifically to the rise, over the 1980s, of the wages of 
black unskilled workers as a consequence of the extension of collective bargaining 
rights hitherto restricted to whites since the 1920s. The policy implication drawn 
was that the labour market regime should be liberalised in order to allow the price 
of (predominantly black) unskilled labour to fall, while improving the quality of 
education and skills provision for black South Africans in particular. 
 
Extensive distortions said to prevail in trade, labour and capital markets formed 
part of a more generalised contention that apartheid industrialisation failed chiefly 
due to a range of product and factor market distortions. The implications flowing 
from this analysis were that post-apartheid policy should primarily be focused on 
the removal of the multifarious product and factor market distortions in the 
economy. 
 
4.1.3 Industrialisation based on a Mineral-Energy-Complex 
 
Fine and Rustomjee (1996) set out an alternative conception of South Africa’s 
industrialisation rejecting “failed” ISI hypothesis. They argue that while there was 
significant progress with import replacement no coherent strategy of ISI, 
proceeding systematically from consumer goods to intermediate and capital goods, 
was ever mounted. While the influence of tariff policy was important a far more 
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fundamental role was played by SOEs in shaping South Africa’s distinct 
industrialisation path.  
 
Rather, they argue that South African industrialisation has been based on a Mineral-
Energy-Complex (MEC) in two distinct but interlocking senses. First 
industrialisation has been concentrated in mining and heavy mineral-processing 
sectors, drawing on extensive use of electricity (itself reliant on coal mining). SOEs 
have played an instrumental role in this industrialisation path, through the 
provision of abundant and cheap electricity generation, rail and port infrastructure, 
as heavy industry producers themselves notably of steel and petro-chemicals from 
coal, and through the provision of finance by the IDC in particular. However the MEC 
is said to be not only a manifestation of industrial structure but also the political 
economy process through which this structure arose, that is a South Africa specific 
“system of accumulation” (Fine and Rustomjee 1996; Freund 2010; Ashman et al. 
2013a). 
 
The MEC as a system of accumulation involved intensifying intertwining of 
historically English and Afrikaner capitals on the one hand and public and private 
capitals on the other. It entailed a confluence of interests and strategies favouring 
expansion of capital and energy-intensive heavy industries, which were bolstered 
by periodic gold and oil price booms during the 1980s. Thus no coherent strategies 
were mobilised for diversified manufacturing, which might have included a 
coherent approach to import replacement. Downstream sectors were protected 
rather than developed through uncritical and unconditional import protection (Fine 
and Rustomjee 1996; Ashman et al. 2013a). 
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Bell and Farrell (1997) have contested the MEC hypothesis on two main grounds. 
First, that it ignores the significant progress made with import replacement since 
the 1920s. Second, that a good alternate explanation for the expansion in mineral-
processing mega-projects were the high commodity prices that prevailed during the 
1980s. Fine and Rustomjee (1998) responded that it was not their contention that 
there had not been significant import replacement, but rather that there no coherent 
ISI strategy had been mounted, understood as a shift from consumer goods 
backwards to capital and intermediate goods and ultimately to exports. Second, 
irrespective of the influence of commodity prices Bell and Farrell overlooked their 
argument of the MEC as a particular “system of accumulation” and not simply a set 
of sectors. Furthermore, there was no generalised commodity boom over the 1980s. 
High commodity prices did indeed prevail in two commodities relevant to the South 
African economy. High energy prices due to international oil shocks may have acted 
as a spur, for instance, to Sasol’s coal-to-oil programme. Similarly, periodic gold 
price booms manifested over the 1980s acted as a temporary spur to an otherwise 
declining gold mining industry. However, it is clear that no such commodity boom 
prevailed in iron ore and steel over the 1970s and 1980s, as reflected in Figure 7.1 
and Figure 7.3 in Chapter 7. 
 
The MEC hypothesis provides a more coherent account of apartheid 
industrialisation than market distortions perspective. It reflects how the strategic 
orientation of large private and state-owned business groups, was driven by an 
increasing intertwining of their interests. This involved accumulation based on the 
development of capabilities in mining and heavy industry combined with corporate 
growth through acquisition across many other sectors of the economy. This “system 
of accumulation” blunted any impetus for the development of forward linkages out 
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of MEC sectors and more generally to develop sufficiently competitive capabilities 
in other manufacturing sectors. In contrast to the policy implications arising from 
the neoclassical market distortions perspective, active state intervention was 
required to harness the strengths of the conglomerate structure that had emerged 
out of the MEC and to re-orient it towards a more diversified industrial trajectory 
linked both to basic needs and exports. However, the market distortions perspective 
proved decisive in influencing post-apartheid policy. 
 
4.2 Getting into GEAR 
 
4.2.1 Competing visions of industrial restructuring 
 
Two broad and incompatible visions of industrial restructuring began to solidify 
over the early 1990s amongst a flurry of publications generated variously from 
academic and commissioned research, international financial institutions, and 
business and labour constituencies.  
 
The first vision was consistent with ascendant Washington Consensus policy 
prescriptions emphasising “disciplined” macroeconomic policies, market 
determined outcomes and trade liberalization (Williamson 2009). This orthodox 
vision drew on the late-apartheid government’s normative economic model (NEM) 
(Central Economic Advisory Service 1993), which itself closely resembled the 
analysis and policy prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund (Weeks 1999; 
Marais 2011). Research produced by the World Bank over the transition, although 
demonstrating some nuance in its earlier stages, increasingly converged with the 
NEM and IMF positions. A number of business inputs also supported an orthodox 
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policy, most influentially the Growth for All manifesto (South Africa Foundation 
1996) issued on behalf of the fifty-odd largest business groups in the economy by 
the South Africa Foundation.19 A sharp depreciation of the currency in 1995 and 
deteriorating macro balances served as the pretext for Minister of Finance Trevor 
Manuel to commission the drafting of the Growth Employment and Redistribution 
(GEAR) (Department of Finance 1996) policy framework which was rammed 
through ANC and alliance structures as non-negotiable (Marais 2011). GEAR 
represented the “adoption of the essential tenets and policy recommendations of 
the neo-liberal framework advocated by the IMF in its structural adjustment 
programmes” (Adelzadeh 1996: 67) and was “supportive of, and broadly consistent 
with the central thrust of the South Africa Foundation report” (Habib and 
Padayachee 2000: 252). Indeed Nattrass (1996) treats the Growth for All and GEAR 
documents as virtually synonymous. 
 
GEAR (Department of Finance 1996) envisaged a private investment-led and 
export-oriented manufacturing boom through animating “investor confidence” 
chiefly via contractionary budget and inflation control, trade liberalisation and 
labour market deregulation. This strategy was predicted to raise growth to 6% per 
annum and create an annual average of 410,000 net new jobs over four years. While 
public investment was desirable in principle, fiscal discipline was necessary to 
counteract a hypothesised crowding-out of private investment by public 
expenditure. Capital controls were identified as an impediment to foreign direct 
                                                        
19 The South Africa Foundation (SAF) was initially established by Anglo in the 1950s and later joined 
by Rembrandt to lobby and influence opinion makers in the US and UK as a counterweight to growing 
pressure for disinvestment and sanctions against the apartheid regime (Innes 1984; Pallister et al. 
1988; Dommisse and Esterhuyse 2009). Considerable continuity is evident in the evolution of the 
SAF into its current incarnation as Business Leadership South Africa (BLSA). 
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investment (FDI) with capital account liberalisation to be accelerated to attract 
foreign capital inflows necessary to bridge the gap between savings and investment. 
FDI was axiomatically assumed to bring with it technology transfer, managerial 
efficiencies and access to markets. GEAR committed to accelerating already far-
reaching trade liberalisation underway as part of South Africa’s unilateral 
commitments in 1993 to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). A 
temporary set of tax and grant-based “supply side measures” would be put in place 
to assist SME’s in particular to adjust to the rapid increase in international 
competition. A competitive exchange rate was identified as a pre-requisite for a 
successful export-oriented manufacturing drive. Mirroring the SAF’s Growth for All 
document GEAR argued for the establishment of a two-tier labour market, 
estimating that two thirds of predicated net new jobs would arise from labour 
market deregulation, while the remaining third would be generated by a private 
investment boom in export-oriented manufacturing. New fixed investment would 
occur predominantly through new entry: of foreign direct investors, domestic small 
and medium manufacturers and emergent black-owned firms. GEAR also envisaged 
extensive privatisation of state assets to raise efficiencies and funds for fiscal 
consolidation.  
 
A second vision of restructuring could be located loosely within a 
Keynesian/Structuralist perspective drawing on scholarship of academics 
sympathetic to the liberation movement, particularly the African National Congress 
(ANC) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu). An ANC convened 
a Macroeconomic Research Group (MERG) who’s report (Macroeconomic Research 
Group 1993) with the work of a Cosatu convened Industrial Strategy Project (ISP) 
feeding (somewhat uneasily) into it. In a similar vein a major labour market study 
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was undertaken through the offices of the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
under the auspices of a Labour Market Commission (Standing et al. 1996). MERG 
and the ILO reports argued that corporate profitability, rather than a vague appeal 
to “investor confidence”, was the primary determinant of fixed investment. 
Corporate profitability also functioned to mobilise the single most important source 
of domestic savings: retained corporate earnings. MERG highlighted that no 
empirical evidence had been adduced to support the assertion that public 
investment would “crowd out” private investment. Conversely public investment 
was essential to crowd in private investment in conjunction with industrial policy 
aimed at reorienting manufacturing to more labour intensive sectors, a competitive 
real exchange rate supportive of manufacturing exports and positive real interest 
rates that were not so high as to discourage fixed investment. Employment, rather 
than being construed as exclusively a function of wage rates, is an outcome of a 
combination of factors: levels of effective demand, sectoral patterns of investment 
and labour market policies aimed at increasing employee skill and commitment 
(Macroeconomic Research Group 1993; Standing et al. 1996). Rather than leaving 
the conglomerates to arrange their own restructuring these measures needed to be 
supplemented with a suitable competition policy, corporate governance 
arrangements that incorporated labour and state representatives, and a capital 
issues commission to vet new capital calls. 
 
4.2.2 Post-apartheid policy: a confluence of scholarship, ideology and 
interests 
 
The apartheid government had become increasingly influenced by the wave of 
conservative economic policy discourse that had swept developed and developing 
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countries alike over the 1980s and was being actively promoted by international 
finance institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank (Holden 1992; Macroeconomic Research Group 1993). Since the early 1980s 
the apartheid regime had implemented a range of orthodox reforms, albeit unevenly 
and with periodic reversals. Monetary policy was tightened over the 1980s with 
inflation control established as its de facto primary objective by 1989, the foreign 
exchange market was liberalised and significant trade liberalisation had been 
implemented while two of the largest state-owned enterprises were privatised: 
Sasol in 1979 and Iscor in 1989 (Macroeconomic Research Group 1993; Bell 1995; 
Standing et al. 1996; Isaacs 2014). Substantial deregulation of the financial sector 
had already been underway since the mid-1980s (Verhoef 2009; Newman 2010; 
Ashman and Fine 2013; Isaacs 2014). 
 
Both the IMF and the World Bank engaged intensively in debates on post-apartheid 
economic policy through a flurry of “informal” policy papers. As neither were 
significant lenders to the South African government their influence lay primarily in 
the realm of ideas. When South Africa’s transitional government signed off on a 
relatively small IMF loan in 1993 of US$850m, to assist with balance of payments 
difficulties, Finance Minister Derek Keys experienced no difficulties in securing 
concurrence of the ANC’s most senior Department of Economic Policy officials with 
a statement of intent committing the incoming government to restrictive monetary 
policy, no expansion of the fiscal deficit or increases in taxation (Marais 2011). This 
group accompanying Keys included Trevor Manuel (subsequently Minister of Trade 
and Industry and then Finance), Tito Mboweni (Minister of Labour and then 
Governor of the Reserve Bank) and Alec Erwin (Minister of Trade and Industry and 
then Public Enterprises). This group also rubber-stamped South Africa's revised 
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offer to the GATT in 1993 that committed the country to deep unilateral tariff 
liberalisation (Hirsch 2005). Their readiness to do so reflected their belief that these 
commitments represented sound economic policy, not some reluctant capitulation 
to the international financial institutions (Marias 2011). 
 
The IMF consistently maintained a strong market fundamentalist line that South 
Africa should rapidly liberalise and deregulate markets, particularly trade, the 
capital account and labour markets. The apartheid government’s own Normative 
Economic Model (NEM) (Central Economic Advisory Service 1993) was in turn 
largely consistent with prevailing IMF dogma (Macroeconomic Research Group 
1993; Standing et al. 1996; Marais 2011).  
 
One thorny issue is how to make a distinction between “scholarly” and “ideological” 
argumentation. While it is necessarily a matter of judgement where the boundaries 
of “scholarly” contestation of ideas ends and that of ideology begins some useful 
guidance can be derived from the World Bank itself. In an assessment the Bank 
commissioned into its own research output between 1998 and 2005, the so-called 
Deaton Report, the authors make a distinction between research which represents 
a “balanced view of the evidence” together with “appropriate scepticism” in 
assessing evidence, as distinct from a “proselytising” or “advocacy” role that 
champions pre-conceived views (Banerjee et al. 2006: 6).  
 
A good example of the transition from scholarship to ideology is evident from the 
shifting treatment by the World Bank of trade policy over South Africa’s transition. 
Initial work by the Bank on the state of South Africa’s trade regime produced a 
detailed and useful empirical assessment of state of the trade regime (Belli et al. 
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1993). The report reflected that South Africa did not display particularly high levels 
of protection relative to other developing countries, but found the complexity and 
opacity of the trade regime, and its lack of support for exporters problematic. 
Notwithstanding this measured assessment, trade policy in practice was 
concurrently being formulated as if the economy were grossly overprotected. 
Indeed subsequent research by the World Bank had to rapidly play “catch up” as it 
sought to establish evidence of a positive impact of trade liberalisation that had by 
the late 1990s gone far beyond the Bank’s original recommendations (Lewis 2001b; 
Tsikata 1999). 
 
Over the latter half of the 1980s the National Party government under PW Botha 
faced a mounting crisis of legitimacy. Growth had stalled and unemployment was 
rising. Rising resistance to the apartheid regime amongst the black majority could 
neither be contained through co-option nor fully subdued through increasingly 
militarised repression. The dominant conglomerate groups saw little prospect of the 
resumption of accumulation unless a political settlement with the ANC could be 
reached, and had lost confidence that Botha was capable of negotiating such an 
accord (Morris 1991; O’Meara 1996). From at least the late 1980s the large 
conglomerate groups, led by Anglo American, initiated a series of engagements with 
the ANC leadership in exile and the leading internal anti-apartheid structure, the 
United Democratic Front (UDF). These engagements proliferated after FW de Klerk 
(who replaced Botha in 1989) signalled a willingness to negotiate a settlement, by 
releasing Nelson Mandela and unbanning the ANC and other political parties in 
1990. De Klerk recognised that the NP’s core political constituency had changed 
fundamentally by the late 1980s with white working-class interests having given 
way to a more affluent white upper-middle class and the interests of large Afrikaner 
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business groups that had increasingly become intertwined with historically English 
capital. Externally, the implosion of the Soviet Union and fall of the Berlin wall 
deflated historical NP anti-communist paranoia (O’Meara 1996; Marais, 2011). 
 
The conglomerates initiated intensive and wide-ranging efforts to influence the 
direction of post-apartheid economic. While the SAF’s 1995 Growth for All manifesto 
was the most prominent public expression of these efforts, extensive influence 
leading up to it was brought to bear on key ANC politicians and its Department of 
Economic Policy (DEP) staff.17 Concerns for safeguarding conglomerate interests 
were evident in the ring-fencing of key economic policy positions under NP control 
in the Government of National Unity.18 Most influential was Derek Keys, drafted in 
from the Gencor conglomerate, and appointed between 1991 to 1994 into a 
succession of ministerial posts with rising effective control over the trade, industry 
and finance portfolios.19 The NP also retained control over the posts of Governor of 
the Reserve Bank and Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs. 20  The negotiated 
1993 constitution entrenched many of the conglomerates’ demands including 
protection of property rights and an independent central bank with a primary 
                                                        
17 A number of examples illustrate the point. Rick Menell, head of the Anglovaal conglomerate, hosted 
Nelson Mandela at his home after Mandela’s release from prison and subsequent divorce from 
Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, and facilitated multiple meetings with leading conglomerate figures 
(Seccombe 2013). There were multiple meetings between Anglo American and a small coterie of ANC 
political and economic policy leaders (Godsell 2016). Derek Keys cultivated a close relationship with 
leading ANC economic policy staff including Trevor Manuel, Alec Erwin and Tito Mboweni through 
their participation in the National Economic Forum (O’ Malley, n.d.); Internships were facilitated at 
Goldman Sachs in New York for leading DEP staff including Tito Mboweni, Lesetja Kganyago and 
Maria Ramos (Mohamed 2010). 
18 Between 27 April 1994 and 3 February 1997 South Africa was governed by a Government of 
National Unity (GNU) under an interim Constitution. 
19 Key’s moved from being the Executive Chairman of Gencor, which was from 1986 Sanlam’s mining 
and industrial conglomerate, into a series of ministerial posts. In rapid succession Keys became 
Minister for Economic Co-ordination and Trade and Industry in 1991, took on the Finance portfolio 
in 1992 and was formally appointed Minister of Finance in 1994. Keys was replaced by banker Chris 
Liebenberg when he resigned in 1994. 
20 Chris Stals served as Governor of the Reserve Bank from 1989 to 1999. Longstanding NP minister 
Pik Botha occupied the position of Minister of Minerals and Energy between 1994 and 1996. 
 155 
mandate to “protect the internal and external value of the rand”. For conservative 
Finance Minister Derek Keys, who so skilfully ushered in a settlement 
overwhelmingly favourable to the conglomerates, the new democratic constitution 
provided a reasonable framework for the conglomerates who would have to reach 
compromises in the new environment, including with labour. Thus, even Keys felt 
that the conglomerates had gone too far in their refusal to reach such an 
accommodation as they pressed ahead with even stronger demands. 
 
And business having got a constitution which guaranteed property rights 
and a market friendly approach and so on veered off into a sort of laissez-
faire position where they expected government to discipline labour and 
resented every aspect in the economy which didn't allow them to operate 
like Victorian capitalists … Business wanted to increase its freedom of 
action. It didn't want to work in a corporatist environment. You have all 
this free market talk going on and so on, you know and I know that the 
world in fact doesn't quite work that way, but this is the plot and that's 
what they wanted. They thought, OK, we've got a good constitution now 
and government should be in a position seeing it's got the alliances on, 
government should be in a position to control COSATU and so we're 
going to go for the greatest freedom of action that we can possibly go for. 
(Derek Keys in O’Malley n.d.). 
 
A sharp disjuncture is evident between the rhetoric of economic orthodoxy 
emphasised in GEAR and the support provided in practice for capital-intensive 
resource-processing projects over the transition and into the post-apartheid period. 
This support included large-scale IDC financing, fiscal support through generous tax 
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allowances, and favourable electricity pricing by Eskom. The flurry of expansions 
over the early 1990s served to support the internationalisation of the 
conglomerates by raising their global scale, inter alia rendering them more difficult 
to regulate under a post-apartheid regime as state intervention shifted to facilitate 
offshore listings.21 While the conglomerates attained most of their Growth for All 
policy wish list, two demands were not secured: a deregulated two-tier labour 
market and more extensive privatisation.  
 
A critical question that arises is how the political credibility for the orthodox policy 
orientation of post-apartheid economic policy argued for by the conglomerates, and 
strongly supported by influential officials within the ANC, was secured. Indicative of 
emerging conglomerate thinking is evident in Derek Keys’ 1992 response to how 
orthodox policies could be secured in the face of expectations of the black majority 
for dramatic socio-economic change: 
 
As I say, you will have to come to an accommodation with the black 
elite and you have to keep the black proletariat or, if you like, the 
uncoloured proletariat, quiescent. It's what you have to do. 
(Derek Keys in O' Malley n.d.). 
 
Part of such an accommodation, as envisaged by MERG and hinted at by Keys, might 
have been with the predominantly black labour movement to deepen industrial 
                                                        
21 In the process a handful of former State Owned Enterprise executives were propelled into major 
global positions. These include Mick Davis, former treasurer of Eskom who took up positions in 
Billiton and then Xstrata and Con Fauconnier, former head of Iscor mining, who became Chief 
Executive of Kumba Resources. Keys re-joined the unbundled Billiton as director immediately after 
resigning his post as Minister of Finance. 
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diversification and growth. However, the conglomerates initiated the mechanism of 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) their chosen instrument of political 
legitimation. This involved asset transfers to newly established BEE consortia 
headed by politically prominent ANC figures, commencing in 1993 with the sale by 
the archetypal Afrikaner conglomerate Sanlam of Metropolitan Life to New Africa 
Investment Limited (NAIL) followed by Anglo American’s 1994 sale of industrial 
subsidiary Johannesburg Consolidated Investment (JCI) to the National 
Empowerment Consortium. Anglo’s sale of JCI was consciously informed by its 
symbolic sale of General Mining in 1965 to a subsidiary of Sanlam: Federale 
Volksbelegings (Cargill 2010). The development of this first phase of BEE reflected 
an accommodation, that at least for a period of time, provided legitimation for 
immediate post-apartheid policy direction, as reflected by an influential economist 
close to the conglomerate and financial sector: 
 
This development, loosely called “black empowerment,” has clearly 
helped to legitimize the established financial structure for the new 
South Africa. 
(Kantor 1998: 69) 
 
4.3 The co-evolution of scholarship and post-apartheid policy 
 
4.3.1 The “successes” of macroeconomic stabilisation and trade 
liberalisation 
 
Economic policy since the early 1990s has strongly emphasised macroeconomic 
stability understood primarily as control of inflation and government debt. As set 
out in the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) (Department of Finance 
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1996) policy framework, macroeconomic stabilisation over the 1990s was 
combined with comprehensive trade and capital account liberalisation, with the 
latter objective particularly sought by the large conglomerate groups. GEAR was 
reflective of the view that had solidified in scholarship that apartheid 
industrialisation had failed as a consequence of pervasive market distortions 
(particularly those introduced by tariff and labour market policies) compounded by 
the legacy of racially discriminatory education and skills provision (Lipton 1986; 
Nattrass 1989; Holden 1992; Fallon and de Silva 1994; Moritz 1994). GEAR also 
reflected the solidifying Washington Consensus promoted by International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) with its emphasis on macroeconomic stabilisation, trade 
liberalisation and the general superiority of market-determined outcomes 
(Williamson 2009). GEAR relied upon theoretical and empirical assumptions that 
were heavily contested. These included the need for “stabilisation” measures to 
drastically reduce levels of inflation and public debt; that public investment 
crowded out private; and the multiple unrealistic assumptions on which the trade 
theory of comparative advantage rests (Adelzadeh 1996; Michie and Padayachee 
1998; Weeks 1999). GEAR conjectured that South Africa’s highly concentrated 
corporate structure would automatically restructure along more labour-intensive 
and export oriented lines through a combination of shifts in relative prices induced 
by the reduction of market distortions and through new entry: of foreign investors, 
small and medium and emerging black owned firms. Great faith was placed in the 
role of foreign direct investment to help bridge the savings-investment gap, transfer 
technology and managerial expertise and facilitate access to markets. A limited role 
was ascribed to industrial policy in GEAR, largely restricted to a set of “supply-side” 
measures aimed at assisting small and medium manufacturers adjust to trade 
liberalisation, while ignoring the parallel and extensive de facto public support being 
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proffered to large capital-intensive mineral-processing expansions. The major 
exceptions to widespread liberalisation set out in GEAR were the introduction of 
legislation providing stronger protection to workers and advancing employment 
equity and limited privatisation. This period of economic policy under the oversight 
of President Thabo Mbeki has been conventionally conveyed in the literature as a 
success. However, success has been construed far less in terms of economic 
outcomes like growth, employment and diversification of exports than progress 
with intermediate measures like lower levels of inflation, fiscal deficits and import 
tariffs (Tsikata 1999; Lewis 2001a; Edwards and van de Winkel 2005; Hirsch 2005; 
Du Plessis and Smit 2007).  
 
The uncritical post-apartheid embrace of trade liberalisation by mainstream 
scholarship and orthodox policy makers overlooked serious theoretical and 
empirical problems. Key assumptions include that full employment prevails both 
before and after liberalisation, that capital is immobile and that technological 
acquisition is costless (Lall 1993, 1992). 22  Bhagwati (2002), one of the most 
vociferous proponents of trade liberalisation states bluntly that the case for 
liberalisation rests ultimately on empirical rather than theoretical grounds.23 The 
relationship between trade and growth remains ambiguous due to the multiple and 
                                                        
22  The emerging neoclassical “new growth theory” pointed out, even within the strictures of 
neoclassical assumptions trade liberalisation is likely to generate only once-off static efficiencies 
(Lucas 1988). Furthermore developments in neoclassical “new trade theory” pointed to the 
theoretical case for strategic protection, even as it advised developing countries to steer clear from 
doing so in practice (Krugman 1987). 
23 “So those who assert that free trade will also lead necessarily to greater growth either are ignorant 
of the finer nuances of theory and the vast literature to the contrary on the subject at hand or are 
nonetheless basing their argument on a different premise: that is, that the preponderant evidence on 
the issue (in the postwar period) suggests that freer trade tends to lead to greater growth after all. In 
fact, where theory includes several models that can lead in different directions, the policy economist 
is challenged to choose the model that is most appropriate to the reality she confronts.” (Bhagwati 
2002: 42). 
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complex mechanisms through which trade may impact growth (Deraniyagala and 
Fine 2001; Pacheco-López and Thirlwall 2009; Cattaneo 2011). Empirical 
assessments of the relationship between trade and growth have proved ambiguous 
due to difficulties in finding appropriate measures of either liberalisation or 
openness, the direction of causality and questions of the robustness of econometric 
methodology (Pritchett 1996; Rodriguez and Rodrik 2001; Rodriguez 2007). By the 
World Bank’s own assessment, the South African economy was not in fact 
excessively protected (Belli et al. 1993) and displayed far higher levels of import 
penetration (at 25%) than the Latin American average (around 10%) (Moritz 1994). 
Rather the main problems lay with the complexity, variability and discouragement 
of exports (Belli et al. 1993). A substantial literature has emerged estimating the 
extent to which trade liberalisation has indeed taken place (Fedderke and Vaze 
2001; Rangasamy and Harmse 2003; Edwards 2005) and seeking to link 
liberalisation to selected outcomes measures such as sectoral productivity and 
export growth (Tsikata 1999; Jonsson and Subramanian 2001; Edwards 2004; 
Edwards and Lawrence 2008). These studies suffer from the theoretical limitations 
discussed above, methodological flaws in measures of effective rates of protection 
and anti-export bias and a focus on the impact of liberalisation on selected narrow 
measures such as exports while neglecting the impact on the balance of payments 
and downplaying the link between liberalisation and job losses (Cattaneo 2011), 
with an artificial distinction between job losses attributed to technological change 
as opposed to liberalisation (Jenkins 2004; Mohamed and Roberts 2008).  
 
Within the context of an emphasis on macroeconomic stabilisation and 
liberalisation GEAR’s limited incorporation of industrial policy was strongly 
influenced by the work of the Industrial Strategy Project (ISP) (Joffe et al. 1995) with 
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its “post-fordist” emphasis on the need to foster flexible small and medium size 
enterprises. The resulting “supply side measures” were spread across multiple 
sectors and objectives with sector specific programmes limited to automotives and 
clothing and textiles (Cassim 2006). In parallel with this formal policy orientation, 
there has been significant post-apartheid continuity in public support for upstream 
heavy industries such as steel, chemicals and aluminium. With the exception of the 
automotive sector the dominance of heavy industries in industrial structure have 
prevailed, rather than the predicated diversification that would be induced by 
orthodox reforms (Roberts and Rustomjee 2010; Mohamed and Roberts 2008).  
 
As the formal orientation of economic policy drew implicitly on orthodox scholarly 
and ideological argumentation, corporate praxis was influenced by the international 
finance literature that narrowed the presumptive role of the firm and its managers 
to a single function: maximising value for shareholders. This required solving an 
agency problem of securing alignment of management behaviour with shareholder 
objectives (Mohamed 2010). Academics closely aligned to the South African 
corporate and financial sphere both embraced and adapted this agency paradigm, 
providing intellectual support for a model of corporate governance that combined 
the Anglo-Saxon emphasis on shareholder value maximisation with the legitimating 
role of Black Economic Empowerment ownership transfers to politically influential 
black individuals (Barr et al. 1995; Kantor 1998; Malherbe and Segal 2001). 
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4.3.2 From macroeconomic stability to microeconomic reform, higher 
public investment, and intensification of BEE 
 
The early 2000s saw important, albeit limited, shifts in policy responding to 
increasing tensions within the ruling tripartite alliance over weak economic growth 
and rising unemployment, the conservative orientation of policy and frustration at 
the slow pace of Black Economic Empowerment. Macroeconomic policy continued 
to be cast as “state of the art” with weak economic performance attributed to a lack 
of microeconomic reform and associated institutional deficiencies (Edwards and 
Van de Winkel 2005; Cassim 2006; Naidoo 2006; Faulkner et al. 2013; Kaplan 2015a, 
2015b). Inadequate reforms were said to include a lack of labour market 
deregulation, incomplete trade liberalisation and even less complete privatisation.  
 
An influential body of work emerged alleging the persistence of a range of directly 
unobservable micro-economic distortions that were said to reflect that average 
pricing markups in South African manufacturing exceeded those of developed and 
developing economies alike (Edwards and van de Winkel 2005; Fedderke and 
Schaling 2005; Fedderke et al. 2007; Aghion et al. 2008, 2013; Fedderke 2013; 
Fedderke et al. 2016). These claims have exerted considerable influence on 
multilateral institutions such as the OECD, World Bank and IMF publications and the 
country’s National Development Plan (National Planning Commission 2012). The 
theory, methodology and interpretation of econometric results relied on to attempt 
to establish a causal link between markups and productivity growth is deeply 
questionable (Zalk 2014). Re-creation of estimates demonstrate that, 
notwithstanding evident data problems, there is no suggestion that South African 
manufacturing markups have been, on average, higher than other countries. 
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Compared to other broad sectors, South African manufacturing markups have been 
lower than all but the gold mining sector since the 1990s and have declined 
dramatically over the 2000s. By contrast sectors with much higher average markups 
than manufacturing are the Financial, insurance and real estate (FIRE) sectors, 
wholesale and retail, other private services and coal and platinum mining. Average 
manufacturing markups do mask considerable variation amongst and within 
individual manufacturing sectors. This is consistent with a process of intense post-
apartheid corporate and industrial restructuring in which conglomerates 
unbundled businesses considered to be “non-core”. However they made aggressive 
acquisitions to consolidate control over sectors amenable to the preservation of 
monopoly rents, including selected manufacturing industries. The conglomerates 
have exited industries where high levels of competition have prevailed or 
intensified, notably sectors experiencing rapid rises in import penetration arising 
from trade liberalisation (Chabane et al. 2006; Makhaya and Roberts 2013, 2014). 
 
Institutional deficiencies highlighted under the microeconomic reform agenda 
include weak education and skills development, inadequate regulation of network 
industries, and ineffective competition policy enforcement. These and other 
institutional weaknesses have also been emphasised in various measures of “good 
governance” such as those constructed by the World Bank in its Ease of Doing 
Business indicators (World Bank 2016 n.d.-a) and Investment Climate Assessments 
(World Bank 2011).  
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4.3.3 A Developmental State? 
 
An increasingly embattled Mbeki presidency began to project the nomenclature and 
rhetoric of a “Developmental State” onto government amid rising pressure from two 
broad groupings within the tri-partite alliance, albeit with vastly differing intent and 
meaning. Both sought greater state intervention in the economy but for different 
reasons. One broad grouping comprised those dissatisfied with a conservative 
approach to economic policy and the other with the slow pace of transfer of black 
ownership and control of economic assets and wealth. These fault-lines were in turn 
reflected in the state itself. The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and newly 
created Economic Development Department (EDD) promoted a vision of 
reindustrialisation and diversification of manufacturing from its mining and heavy 
industry base in the face of growing dominance of the financial sector (Department 
of Trade and Industry 2007; Economic Development Department 2008). The DTI, as 
formal custodian of BEE policy, has also sought to temper criticisms of elite 
enrichment through the introduction of a broad-based BEE strategy and subsequent 
legislation including broader ownership and non-ownership elements (Republic of 
South Africa 2003). In practice departments such as Mineral Resources and Energy, 
and State Owned Enterprises have focused their licencing and procurement powers 
on the narrow objective of black ownership and resource transfers. A newly 
established and somewhat paradoxically named National Planning Commission 
(headed by former Minister of Finance Trevor Manuel) sought to temper and direct 
the notion of a Developmental State through a widely marketed National 
Development Plan (NDP) (National Planning Commission 2012). The National 
Treasury, National Planning Commission and South African Reserve Bank have 
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sought to “hold the line” on macroeconomic prudence, continuing to emphasise 
microeconomic reform with little attention to industrialisation. 
 
An Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative (ASGISA) (Presidency 2006) 
emphasised further microeconomic reform in conjunction with a recognition of the 
need for higher public expenditure to reverse weak investment performance. The 
role of state owned enterprises (SOEs) and public investment more generally thus 
shifted both to address weak fixed capital formation and to support of Black 
Economic Empowerment ownership transfers. Black Economic Empowerment was 
increasingly introduced in policy form in areas such as minerals and energy policy 
and public procurement. ASGISA also identified industrial policy as necessary to 
raise private sector investment and highlighted the long-standing practice of 
monopolistic pricing by upstream sectors such as steel and petrochemicals as a 
constraint to industrial diversification. Controversially, a group of predominantly 
Harvard based economists were drafted in by the National Treasury to provide ex 
post intellectual scaffolding for, and establish stronger influence over, the direction 
of the ASGISA initiative. Through this “Harvard Group” standard neoclassical 
interpretations of post-apartheid economic performance held back by market 
distortions were supplemented with a limited recognition of market imperfections 
and a theoretical if limited case for state intervention in areas such as currency 
misalignment and industrial policy (Hausmann 2008; Hausmann et al. 2008; Rodrik 
2008).  
 
Within this perspective industrial policy is conveyed as a reluctant but necessary 
choice in which the state is “doomed to choose” certain activities rather than others 
due to circumscribed market failures (Rodrik and Hausmann 2006). 
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Industrialisation may be impeded by various market imperfections due to 
appropriability problems, information asymmetries and coordination failures. 
There may be suboptimal investment in feasible new production opportunities due 
to the threat of new entrants rapidly eroding profitability in a newly created market. 
Temporary subsidisation may thus be required to overcome this appropriability 
problem analogous to time-bound rents embodied in patent protection. An 
asymmetric information problem arises between entrepreneurs with knowledge of 
a feasible production that may require such subsidisation or complementary public 
good, and state officials. Thus industrial policy should be conducted through 
processes of “self-discovery” between entrepreneurs and the state to identify these 
feasible investment projects and associated state support required, as far as possible 
through a technocratic process freed from political interference (Hausmann and 
Rodrik 2003; Rodrik 2004, 2008, 2009). This theoretical justification for industrial 
policy has been criticised for ignoring key structural features of the South African 
economy, notably the dominance of an MEC and the dramatic rise in the share and 
influence of the financial sector (Fine 2009a). It is removed from the logic of 
cumulative causation historical evidence of how successful industrial policy has 
taken place in practice, and places excessive faith on the role of new entrants. There 
is little if any engagement with the need to reorient the large business groups that 
dominate the economy or how political economy bargains would have to be recast 
to mount a serious industrialisation effort. 
 
In an environment at least formally more open to industrial policy, a National 
Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF) (Department of Trade and Industry 2007) was 
launched in 2007 with implementation guided by subsequent annual Industrial 
Policy Action Plans (IPAPs) (Department of Trade and Industry various years). 
 167 
These industrial policy documents place a strong emphasis on revitalising the 
engineering sectors on the back of rising public investment in areas such as 
electricity and rail, capital equipment and other fabricated inputs into mining in the 
context of a prevailing mineral commodity boom, and addressing the monopolistic 
practice of import parity pricing of steel and other inputs. 
 
4.3.4 A corporatist alliance between “big business”, “big labour” and “big 
government”? 
 
As the orthodox literature has grappled to fully account for weak manufacturing and 
more generalised economic performance amid an evident rise in tensions in social 
relations it has turned belatedly to institutional explanations beyond conventional 
measures such as “good governance” metrics. These explanations have drawn upon 
or been loosely informed by various strands of the institutional literature notably 
Varieties of Capitalism (VOC), the New Institutional Economics and a rapidly 
expanding Political Settlements literature. A common narrative has emerged of the 
post-apartheid political economy as a collusive arrangement between “big 
business”, “big labour” and “big government” cast either in VOC terms as an 
inconsistent mix of institutions, or more loosely as a broad corporatist arrangement.  
 
Nattrass (2003; 2014) and Nattrass and Seekings (2010) and argue that South 
Africa’s post-apartheid political economy has been characterised both by policies 
and the exercise of interests (particularly by labour) that have exhibited 
contradictory elements of both “Liberal Market” (LME) and “Co-ordinated Market” 
(CME) forms of capitalism. This mismatch is said to have emerged as a result of 
adoption of neoliberal policies such as restrictive macroeconomic policy and trade 
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liberalisation on the one hand (associated with LMEs) in conjunction with 
strengthened labour market protections (prevailing in CMEs) rather than labour 
market deregulation. The confluence of this “institutionalised ideological mismatch” 
(Nattrass 2014: 67) was that profitability was sustained for manufacturing firms 
remaining in business by the combination of laying off workers and increasing 
mechanisation, with remaining relatively skilled workers achieving higher wages 
but productivity rising faster than wages.  
 
This narrative has been extended, albeit delinked from any explicit reference to the 
VOC paradigm, to argue that South Africa’s post-apartheid experience reflects a 
corporatist “rent-sharing” arrangement between insiders and outsiders within 
business, labour and government constituencies (Bhorat et al. 2014, 2015; Mahajan 
2014; Sharma 2014). Drawing on the markups literature traced above monopolistic 
rents, said to prevail universally across manufacturing sectors and in service sectors 
such as telecommunications, are shared as part of “an uneasy, but stable, political 
economy equilibrium … defined by high margins, or rents, distributed between 
organized labour and big business” (Bhorat et al. 2014: 16) as well as politically 
connected individuals linked to the ruling party.  
 
This cosy collusive arrangement benefits “insiders”: firms in high rent sectors, a 
“labour aristocracy” and politically connected individuals while locking out 
“outsiders” particularly small firms and the unemployed. Thus post-apartheid South 
Africa is characterised by an  
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‘insider–outsider’ model, in which GDP growth is constrained by the 
oligopoly power of the ruling party, of corporations that endure from the 
apartheid era and of the unions allied to the ruling party. 
(Sharma 2014: 61) 
 
Within or closely related to this narrative post-apartheid industrial policy is said to 
have exacerbated the “insider-outsider” problem with respect to labour markets in 
particular. This is because industrial policy has not been accompanied by a 
concurrent labour market deregulation and because industrial policy is said to have 
contributed to the displacement of labour by capital (Nattrass 2003; Nattrass and 
Seekings 2010; Kaplan 2015a, 2015b). 
 
4.4 Conclusions 
 
The dominant consensus that solidified over the early 1990s, of industrialisation 
having failed primarily due to market distortions and skills deficits, has proved 
extremely durable and has been extended into the post-apartheid period. This is 
notwithstanding fundamental conceptual and empirical weaknesses and a 
sustained attack on various distortions, most notably via extensive trade 
liberalisation.  
 
Post-apartheid policy has been shaped in practice by the confluence of scholarship, 
ideology and interests with particular influence exerted by the large conglomerate 
groups amid the rising importance of institutional financial investors. The 
conglomerates adopted the ideological rhetoric of neoliberalism to justify policies 
as favourable as possible to their unfettered domestic and international 
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restructuring. They eschewed other possible sources of legitimation, such as an 
accommodation with labour to deepen industrialisation, in favour of legitimation 
through initiating the mechanism of narrow Black Economic Empowerment asset 
transfers. 
 
Post-apartheid economic policy and mainstream scholarship have co-evolved with 
both being compelled to relax more restrictive elements and assumptions in the face 
of disappointing economic performance, mounting frustration over the direction of 
policy, and developments in mainstream economics itself. Notwithstanding some 
adaptation to take on board market imperfections and a belated recognition of the 
importance of institutions over the post-apartheid period, orthodox scholarship has 
advanced a misleading understanding of both apartheid and post-apartheid 
industrialisation, serving ex ante to inform and ex post to validate orthodox elements 
in economic policy.  
 
Chapters 5 to 8 examine in detail how orthodox reforms and the entrenchment in 
policy and practice of particular forms of BEE, have acted upon corporate and 
industrial restructuring in the steel and engineering sectors. Orthodox scholarship 
tends to convey this process of economic restructuring at a high level of abstraction 
as the recombination of atomised factors of production through shifts in relative 
prices. By contrast the detailed analysis of post-apartheid corporate and industrial 
restructuring, in steel and engineering in particular, reflects how particular interests 
and ideas have bolstered policies and institutions that have influenced corporate 
strategic orientation in a way that has discouraged the deepening of firm capabilities 
to deepen and diversify their manufacturing interests. 
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Chapter Five 
Post-apartheid institutions of industrial restructuring and 
industrial performance 
 
In his 1997 national budget speech Minister of Finance Trevor Manuel set out the 
following vision for the future of the South African economy:  
 
The GEAR strategy is an economic reform programme directed towards a 
competitive fast growing economy which creates sufficient jobs for all 
jobseekers … At the centre of the GEAR strategy is investment and job 
creation … Evidence is emerging that structural changes are well underway 
in the non-agricultural sectors of the economy and in the manufacturing 
sector in particular, reflecting the changes that the GEAR is designed to 
sustain. Overall, investment will in due course lead to stronger employment 
creation … We are on track for an acceleration in growth and job creation.  
(Department of Finance 1997) 
 
South Africa’s uneasy post-apartheid bargains, heavily influenced by the agency of 
the large conglomerates, shaped a range of policies and institutions that have in turn 
conditioned corporate and industrial restructuring, within the context of major 
shifts in the global economy. This chapter reflects how these policies and 
institutions have influenced corporate and industrial restructuring in a manner 
which has discouraged higher fixed investment, particularly in “diversified” or “non-
commodity” manufacturing sectors outside of heavy industry, such as engineering, 
and eroded the capital based in the scale-intensive steel sector itself. 
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Section 5.1 briefly establishes the international context for post-apartheid corporate 
and industrial restructuring, emphasising global processes of liberalisation and 
deregulation that have given rise to a shareholder value movement and a “Global Big 
Business Revolution” involving intense consolidation of a wide range of sectors 
under the control of a handful of very large transnational firms. Section 5.2 
illustrates how the confluence of orthodox policies and the deepening of Anglo-
American style capital market institutions have facilitated the outflow of long-term 
investable capital and replaced it with a reliance on volatile short-term inflows. 
Rapid financial sector growth and the flow of large-scale rents to institutional 
investors has ensued without a corresponding increase in savings and fixed 
investment. Growth in fixed capital formation in manufacturing sectors outside of 
heavy industry, such as engineering, has been particularly limited. Section 5.3 
reflects how Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) has transformed over the post-
apartheid period from a tactical conglomerate legitimation mechanism to a 
fundamental part of post-apartheid policy and practice involving substantial 
transfers of rents with little demonstrable positive effect on fixed investment in 
general and manufacturing in particular. More recently the rhetoric of advancing 
BEE has been associated with an apparent shift to a particularly predatory form of 
rent-seeking. Section 5.4 demonstrates how extensive trade liberalisation has 
placed intense pressure on sectors such as engineering. Conversely neither trade 
liberalisation nor heavily contested competition policy have meaningfully 
addressed the long-standing constraint of monopolistic steel pricing. Considerable 
continuity is reflected by the relatively low proportion of financing extended by the 
Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) to manufacturing sectors outside of 
heavy industry, such as engineering. Finally this section interrogates whether 
alleged labour market inflexibility is the primarily cause of weak manufacturing 
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performance and high unemployment, as frequently claimed. Section 5.5 concisely 
reviews post-apartheid industrial performance with a particular focus on the steel 
and engineering sectors. It reflects that, notwithstanding some positive elements, 
engineering performance has been disappointing and indicative of a number of 
weaknesses and lost opportunities, while foreign ownership in steel has been 
associated with mounting inefficiencies. Section 5.6 concludes that South Africa’s 
uneasy post-apartheid bargains have given rise to a set of institutional 
arrangements which have militated against the development of sectors outside of 
heavy industry such as engineering, including the monopolistic pricing of 
intermediate inputs such as steel, while the uncritical embrace of foreign ownership 
in steel has led to underinvestment and a crisis in the steel sector following the onset 
of the global financial meltdown. 
  
5.1 Key global forces 
 
South Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy needs to be located within a 
broader set of shifts unfolding globally since the early 1980s. Rising financialisation, 
set in motion by deregulation of capital markets and liberalisation of capital flows 
had been reshaping the global financial landscape since the early 1980s with an 
exponential proliferation in the scale of financial assets (Epstein 2006; Fine 2009c; 
Palma 2009). Palma (2009) estimates that the face value of global financial assets 
grew from 1.2 to 4.4 times global GDP between 1980 and 2007. The rising scale of 
financial assets has been associated with a “shareholder value revolution” involving 
a fundamental shift in the relationship between institutional investors and investee 
firms. This represented a shift from a “patient” post-war form of capital willing to 
invest in long term fixed capital, innovation and human resource development, to 
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increasingly “impatient” capital from the 1980s onwards predicated on maximising 
shareholder returns as rapidly as possible (Porter 1992; Lazonick and O’Sullivan 
2000; Epstein 2006). Even as mainstream management guru Michael Porter (1992) 
highlighted the detrimental impact of this shift on long-term investment and 
innovation on US economy, in contrast to the long term financing arrangements in 
Japan and Germany, the “shareholder value revolution” was rapidly spilling over to 
developing economies (Singh et al. 2005; Mohamed and Roberts 2008).  
 
The shareholder value movement has played a significant role in contributing to a 
process of international corporate restructuring described as a “Global Big Business 
Revolution” (GBBR) (Nolan et al. 2002, 2008). As large corporations have been 
pressured by institutional shareholders to focus on “core” sectoral activities and 
dispose of “non-core” activities, there has been a process of rapid global 
consolidation of sectors and associated production chains through a slew of mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As) with most sectors now dominated by a handful of large 
transnational corporations headquartered in high income countries. The explosion 
of abundant finance arising from rapidly growing financial markets has provided 
ample funding for this wave of M&As (Nolan 2001; Nolan et al. 2002, 2008). The 
global commodity boom of 2001 to 2008 fuelled this process in sectors such as iron 
ore and steel. The GBBR has given rise to new forms of private “industrial planning” 
which extend far beyond the boundaries of legal ownership of the firm. Lead firms 
in each value chain “exercise tight control over firms across the whole value chain, 
both upstream and downstream” (Nolan et al. 2002: 92). Thus the scope of the large 
transnational firm is therefore not confined to narrow boundaries of legal 
ownership but “by the sphere over which conscious coordination of resource 
allocation takes place” with influence extending to a much larger “external firm” 
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(Nolan et al. 2002: 101). This process of global consolidation contrasts sharply with 
the predictions of orthodox neoclassical economic theory that reduced government 
regulation of trade and capital flows should lead to a closer approximation of 
perfectly competitive markets. It also has profound implications for developing 
country subsidiaries, rendering them subject to the strategy and position within the 
division of labour established by the global parent. 
 
As elaborated in this Chapter and the three that follow the increasing sway of the 
financial sector, and global processes of consolidation in industries that include iron 
ore, steel and engineering have strongly influenced the restructuring of large South 
African business groups. 
 
5.2 Washington consensus policies and Anglo-American capital market 
institutions 
 
5.2.1 Orthodox macroeconomic policies and financial flows 
 
A major thrust of GEAR, and reflective of the single most emphatic demand of the 
large conglomerate groups, was extensive capital account liberalisation. The need 
for capital account liberalisation was predicated on attracting capital inflows to 
finance the gap between domestic savings and investment and that capital controls, 
irrespective of the form they took, inhibited foreign direct investment. Restrictions 
were sequentially lifted, limits raised on corporate offshore investment and 
remittance of profits and individual portfolio investments. Permission was granted 
for a number of South Africa’s largest conglomerate groups to move offshore. Firms 
that have shifted their primary listings offshore include Billiton (mining and mineral 
processing), South African Breweries (beer), Anglo American Corporation (mining), 
 176 
Old Mutual Life Assurance and Investec (financial services), and Dimension Data 
(information technology). These conglomerates argued that offshore listings would 
inter alia allow them to raise capital more cheaply on international capital markets 
in order to reinvest in South Africa. According to the Reserve Bank offshore listings 
would “promote foreign investment in South Africa … [and create] … the 
opportunity to improve South Africa’s profile internationally” (Walters and Prinsloo 
2002: 61). However, rather than resulting in conglomerates raising capital to 
increase investment in South Africa they have used these offshore listings as a 
springboard for acquisition and expansion elsewhere (Chabane et al. 2006). 
 
Substantial long-term capital has been removed from South Africa via offshore 
listings of large conglomerates, acquisition of South African firms by foreign owners 
and the subsequent stream of dividend outflows.24 As demonstrated in Chapter 7, 
outflows associated with foreign ownership in the steel sector substantially 
exceeded inflows. Ashman et al. (2011) argue that the post-apartheid period has 
witnessed widespread capital flight, both legal and illegal averaging 12% of GDP 
between 2001 and 2007. They associate much of this capital flight with transfer 
pricing, particularly trade mis-invoicing related to minerals and metals exports. 
Outflows of long-term potentially investable capital have in turn been replaced by 
large-scale and volatile short-term inflows into the stock exchange, bond and money 
markets. 
 
Reflective of the growing orthodox orientation of senior ANC economic policy 
officials, the ANC’s first major macroeconomic policy decision as government-in-
                                                        
24 37% of South Africa’s sustained current account deficit between 2004 and 2013 was due to “net 
FDI income” payments abroad, compared to the 26% contribution of the trade deficit (Strauss 2017). 
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waiting was to agree to entrench central bank “independence” in the post-apartheid 
constitution, with the primary objective of the Reserve Bank to "protect the value of 
the currency" (Republic of South Africa 1996: 224(1)). Tight monetary policy has 
prevailed over much of the post-apartheid period, anchored since 2000 in a formal 
inflation-targeting framework, targeting a band of between 3 and 6%, with real 
short-term interest rates significantly above the developing country median 
prevailing for most of this period (Figure 5.1). 
  
Figure 5.1: Short term real interest rates: South Africa versus peer middle-
income developing countries (%), 1995-2014 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Economist Intelligence Unit, (2016). 
Note: Developing country comparators: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, 
Egypt, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela 
 
South African Reserve Bank researchers have conceded that the openness and scale 
of South African stock and bond markets render the economy vulnerable to volatility 
and instability. The currency “is a common speculative target” with around 65% of 
transactions attributable to offshore trade (Hassan 2013: 2). The rapid appreciation 
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of the currency from 2001 and sustained overvaluation until well into the global 
financial crisis coincided with the global metal and mineral commodity boom, 
notwithstanding the mediocre performance of South African real mining and 
primary metals production and exports in volume terms. Overvaluation and 
volatility has had a strong negative impact on non-commodity manufacturing 
sectors (Rodrik 2008; Zalk 2012, 2014a) (Figure 5.2). By contrast mining and 
commodity manufacturing enjoys an inbuilt hedge against currency appreciation 
due to rising international dollar prices for their output. 
 
Figure 5.2: Balance on current and financial account (Rm), and real effective 
exchange rate (1990=100), 1990-2015 
Source: Author’s calculations based on South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin (South African 
Reserve Bank n.d.) 
 
Influenced by the assumption that public expenditure crowds out private 
investment tight monetary policy was accompanied by relatively tight fiscal policy 
until the onset of the global financial crisis. However, more significant than the 
specific level of the fiscal deficit has been the general discouragement of public 
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investment that prevailed over much of the first decade of democracy, either on-
budget or by state-owned-enterprises. The de-emphasis of public fixed investment 
over the first decade of democracy and the failure of the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme to materialise manifested itself in the form of weak steel 
and engineering demand compounded by the lack of meaningful strategies to 
reorient and develop capabilities that had been built up over the apartheid period, 
particularly from a heavy to light engineering orientation and towards the 
development of export markets. 
 
GEAR’s faith in future foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows have not been 
quantitatively or qualitatively met over the post-apartheid period. Net FDI inflows 
have averaged 1.32% of GDP between 1994 and 2015 (World Bank, n.d.) and have 
largely been in the form of acquisition rather than net new investment. Former state 
owned enterprises (such as Telkom, Iscor and South African Airways) have been 
major objects of FDI, as has entry into the banking and mining sectors, albeit with 
some reversals (Chabane et al. 2006). As elaborated in Chapter 7 foreign ownership 
in the steel sector has not generally been associated with any of the predicated 
benefits of FDI: net fixed investment, technology transfers and operational 
efficiencies. 
 
5.2.2 Financial deregulation, “financial deepening” and “good corporate 
governance” 
 
In parallel with the reshaping of macroeconomic policy, the financial sector had 
been extensively liberalised over the 1980s in line with the recommendations of the 
De Kock Commission, which emphasised the conduct of both monetary policy and 
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the financial system as far as possible through unmediated market mechanisms. The 
removal of any distinction between deposit-taking institutions led to the 
demutualisation of building societies and their takeover by large commercial banks 
(Isaacs 2014; Ashman and Fine 2013). The “prescribed asset” system which 
required every pension fund to place a prescribed minimum of its total investments 
in both government bonds and various public assets was revoked in 1989 (Pollin et 
al. 2006). GEAR paid virtually no attention to financial sector policy other than 
asserting that implementation of its policy framework would lead to greater 
financial stability and assumed that the financial sector would operate efficiently to 
aggregate and channel savings into higher levels and more diversified fixed 
investment in export oriented manufacturing sectors.  
 
These reforms have unleashed rapid post-apartheid growth of the financial sector 
and its constituent institutions. Capital account liberalisation has been accompanied 
by large short-term capital inflows by a range of institutional investors across a 
range of financial markets, assets and instruments. A particular focus in subsequent 
chapters is on the role of equity investors who have propelled the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE) into the second largest in the world relative to GDP, with a 
stock market capitalisation to GDP ratio of 257% in 2014 (World Bank n.d.-a). While 
equity investors may have differing time horizons, that range from short to medium 
term, they have the common characteristic of being able to rapidly withdraw their 
capital. Similarly, the currency, bond and derivatives markets have each grown to 
amongst the twenty largest in the world (Hassan 2013). However, rapid growth of 
the financial sector and associated assets has taken place without any significant 
associated improvements in South African savings and investment rates (Figure 
5.3.). 
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Figure 5.3: Ratios of savings and fixed investment to GDP, and FIRE sector size 
relative to GDP (%), 1970-2015 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin (South African 
Reserve Bank n.d.) 
 
These developments have led to major changes to the composition of the JSE. Two 
in particular stand out in Table 5.1. First, the massive decline in Anglo’s share of the 
JSE, from 43.3% in 1994 to 5.5% in 2014. In Second the large rise in share of 
institutional investors, both domestic and foreign whose collective share rose from 
3.1% in 1994 to 54.6% in 2014. The rising influence of institutional investors has 
taken place hand-in-hand with a corporate governance regime that emphasise 
“enlightened shareholder value” with an emphasis on maximising shareholder value 
but with strong provisions for advancing BEE ownership transfer and managerial 
representation (Malherbe and Segal 2001; Padayachee 2013). 
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Table 5.1: Summary of JSE Market Capitalisation Control (%), 1993–2014 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
FOREIGN 2.4 2.2 4.1 4.1 4 3.9 4 3.9 3.6 10.1 17.9 18.5 14.2 20.8 20.7 33.1 27.9 29.8 30 33.2 30.9 
INSTITUTIONS 6.0 0.9 1.7 0.8 0.8 4.2 9.2 6.7 6.3 9.1 11.2 10.3 13.7 9.1 12.6 14.4 17.6 17 19.4 22.1 23.7 
DIRECTORS 5.6 7 11.4 10 10.6 14.4 11.4 8.9 9.2 7.4 6.1 5.8 8.2 6.7 9.4 7.7 8.3 8.9 9.2 7.0 7.1 
SABMILLER        2.8 3.1 4.0 3.5 5.1 4.9 5.7 5.5 5.9 6.5 7.5 9.2 9.1 9.4 
ANGLO AMERICAN CORP 38.2 43.3 37.1 27.5 22.6 17.4 22.3 23.6 27.3 20.2 22.3 18.7 17.3 21.0 20.8 10.6 13.0 11.8 8.9 6.8 5.5 
REMBRANDT 15.5 13.0 7.8 10.6 9.9 9.0 10.4 11.0 9.6 10.0 8.1 7.9 7.8 7.8 6.7 3.8 5.1 5.2 7.2 9.1 9.3 
BLACK GROUPS    6.3 9.3 9.6 4.7 5.7 5.3 3.5 4.7 6.3 5.8 5.1 5.5 7.0 5.4 4.6 3.9 1.5 1.3 
RMB/FIRSTRAND  0.5 1.0 1.7 1.8 4.8 3.6 2.9 3.8 4.7 4.4 4.9 5.0 3.9 3.1 2.5 2.8 3.1 3.9 2.3 3.0 
S A MUTUAL 10.7 9.7 11.2 10.2 11.4 8.8 10.7 11.0 10.8 12.0 6.9 4.5 4.5 5.5 4.0 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.3 2.8 2.7 
SANLAM 12.0 10.5 12.7 11.4 11.0 11.1 12.0 13.2 10.0 6.3 3.8 2.7 1.6 2.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.7 
LIBERTY LIFE/ STANDARD 
BANK 
6.2 7.2 7.3 11.1 11.9 9.5 4.9 5.2 5.3 6.0 4.3 4.7 4.3 3.5 3.4 4.3 3.9 2.4 1.1 2.5 2.5 
BIDVEST GROUP      1.0 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 
INVESTEC  0.4 0.9 1.1 2.4 3.3 2.6 1.9 2.4 1.9 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.2 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.9 
PSG                   0.6 0.5  
STATE           1.5 2.2 2.5 2.0 1.8 1.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 
ALTECH                  0.1 0.1 0.0 0.8 
ABSA^            2.2 2.3         
SASOL*  1.7 1.9 2.1 2.8 2.2 2.6 2.2 2.4 3.8 3.7 4.2 5.9 4.6 3.5 4.6 3.5 3.9    
ANGLOVAAL+ 3.4 3.6 2.9 3.0 1.5 0.8 0.7               
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: McGregor’s Who Owns Whom, various years 
Notes: Black controlled and director controlled companies are defined by an empowerment or directors’ holding exceeding 26% with no other dominant shareholder. Once 
control has been allocated the full market cap of that company is used in the calculation for comparative purposes.  
^ Moved to Foreign    * Moved to Institutions    + No Longer Operating 
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In 1999 the JSE introduced a mechanism for “unlocking shareholder value” 
additional to share price appreciation and dividends. that is provision for share 
buybacks, a mechanism already well established in the United States and the United 
Kingdom. Lazonick argues that share buybacks represent perverse incentives that 
reward investors for disinvesting their capital rather than purchasing and holding 
shares over a sustained period to finance potentially productive investment 
(Lazonick 2014). Wesson (2015) provides a conservative estimate that over the 
decade 1999 to 2009 at least R248bn in dividends and R137bn in share buybacks, 
totalling a minimum of R384bn was returned to JSE investors JSE. This is a 
considerable underestimate of the total returns flowing to investors from dividends 
and share buybacks over the period. First Wesson’s study excludes firms 
categorized under two of the largest JSE indices, Basic Materials and, critically, 
Financials. 25  Second, it excludes dividend payments and share buybacks by 
companies historically linked to South Africa now listed on the LSE including Anglo 
American, British American Tobacco and Richemont. It also excludes pay-outs to 
investors in unlisted companies, such as in the rapidly growing private equity 
industry. As discussed in Chapter 6 both Anglo and Remgro have been amongst the 
largest users of the share buyback mechanism. The large magnitude of transfers to 
investors through dividends and share buybacks enumerated by Wesson, bearing in 
mind that they reflect a conservative estimate of total transfers, is evident when they 
are related to levels of fixed investment in the economy. The R384bn transferred to 
shareholders between 1999 and 2009 is equivalent to 17% of total gross fixed 
                                                        
25 Wesson’s estimates of the stock of share buybacks over the decade 1999-2009, notwithstanding 
the exclusion of major JSE categories of shares, represents a major empirical effort. This is because 
the JSE does not require listed firms to report on share buybacks in a clear and transparent manner 
and required calculation from the annual financial statements of individual firms included in her 
study. 
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investment in the economy over the same period or 61% of fixed investment in 
manufacturing. Rather than contributing to fixed investment these flows have 
exceeded capital raised on the JSE over the same period. As conveyed by financial 
journalist Ann Crotty: 
 
The splurge of buybacks questions the traditional role of stock 
exchanges, which has been to provide companies with funds to invest. 
Adding the repurchases to … dividends paid out to shareholders … 
suggests JSE- listed companies pump out more money to investors than 
they receive from them.  
(Crotty 2015: 3) 
 
Rather than introducing greater competition as assumed by De Kock, deregulation 
has led to the consolidation of banking by the “big four” commercial banks: Standard 
Bank, ABSA, FirstRand and Nedbank (Ashman and Fine 2013). Growth in private 
credit extension has not entailed a meaningful increase in funds extended to 
industry. Private sector credit has increasingly been advanced to households for 
consumption, hire purchase and mortgage credit with the ratio of household debt to 
income rising from 55% in 1994 to an unsustainable peak of 8686% in 200 and 
subsiding only slightly thereafter (South African Reserve Bank n.d.). A major reason 
cited for high levels of short-term credit extension is the reluctance of South African 
banks to advance long-term loans against short term sources of funds, largely 
deposits. This is in contrast to countries like Brazil and Germany whose 
development banks extend long term loan facilities through the private banking 
system for on-lending to their industrial sector (Letsema Strategy Services 2010). 
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Short-term portfolio inflows have amplified short term credit extension to 
households through the financial system (Ashman et al. 2013a). 
 
A further area of “financial deepening” has been the rapid growth, albeit from a low 
base, of a South African venture capital and private equity (henceforth private 
equity) industry targeting the purchase, restructuring and resale of existing firms 
within a period of five to seven years with returns in excess of alternative asset 
classes such as listed equities (Bhika 2014). Funds under management have risen 
from R39.3bn in 2003 to R171.1bn in 2014 (KPMG and SAVCA 2015). At the end of 
2007 private equity funds under management were equivalent to 2.8% of GDP 
(Padayachee 2013). Manufacturing makes up a significant proportion of South 
African private equity holdings, comprising 24.8% of unrealised investments in 
2014 (KPMG and SAVCA 2015). Private equity has played an important role in two 
respects relevant to this study. First, private equity firms and methods have played 
a prominent role in conglomerate unbundling of a range of engineering assets. 
Second, and overlappingly, private equity has been prominent in a number of BEE 
transactions with private equity techniques an important mechanism for building 
up leading BEE investment holding companies such as Kagiso Tiso Holdings (KTH). 
As discussed below the Public Investment Corporation (PIC), investor of public 
pension funds, has been the leading provider of capital to a growing South African 
private equity industry aimed primarily at building up black-owned financial firms. 
 
Contrary to the predictions of GEAR, low inflation, fiscal deficits, and capital account 
liberalisation and the associated ushering in of Anglo-American capital market 
institutions have not been associated with significant improvements in gross fixed 
capital formation and savings levels. South African gross fixed capital formation as 
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a percentage of GDP has been weak in comparison with the peer middle-income 
comparators. This is despite the financial sector having exhibited the fastest growth 
of any sector over the post-apartheid period with its share in GDP rising from 
around 6% to 14% between 1990 and 2014 (South African Reserve Bank n.d.) Far 
from demonstrating rising levels of efficiency, there has been increasing inefficiency 
in the core function of the financial sector to mobilise savings and channel it into 
productive investment, with each Rand of savings and investment mobilised 
“requiring” an increasing share of finance in GDP. This is reflective of large-scale 
rents transferred from the real economy to the financial sector and institutional 
investors rather than being invested to raise private fixed investment and shift its 
patterns towards structural transformation of the economy, particularly 
manufacturing sectors outside of heavy industry. 
 
5.3 The evolution of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) 
 
5.3.1 BEE: from tactical conglomerate legitimation mechanism to 
cornerstone of economic policy 
 
Over the post-apartheid period Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) has been 
fundamentally transformed from a tactical legitimation mechanism initiated by the 
large conglomerates to a cornerstone of economic policy and practice. A “first phase” 
of conglomerate initiated transfers to consortia headed by individuals prominent in 
ANC circles, typically in the form of highly leveraged special purpose vehicles (SPVs) 
dependant on dividend flows for repayment of debt, quickly propelled black 
ownership from virtually nothing to 9.6% of JSE market capitalisation by 1998 
(Table 5.1 above). However, the collapse of many of these deals with the onset of the 
1998 Asian crisis and the narrowness of its beneficiaries prompted the creation of a 
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Black Economic Empowerment Commission in 2001 leading to the entrenchment of 
BEE in public policy, legislation and practice BEE has advanced most rapidly in 
sectors requiring government licencing and sectors in which procurement by 
government and state owned enterprises is a major source of demand (Iheduru 
2004; Hirsch 2005; Chabane et al. 2006; Southall 2007; Tangri and Southall 2008; 
Cargill 2010). Criticism of the narrow base and political connectedness of early BEE 
beneficiaries and its overwhelming emphasis on ownership transfer led to the 
development by the DTI of Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment legislation 
and associated Codes of Good Practice providing for firms to meet BEE targets 
through a combination of ownership and non-ownership elements (Tangri and 
Southall 2008; Cargill 2010). However, this broad based approach has been far from 
universally adopted by government departments and public entities. Mineral and 
liquid fuels licencing legislation and SOE procurement practices have 
overwhelmingly emphasised black ownership as their primary criterion. 
 
The first piece of legislation advancing BEE was the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act (MPRDA) (Government of South Africa 2002) and 
associated Mining Charter, which effectively clawed back existing mining rights to 
the state with the chief conditionality attached to the issue of “new order” mining 
rights dependent on achieving a minimum of 15% black shareholding by 2009 and 
26% by 2014. Mining companies were also obliged to meet targets of at least 40% 
black management, targets for various categories of procurement from black 
empowered companies, and socio-economic plans related to employee housing and 
community development. The extent to which the Department of Mineral Resources 
(DMR) has monitored and enforced the socio-economic development obligations of 
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the Charter has been subjected to significant question (Ponte et al. 2007; Tangri and 
Southall 2008; Capps 2012). 
 
Given the prominence BEE has occupied in economic policies there has been 
surprisingly little collection of official statistics enumerating the extent to which 
ownership and non-ownership elements of BEE have progressed (Acemoglu et al. 
2007). There has been vigorous contestation over the extent to which ownership of 
assets has been transferred into black hands through BEE processes. As reflected in 
Table 5.1, ownership by black groups of the JSE, as estimated by McGregor’s, 
remains low. Mirroring the fall in black ownership after the Asian financial crisis in 
1998, black ownership fell from 7% in 2009 to 1.3% in 2014 after the onset of the 
global financial crisis. Other estimates place black ownership considerably higher: 
10% direct black ownership in 2013 and 23% including ownership via pensions and 
other investment schemes (Old Mutual 2016). Irrespective of specific levels of JSE 
ownership a process of large-scale rent transfer has taken place relative to levels of 
fixed investment in the economy. One estimate places the “unencumbered”, or debt-
free, value of shares transferred to BEE recipients by the 100 largest companies 
listed on the JSE between 2000 and 2014 at R317bn. This figure represents the 34% 
of BEE deals that have been finalised over this period, with 64% of “live” BEE deals 
still due to “vest”, that is to transfer sufficient cumulative dividends to BEE 
purchasers of shares to extinguish the debt raised to finance the purchase (Intellidex 
2015). Similarly, to the large-scale transfers to shareholders via dividends and share 
buybacks, this figure is likely to substantially underestimate BEE asset and wealth 
transfers through other mechanisms, particularly procurement by government and 
SOEs. Although levels of black ownership on the JSE remain low the large-scale of 
these (conservatively estimated) transfers is evident when related to levels of fixed 
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investment in the economy. These transfers have been equivalent to 8% of total 
fixed investment in the economy and 29% of manufacturing investment respectively 
between 2000 and 2014. Similarly to financial flows to institutional investors, there 
is little to indicate that BEE transfers have contributed to the growth in gross fixed 
capital formation in general, or manufacturing in particular, as discussed in the next 
two sub-sections. 
 
5.3.2 BEE and the role of public finance institutions 
 
The two largest public financing institutions: the Public Investment Corporation 
(PIC) and the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) together with the National 
Empowerment Fund (NEF) have placed significant emphasis on BEE, both providing 
and leveraging finance towards this end. The PIC invests the pension contributions 
of state employees to the Government Employee Pension Fund (GEPF) and other 
smaller public pension funds. It is the single largest institutional investor both in the 
South African economy and on the continent, with R1.8 trillion in assets under 
management. The PIC accounts for approximately 12.5% of the market 
capitalisation of the JSE, is the largest single investor in the Top 40 listed companies 
on the JSE, accounts for 28% of South Africa’s bond market capitalisation, 25% of 
South African government bonds, and has the largest single exposure to SOE bonds. 
Outside of equities and bonds, the PIC’s single largest area of asset allocation has 
been in property, accounting for 11.3% of the JSE listed property index and a very 
large exposure to unlisted properties comprising R94.1bn or 5.19% of its assets in 
2015. It also has large offshore holdings and a significant and growing exposure to 
investments on the rest of the continent. The PIC states that it seeks to balance its 
pension fund mandate with socio-economic objectives with the latter involving an 
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overwhelming emphasis on prising open the upper echelons of ownership and 
management for black participation, particularly in the financial and property 
sectors (Public Investment Corporation n.d.). 
 
5.3.3 BEE and industrialisation 
 
South Africa’s BEE policy is predicated on a combination of redressing historic 
discrimination, ensuring social and political stability in which development can take 
place and promoting accumulation by emerging black capitalists (Republic of South 
Africa 2003). From the perspective of cumulative causation theory, which assigns a 
central role to capital accumulation in manufacturing, the emergence of black 
industrial capitalists, essential to raise growth and employment in South Africa, 
have not until recently been emphasised.  
 
Reflecting the two major policy levers driving BEE, ownership transfers on the JSE 
between 2000 and 2014 have occurred most rapidly in sectors reliant on state 
licencing and public procurement. In absolute terms, the largest transfers of wealth 
to black ownership have been in firms forming part of the mining (R101bn), banking 
and financial (R89bn), “industrials” (R57bn) telecommunications (R17bn) and 
healthcare (R14bn) groupings of the JSE (Intellidex 2015). From the perspective of 
industrialisation, companies included in the “Industrial” indices of the JSE are 
largely a misnomer. They overwhelmingly include non-manufacturing companies 
such as retailers and logistics firms or companies that have a low contribution of 
manufacturing to overall revenues and profits (Zalk 2014a). 
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BEE ownership transfer has proceeded very slowly in the manufacturing sector. 
This appears to a significant degree to be because of the low and declining 
profitability of the sector in aggregate and hence the limited attractiveness for BEE 
investors on the one hand, nor the scale of rents necessary to effect such transfer on 
the other. As illustrated in Chapters 6 and 7 the unbundling of Iscor’s steel 
operations was not accompanied by requirements to introduce BEE nor demands 
from prospective BEE investors for such participation. in what were then relatively 
low profitability steel assets. This stands in contrast to intense contestation over 
lucrative iron ore mining rights, as reflected in Section 7.4, as iron ore in the context 
a boom in iron ore prices over much of the 2000s. Opportunities for emerging BEE 
groups to take deeper stakes in manufacturing, including the potential to achieve 
majority black ownership, have been eschewed in favour of often much smaller 
stakes in large mining and financial sector transactions, as reflected for instance in 
the case of Shanduka’s engagement with Scaw and Kagiso-Tiso’s approach to 
manufacturing. 
 
Licencing and public procurement regulations and de facto practice have been 
inimical to domestic manufacturing and have perversely favoured foreign OEMs 
over domestic manufacturers. The Mining Charter places a requirement on mining 
companies not only to have in excess of 25% of black ownership, but to cascade this 
requirement down to their own suppliers. Thus the Mining Charter (Republic of 
South Africa 2002) set targets for procurement from black empowered companies 
for 2014 as follows: capital goods: 40%; services: 70%; consumables: 50% (with 
multinational suppliers of capital goods also to contribute 0.5% of sales into a social 
development fund). SOEs have similarly placed overwhelming emphasis on BEE 
ownership objectives. These arrangements perversely favour foreign OEMs over 
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domestic manufacturers. Since there has been little consideration of local content in 
mining policy, nor until recently in relation to SOE procurement practices it has 
become attractive and relatively easy for a foreign OEM to open up an “empowered” 
sales office in South Africa and gain an advantage over a “non-empowered” South 
African manufacturer.  
 
Recently the DTI has sought to respond to the low levels of black participation in the 
manufacturing sector through the introduction of a “Black industrialist” programme 
that has sought to promote black ownership and active management in the sector 
(Department of Trade and Industry 2015). IDC has followed suite, announcing an 
allocation of R23bn to support black industrialists. However, there has been 
significant contestation over what constitutes a black “industrialist” with a strong 
push in some quarters to include intermediation activities with little value-added 
and sometimes overwhelmingly embodying imports. For example, state-owned 
South African Airways has committed to channelling half of its approximately R20bn 
annual procurement spend towards “black industrialists” which in practice 
predominantly involves the insertion of intermediaries in the procurement of 
imported jet fuel (Creamer 2015). 
 
A more recent shift within parts of the ANC and the state from the rhetoric of a 
“Developmental State” to that of using state institutions to promote a new phase of 
accelerated asset transfers to black ownership through named “Radical Economic 
Transformation” has been associated by various analysts with a shift to a new form 
of predatory accumulation and patronage (Friedman 2016, 2017; Bhorat et al. 
2017). This phenomenon is said to be centred around an expatriate Indian business 
family, the Guptas, with controversial links to President Zuma, his family and 
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associates who have “captured” contracts and licences awarded by various 
government departments and state-owned enterprises (Public Protector 2016; 
Bhorat et al. 2017). “Political cover” for this process is said to be secured through 
the flow of rents to “rural barons”, that is Premiers of provinces with large rural 
populations, with these rents used in part to secure support within political and 
bureaucratic structures of the provinces (Friedman 2016, 2017; Bhorat et al. 2017). 
This phenomenon has coincided with substantial difficulty experienced by the DTI 
in compelling SOEs such as Transnet and Prasa to give effect to localisation 
requirements. These obligations are embodied in the designation of a range of rail 
rolling stock and associated components to be manufactured domestically at or 
above specified levels of local content, as part of a broader strategy to revive the rail-
related manufacturing and export competitiveness (Crompton et al. 2017). Recent 
e-mail leaks allege that the Gupta family struck a “facilitation” fee for approximately 
10% of the value of the single largest rail contract, between Transnet and China 
South Rail (amaBhungane and Scorpio 2017). 
 
5.4 Trade, industrial and competition policy 
 
5.4.1 Trade liberalisation 
 
In anticipation of reintegration into international institutions upon the reaching a 
political settlement between the state and the ANC, the late-apartheid government 
tabled a minimalist offer in 1990 to participate in the Uruguay round of trade 
negotiations of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the predecessor 
to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), committing South African to no more than 
binding, or placing a ceiling on, 55% of its industrial tariffs. However, in 1993, under 
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the stewardship of Derek Keys, South Africa submitted a fundamentally revised 
offer. 26  This revised offer committed South Africa to a unilateral and 
unreciprocated 33% average reduction across all its industrial tariffs with some 
exceptions for the clothing and textiles and automotive industries, and a 21% cut in 
agricultural tariffs (Hirsch 2005).27  
 
As part of its membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) South Africa went 
further, unilaterally lowering its tariffs beyond what was required in terms of its 
1993 WTO commitments. As reflected in Table 5.2 the average industrial tariff was 
cut from 28% in 1990 to 23% in 1994 and to 8.2% by 2004, a reduction of 64% over 
the latter period (Edwards 2005). The engineering sectors, not particularly 
protected by 1994, experienced further deep relative cuts between 1994 and 2004: 
58% in Metal products (from 18.5 to 7.8%), 68% in Machinery and equipment (from 
10.5 to 3.4%) and 93% in Transport equipment (from 12.3 to 0.8%). The average 
tariff on Basic iron and steel fell by 57% (from 9.0 to 3.9%). The effects of these cuts 
were thus felt in the engineering sector and smaller steel producers, particularly in 
the castings and foundry subsector. Conversely, as discussed in Section 5.4.4 below 
trade liberalisation has had a limited impact on large integrated carbon steel 
producers Iscor, Highveld and stainless steel producer Acerinox (previously 
Columbus) due to “natural” protection arising from the high logistics costs of 
imported steel. 
 
                                                        
26  By 1992 Keys was Minister of both Economic Co-ordination and Trade and Industry, and 
effectively responsible for the Finance portfolio. 
27  As part of this process quantitative restrictions were converted to tariffs in 1994, import 
surcharges were phased out by 1995 and a crudely constructed export subsidy (the General Export 
Incentive Scheme (GEIS)) was scaled down and terminated by 1997 (Edwards 2005) 
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From around 2006 and informed by the introduction of a national industrial policy 
framework and plans, discussed in Section 5.4.3 below, tariffs were to be used 
strategically, informed by sector development strategies with an emphasis on 
promoting downstream value-adding and more labour-intensive sectors. A 
particular area where tariffs were in fact lowered was on intermediate input sectors 
engaged in the practice of import parity pricing including primary carbon and 
stainless steel, aluminium and chemical products. The coherence and effectiveness 
of the revival of tariff policy as an instrument of industrial policy has been, at least 
in part, undermined by its institutional fragmentation and limited evidence of 
reciprocity required from industrialists in exchange for tariff protection (Tregenna 
and Kwaramba 2014). 
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Table 5.2: Scheduled tariffs and collection rates (%), 1994 versus 2004 and 2003 respectively 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Edwards (2005) 
Note: Scheduled and collection rates are inclusive of surcharges. 
Sectors [SIC classification] Scheduled tariff 1994 Scheduled tariff 2004 %  tariff reduction Collection rates 1994 Collection rates 2003 % reduction in collection rate
Total 22,3 7,9 -65% 13,6 6,1 -55%
Agriculture, forestry & fishing [1] 9,0 3,3 -63% 7,6 3,6 -53%
Mining [2] 2,8 0,8 -71% 1,6 0,4 -75%
Coal mining [21] 0,0 0,0 - 0,0 0,0 -
Gold & uranium [23] 10,0 0,0 -100% 0,0 0,0 -
Other mining [22/24/25/29] 2,9 0,9 -69% 1,7 0,4 -76%
Manufacturing [3] 22,9 8,2 -64% 13,9 6,3 -55%
Food [301-304] 22,8 11,2 -51% 18,2 10,6 -42%
Beverages [305] 36,4 12,3 -66% 49,4 30,9 -37%
Tobacco [306] 46,1 29,7 -36% 38,4 26,5 -31%
Textiles [311-312] 41,2 16,5 -60% 19,3 12,5 -35%
Wearing apparel [313-315] 75,1 31,0 -59% 32,7 18,2 -44%
Leather & leather products [316] 25,9 11,4 -56% 22,7 11,4 -50%
Footwear [317] 47,9 22,4 -53% 48,6 28,6 -41%
Wood & wood products [321-322] 14,8 8,7 -41% 14,0 7,9 -44%
Paper & paper products [323] 11,4 6,5 -43% 9,9 5,7 -42%
Printing & publishing [324-326] 16,1 4,7 -71% 14,0 4,6 -67%
Coke & refined petroleum [331-333] 12,6 3,4 -73% 3,6 3,4 -6%
Basic chemicals [334] 8,3 1,7 -80% 5,9 1,2 -80%
Other chemicals [335-336] 16,4 4,3 -74% 11,8 3,2 -73%
Rubber products [337] 19,0 10,6 -44% 16,8 10,8 -36%
Plastic products [338] 19,9 9,6 -52% 19,4 11,4 -41%
Glass & glass products [341] 17,2 7,3 -58% 16,2 6,3 -61%
Non-metallic minerals [342] 15,5 5,6 -64% 13,2 4,8 -64%
Basic iron & steel [351] 9,0 3,9 -57% 5,4 3,1 -43%
Basic non-ferrous metals [352] 8,8 2,0 -77% 4,3 1,6 -63%
Metal products [353-355] 18,5 7,8 -58% 15,2 6,6 -57%
Machinery & equipment [356-359] 10,5 3,4 -68% 7,0 1,8 -74%
Electrical machinery [361-366] 18,5 7,2 -61% 14,1 5,6 -60%
Communication equipment [371-373] 24,1 2,7 -89% 16,3 1,5 -91%
Professional & scientific [374-376] 12,4 0,3 -98% 11,2 0,2 -98%
Motor vehicles [381-383] 26,1 14,6 -44% 10,1 7,2 -29%
Other transport equipment [384-387] 12,3 0,8 -93% 9,9 1,1 -89%
Furniture [391] 32,2 17,4 -46% 28,6 16,6 -42%
Other manufacturing [392-393] 26,9 5,8 -78% 24,8 5,2 -79%
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5.4.2 The role of the Industrial Development Corporation 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) 
established itself as the leading de facto voice on trade and industrial policy (which 
it treated as interchangeable) over the transition and key proponent of trade 
liberalisation. The implementation of sweeping trade liberalisation described above 
took place for the most part in the absence of industrial strategies for the 
restructuring of manufacturing industries, with the most notable exception being 
the automotive sector. However, in stark contrast to the rhetoric of the need for 
undistorted market-determined outcomes, large-scale de facto public support was 
directed towards private conglomerate resource-processing mega-project 
expansions over the 1990s, including privatised Iscor and Sasol. This support 
comprised a mix of IDC funding, the generous “37E” tax allowance (a reference to 
the relevant section of the Income Tax Act), cheap long-term electricity supply 
arrangements from Eskom and disproportionate benefits from the clumsily 
designed General Export Incentive Scheme (GEIS)). 28  Capital-intensive mega-
project expansions supported by one or more of these mechanisms and generally 
involving IDC financing included:  
 The Columbus Stainless Steel project (a joint venture between Gencor, Anglo 
and the IDC) 
 Construction of a new integrated carbon steel plant at the port of Saldanha 
(a joint venture between recently privatised Iscor and the IDC) and the co-
                                                        
28 Section 37E of the Income Tax Act operated between 1991 and 1999 and introduced a tradable 
tax allowance (in the form of “negotiable tax credit certificates’’) for capital-intensive processing of a 
raw material or intermediate product which could either be deferred against future taxation when 
the lumpy capital intensive investments came on stream or “monetised” upfront by selling it (at a 
discount) to another entity against which the latter could offset its current tax obligations (Hanival 
and Rustomjee 2008). 
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located Duferco Steel Processing (DSP) steel mill to convert much of 
Saldanha’s output into cold-rolled steel (a joint venture between Swiss 
Duferco and the IDC) 
 The Alusaf aluminium smelting project (with Gencor and IDC as major 
investors) and associated Hulett Aluminium project (with Anglo American 
and IDC as major shareholders) 
 The Mozal aluminium smelting project in Maputo, Mozambique (involving 
Billiton (Gencor’s successor), Mitsubishi and the IDC), 
 The Namakwa Sands Titanium Slag (an Anglo subsidiary) and a Sasol 
expansion project were also both supported by the 37E tax incentive. 
(Macroeconomic Research Group 1993) 
 
From the early 1990s to the mid-2000s IDC funding reflected a combination of 
continuity with its historical patterns of support for capital-intensive resource-
processing projects, and a shift to the increasing funding of BEE ownership transfer 
deals, a significant proportion of which were in mining. IDC financing for 
investments in the non-ferrous metals (largely aluminium) and basic iron and steel 
industries accounted for one quarter of total national manufacturing investment in 
these sectors between 1992 and 1997, with the IDC providing R14.1bn of the 
R25.4bn invested in these projects (Mondi and Roberts 2005). IDC’s financing 
between 1994 and 2004 was concentrated on large-scale capital-intensive mineral-
processing projects in the metals and chemicals sectors, which represented a large 
proportion of national fixed investment in these sectors. In chemicals IDC 
investment fluctuated between 5 and 15% of fixed investment in the sector, peaking 
at 20% in 1994. In metals it ranged between 10 and 45% over most of the period, 
peaking at over 50% in 1999 (Hanival and Rustomjee 2008). Driven by mounting 
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regulatory requirements to introduce a minimum of 25% black ownership across 
the liquid fuels, mining and telecommunications sectors, a small number of large 
BEE ownership transfer deals featured increasingly in IDC financing between 1995 
and 2004, most prominently in mining, followed by the transport, storage and 
communication sectors (Mondi and Roberts 2005). The economic impact of this 
pattern was to reinforce apartheid patterns of investment in MEC sectors on the one 
hand, combined with financing for BEE ownership transfer deals (themselves 
concentrated in mining) involving little addition to fixed capital stock, and relative 
neglect of manufacturing outside of heavy industries (Mondi and Roberts 2005).  
 
The introduction by the DTI of the National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF) 
(Department of Trade and Industry 2007), various Industrial Policy Action Plans 
(IPAPs) (Department of Trade and Industry various years) and the Economic 
Development Department’s New Growth Path (NGP) (Economic Development 
Department 2008) policy framework saw the IDC commit to shift its focus towards 
supporting more labour-intensive and value-adding manufacturing sectors.  
 
However, there has been little discernible shift away from the IDC’s historical focus 
on capital intensive investments, as shown in Table 5.3. Rather considerable 
continuity is evident in IDC’s cumulative stock of funding of its historical support for 
large capital-intensive projects. At the end of 2015 45.9% of IDC’s debt funding and 
90% of its equity funding was advanced to a combination of mining, electricity and 
heavy industries. 29  By contrast 26.9% of debt and 2.7% of equity funding was 
                                                        
29  IDC’s exposure to electricity reflects its participation in funding renewable energy projects. 
Although this obviously departs from historical support for projects linked to coal-based electricity 
it does reflect continuity in the sense of support for large capital-intensive projects. 
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extended to manufacturing sectors outside of heavy industry (Industrial 
Development Corporation 2015). These patterns reflect the legacy of IDC’s 
investment in the steel, aluminium, petro-chemicals and fertiliser industries over 
the apartheid period and well into the 1990s. The large exposure to mining and a 
range of service sectors are due to IDC’s role in financing BEE share acquisitions as 
BEE ownership became the preeminent condition attached to state licenced sectors, 
from the mid-1990s onwards. Investment in electricity reflects the relative recent 
large-scale financing of IDC of renewable energy projects. Although IDC’s funding in 
steel and related sectors appears low, accounting for 0.2% and 4.1% of debt and 
equity funding respectively, it is understated. First, Iscor’s 2001 unbundling of its 
steel and mining operations, as discussed in Chapter 7, shifted the categorisation of 
iron ore and other minerals to mining. Second, IDC’s investments in ferrochrome 
and manganese fall are categorised under mining rather than manufacturing. 
Funding committed to engineering stands at 8.1 and 1.4% of debt and equity 
respectively.  
 
 201 
Table 5.3: IDC stock of loans, advances and investment securities by sector (Rm 
and %), 2015 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Industrial Development Corporation (2015) 
  
Loans and advances Investment securities
Other mining 2 767 12,3% Other chemicals and man-made fibres 22 093 38,5%
Electricity, gas and steam 2 616 11,7% Other mining 13 227 23,1%
Catering and accommodation services 2 348 10,5% Basic non-ferrous metals 9 001 15,7%
Communication 1 809 8,1% Medical, dental and other health and 
veterinary services
2 356 4,1%
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1 513 6,8% Basic iron and steel 2 325 4,1%
Food 1 487 6,6% Electricity, gas and steam 2 209 3,9%
Motor vehicles, parts and accessories 1 048 4,7% Other community, social and personal 
services
1 641 2,9%
Other chemicals and man-made fibres 1 005 4,5% Gold and uranium ore mining 907 1,6%
Metal products excluding machinery 827 3,7% Other transport equipment 755 1,3%
Coal mining 583 2,6% Basic chemicals 739 1,3%
Finance and insurance 560 2,5% Furniture 377 0,7%
Transport and storage 544 2,4% Non-metallic minerals 268 0,5%
Non-metallic minerals 470 2,1% Other industries 228 0,4%
Machinery and equipment 439 2,0% Other services 222 0,4%
Building construction 413 1,8% Finance and insurance 203 0,4%
Wood and wood products 370 1,7% Wood and wood products 122 0,2%
Electrical machinery 339 1,5% Transport and storage 87 0,2%
Other community, social and personal 
services
331 1,5% Coal mining 85 0,1%
Gold and uranium ore mining 329 1,5% Motor vehicles, parts and accessories 84 0,1%
Water supply 327 1,5% Agriculture, forestry and fishing 79 0,1%
Medical, dental and other health and 
veterinary services 
315 1,4% Professional and scientific equipment 61 0,1%
Furniture 295 1,3% Metal products excluding machinery 54 0,1%
Wearing apparel 292 1,3% Building construction 48 0,1%
Textiles 256 1,1% Food 42 0,1%
Plastic products 190 0,8% Business services 39 0,1%
Other transport equipment 134 0,6% Catering and accommodation services 37 0,1%
Basic chemicals 118 0,5% Electrical machinery 35 0,1%
Business services 110 0,5% Paper and paper products 18 0,0%
Glass and glass products 110 0,5% Communication 7 0,0%
Footwear 77 0,3% Television, radio and communication 
equipment
1 0,0%
Wholesale and retail trade 75 0,3% Textiles 1 0,0%
Professional and scientific equipment 70 0,3% Beverages - -
Other industries 56 0,2% Coke and refined petroleum products - -
Basic iron and steel 39 0,2% Footwear - -
Paper and paper products 33 0,1% Glass and glass products - -
Printing, publishing and recorded media 28 0,1% Government - -
Leather & leather products 18 0,1% Leather & leather products - -
Basic non-ferrous metals 17 0,1% Machinery and equipment - -
Television, radio and communication 
equipment
17 0,1% Plastic products - -
Government 15 0,1% Printing, publishing and recorded media - -
Beverages 13 0,1% Rubber products - -
Coke and refined petroleum products 5 0,0% Water supply - -
Rubber products 4 0,0% Wearing apparel - -
Other services - Wholesale and retail trade - -
22 412 100,0% 57 351 100,0%
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5.4.3 The late arrival of industrial policy 
 
In parallel with large-scale de facto industrial policy intervention in favour of 
capital-intensive resource-processing expansions, de-emphasised in the official 
articulation of industrial policy, immediate post-apartheid industrial policy more 
prominently emphasised a less well-resourced set of “supply side measures” with 
the objective of assisting small- and medium- size enterprises (SMEs) to adjust to 
rapid trade liberalisation, and reflecting the influence of the post-fordist “flexible-
specialisation” orientation of the ISP (Department of Finance 1996; Department of 
Trade and Industry 1998; Hirsch 2005). These incentives sought to promote SME 
investment, innovation and competiveness. In practice these “supply side measures” 
interventions were thinly spread over a multiplicity of firms and objectives, limiting 
their impact (Roberts 2005; Zalk 2014).  
 
Continuity over the post-apartheid period in support of large resource-processing 
projects has been evident, not only with respect to IDC funding and the 37E tax 
allowance discussed in the previous section, but in terms of the 1996 Tax Holiday 
Scheme and a Strategic Investment Programme (SIP) in operation between 2002 
and 2007 (Hanival and Rustomjee 2008). This support was extended with few 
conditionalities to support the development of downstream industries. Although the 
37E tax allowance apparently included an obligation to sell output at export parity 
prices to downstream fabricators using the input to manufacture products for the 
export market, the extent and duration of these commitments are unclear, with little 
evidence of monitoring and enforcement. Commitments to provide export parity 
pricing for fabricated exports appear to have been linked to time-bound commercial 
contracts which have apparently lapsed, for instance in the case of BHP Billiton’s 
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provision of aluminium from its Richard’s Bay plants and Iscor’s sale of steel from 
its Saldanha expansion. In practice Iscor evaded this requirement by supplying 
output from its newly established Saldanha plant at export parity prices to the co-
located Duferco project on condition that Duferco only sell its output into the export 
market (Hanival and Rustomjee 2008; Roberts and Rustomjee 2010). 
 
In the absence of an overall industrial policy framework and outside of support for 
capital-intensive resource-processing sectors and generic on-budget support there 
have been two major areas of sector-specific industrial policy support since the 
early 1990s: for the automotives and clothing and textile sectors. Under the Motor 
Industry Development Programme (MIDP) which commenced in 1995 the industry 
was restructured from multiple inefficient platforms to greater economies of scale 
and rapid growth in exports. Major challenges remain, however. A trade deficit in 
both vehicles and components has been high and risen. Domestic component 
production has been concentrated on narrow areas such as catalytic convertors and 
leather seat covers. The focus of a revised phase of automotive policy – the 
Automotive Production Development Programme (APDP) from 2013 through 2020 
– aims to raise economies of scale and localisation. The effectiveness of the 
programme has been contested with detractors arguing that levels of support and 
costs to consumers have been excessive and that the sector, particularly vehicle 
assembly, is relatively capital intensive in the context of South Africa’s 
unemployment crisis (Flatters 2005). Notwithstanding its limitations the 
programme has played an important role in sustaining linkages with other sectors 
such as metal fabrication and as the major source of manufacturing exports not 
linked to minerals (Barnes and Black 2013). 
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In an environment at least formally more open to industrial policy, in the context of 
an uneasy shift to the rhetoric a “Developmental State” towards the end of the Mbeki 
presidency, a National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF) (Department of Trade 
and Industry 2007) was launched in 2007 with implementation guided by 
subsequent annual Industrial Policy Action Plans (IPAP) (Department of Trade and 
Industry various years). Cautious support for industrial policy also arose from the 
market imperfections based inputs of the “Harvard Group” of economists drafted in 
by National Treasury, as discussed in Chapter 4. The NIPF emphasised the need for 
interventions to induce structural transformation of the economy away from a 
reliance on primary and semi-processed mineral commodities, the rapid growth of 
the financial sector and associated consumption-led growth path, in favour of higher 
value and more labour intensive manufacturing and other tradable sectors. It 
identified the need for government-wide policy alignment to support 
industrialisation including the exchange rate, industrial financing, public 
procurement, trade and competition policy. However, by the time of the 
introduction of the NIPF the scale of on-budget support for industrial policy 
programmes had dwindled with little meaningful budget allocation by the 2006/7 
financial year. Notwithstanding Cabinet approval of the NIPF in 2007 Treasury 
resistance to industrial policy meant that meaningful budget allocations only began 
from 2009/10 well into the spill-over of the global financial crisis onto the South 
African economy (Zalk 2014a).  
 
Under the NIPF and sequential IPAPs sectoral strategies were mounted, in practice 
unevenly, for industries identified as having growth and employment potential as 
well as to preserve employment in certain vulnerable sectors like clothing. 
Engineering was identified as a leading cluster of targeted industries in metal 
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fabrication, capital equipment and transport equipment due to their potential to 
induce linkage formation with other sectors and to resuscitate and build on pre-
existing capabilities (Department of Trade and Industry 2010). Significant emphasis 
was placed on opportunities to provide machinery and fabricated products into a 
revived public expenditure programme, particularly in electricity generation and 
transmission, and the recapitalisation of freight and passenger rail. Successive IPAPs 
have thus emphasised the need to leverage these areas of public investment in order 
to build industrial capabilities within firms, initially to serve domestic demand but 
thereafter capable of competing in export markets as domestic investment peaks 
and declines. A second area of focus has been to support the further development of 
a significant pocket of relative export success of capital equipment linked to mining 
which has unsurprisingly developed as a particular area of competency in the 
context of South Africa’s long history of reliance on mining. A related area of 
emphasis has been to address the disadvantage that the monopolistic practice of 
import parity pricing of steel and other semi-processed commodities present for the 
downstream steel-consuming engineering sectors. The direct and indirect 
contribution to engineering costs of production of steel inputs in the Metal products 
and Machinery and equipment sectors is estimated to vary from 23.4 to 42.7% 
(Table 5.4), rendering steel pricing critical for the ability of these sectors to compete 
against imports and in export markets.  
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Table 5.4: Direct and indirect proportion of the value of steel as an input into 
metal product and machinery sectors (%) 
Sector Sub-sector % Direct 
inputs 
% Direct inputs + 
Indirect inputs 
Metal products Structural metal products 32.0% 42.7% 
 Other fabricated metal 
products 
36.6% 42.2% 
 Treated metal products 35.8% 40.9% 
Machinery and 
Equipment 
General machinery 19.3% 24.9% 
 Mining machinery 18.8% 24.4% 
 Food machinery 18.4% 23.4% 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry (2010) based on Statistics South Africa data. 
 
The NIPF and IPAPs identified the need to amend public procurement regulations 
to introduce local content requirements in areas such as the rail recapitalisation 
programme and to introduce similar objectives into mining policy and regulations. 
Leveraging public procurement was also identified in 2009 as a critical measure in 
the country’s response to onset of the global crisis (National Economic Development 
and Labour Council, 2009). However, reflecting the National Treasury’s ideological 
ill disposition towards such measures, it took until the middle of 2012 to introduce 
the necessary amendments to the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 
(PPPFA) (Zalk 2014a) The amended regulations empowered the DTI to “designate” 
certain products procured by public entities, requiring minimum levels of local 
content. Initially designated sectors have included rail rolling stock, buses, certain 
inputs into electricity generation and labour-intensive products such as apparel. In 
practice there have been substantial delays in the implementation of these 
designations by National Treasury (Department of Trade and Industry various 
years). Furthermore, there is limited evidence of compliance with designations, 
particularly with respect to the large-scale rail rolling stock procurement 
programmes by the SOEs responsible for freight and passenger rail respectively: 
Transnet and Prasa (Department of Trade and Industry various years; Crompton et 
al. 2017). Apparent failure to give meaningful effect to localisation requirements 
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have coincided with reportedly corrupt deals struck with foreign OEMs, linked to 
the patronage networks described in Section 5.3.3 (Bhorat et al. 2017) 
 
5.4.4 The role of competition policy 
 
Apartheid-era competition policy is widely considered to have been ineffective in 
curbing the highly concentrated conglomerate structure that was consolidated, 
extensively via acquisition rather than net new investment, over the 1980s, or in 
acting against abuses of market dominance. Unlike large conglomerates in Japan or 
South Korea, there was little association between South African conglomeration and 
the development of a dynamic and internationally competitive industrial base 
outside of the commodity processing sectors (Joffe et al. 1995; Fine and Rustomjee 
1996; Roberts 2004). 
 
In practice, and belying their rhetoric of support for Anglo-American style orthodox 
market policies that include robust measures against anti-competitive structure and 
conduct, the content of post-apartheid competition policy and legislation was 
heavily contested by the conglomerate groups in order to circumscribe its scope. 
The new Competition Act of 1998 (Republic of South Africa 1998) was formulated 
along restrictive lines with a strong emphasis on consumer protection, limited 
ability to address pre-existing industrial structure, and stronger powers than ersatz 
apartheid-era competition legislation to act against ex-post anti-competitive 
behaviour (Roberts and Zalk 2004; Makhaya and Roberts 2013).  
 
In its first few years, and coinciding with the most intense period of corporate 
unbundling and re-consolidation, the competition authorities focused almost 
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exclusively on a minimalist function of assessing large mergers, blocking only a 
handful which would obviously have an egregious impact on competition (Chabane 
et al. 2003). In the steel sector it approved a number of mergers without substantive 
conditions related to the development of steel using-sectors. These included the 
merger of Iscor and Saldanha and between steel traders Trident and Baldwins and 
most starkly the approval of LNM’s (the precursor to ArcelorMittal) acquisition of a 
majority stake in Iscor (Chabane et al. 2003), as discussed Chapter 7. 
 
Competition policy has proved an extremely limited instrument in dealing with the 
practice of import parity pricing of semi-processed industrial inputs, particularly 
metals and chemicals. Country and sub-regional specificities render this a particular 
problem in the South African economy. Scale intensive industries such as steel are 
likely to be product-specific natural monopolies in a small economy. Hence the 
alternate source of supply for steel-consuming industries is to import. This allows 
domestic producers to price up to the point it would cost to import: namely an 
import parity price. The practice of charging higher prices in the domestic than 
export markets, even in the absence of tariff protections, is undoubtedly widespread 
worldwide to a greater or lesser degree (implying some degree of dumping in export 
markets). However, the confluence of specific product and geographic conditions 
render it a particular, possibly unique, constraint to South African manufacturing. 
Bulky and heavy semi-processed products like steel embody a high weight-to-value 
ratio meaning that sea freight and rail costs make up a relatively large proportion of 
the delivered price. In most regions of the world, potential alternative regional 
sources of supply discipline pricing even in small economies. Due to the under-
industrialisation of the Southern African region, there are no competing integrated 
steel plants in the region. Furthermore, the location of a large part of steel-
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consuming industries in the inland “PWV” (Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging) or 
“Vaal Triangle” area impose high relative external and internal transport costs to 
imports. This has allowed domestic primary producers, particularly Iscor and 
Highveld to price steel up to what it would cost to import, that is to introduce a set 
of notional transport and related costs into domestic steel pricing including a “hassle 
factor” to capture the logistical disadvantages of importing. Thus notwithstanding 
the largest domestic producer, and hence price leader, Iscor and its successor AMSA 
having been for a sustained period of time in the lowest quartile of the global cost 
curve they have priced steel in the highest quartile of global prices. As elaborated in 
Chapter 7, however, much of this cost advantage was derived from concessional iron 
ore arrangements, with the commodity boom of 2002-2008 masking 
underinvestment and rapidly rising inefficiencies. 
 
5.4.5 Labour market inflexibility and skills deficits: the villains of weak 
post-apartheid industrial performance? 
 
As apartheid racist controls over black movement, occupation and social 
provisioning shifted over the post-war period to becoming more obviously inimical 
to accumulation, conglomerates such as Anglo and Rembrandt called for measures 
to create a more stable urban black workforce, including the legalisation of black 
trade unions. However, the conflicts of the 1980s often blurred the boundaries 
between political and workplace struggles, leading to high levels of conflict (Forrest 
2011). Thus the prospect of a post-apartheid labour market regime which provided 
for orderly collective bargaining was initially welcomed by conglomerates such as 
Anglo (Anglo American Industrial Corporation various years). 
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Declining post-apartheid manufacturing employment amid rising economy-wide 
unemployment is linked to a dominant consensus, traced in Section 4.1.2, that 
excessive labour market protections have been extended since the mid-1980s to low 
skilled workers while a poorly performing education system and vocational skills 
have perpetuated the apartheid-era legacy of skills shortages in the context of 
increasingly “skills biased technical change”. From this perspective the major post-
apartheid policy weakness has not been the “neoliberal” policies that flowed from 
GEAR but the failure to implement its commitment to labour market deregulation 
(Nattrass 2003; Nattrass and Seekings 2010; Kaplan 2015a, 2015b). An alternate 
view is that declining manufacturing employment and high unemployment are due 
to structural features of the economy, including weak domestic demand, low levels 
of fixed investment in manufacturing amid a shift toward a far greater financial 
orientation of the economy, and the continued dominance of capital-intensive heavy 
industry with manufacturing (Adelzadeh 1996; Standing et al 1996; Weeks 1999; 
Mohamed and Roberts 2008; Ashman et al. 2013a). 
 
Available empirical indicators cast significant doubt on the claim that South Africa’s 
uniquely high levels of unemployment can be explained predominantly in terms of 
labour market inflexibility, excessive wage rates and weak skills formation. First, 
notwithstanding surprisingly little cross-country data compiled on South African 
wage rates, available evidence suggests, that while South Africa is not a very low 
wage economy, relative unit labour costs in manufacturing declined substantially 
between the 1970s and the late 1990s relative both to developed and developing 
countries (Edwards and Golub 2004). Furthermore, relative wages in tradable 
sectors are sensitive to exchange rate movements, with periods of overvaluation 
pushing up relative wage costs even in the absence of domestic wage increases 
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(Rodrik 2008, Zalk 2012, 2014a). Second there is no obvious relationship between 
measures of labour market rigidity and unemployment across a range of developing 
countries as reflected in Figure 5.4, suggesting South Africa’s uniquely high levels of 
unemployment cannot predominantly be explained by levels of labour market 
rigidity. 
 
Figure 5.4: Rigidity of employment index versus unemployment (%), 2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Development Indicators (World Bank n.d.a) and World 
Bank Rigidity of Employment Index (n.d.b)  
Note: ARG: Argentina, BRA: Brazil, CHL: Chile, CHN: China, CZE: Czech Republic, HKG: Hong Kong SAR, 
China, HUN: Hungary, IND: India, IDN: Indonesia, KOR: Korea, Rep., MYS: Malaysia, MEX: Mexico, POL: 
Poland, RUS: Russian Federation, ZAF: South Africa, THA: Thailand, TUR: Turkey, VNM: Vietnam 
 
Third, shortages of skilled labour do not feature as prominent reasons given by firms 
for underutilisation of production capacity (Figure 5.5). Rather firms cite 
inadequate demand as their overwhelming constraint. This is not to suggest that 
skills formation is irrelevant or deny fundamental weaknesses with skills 
development institutions. Rather it suggests that skills shortages are not the 
proximate constraint to the growth of manufacturing value-added and employment. 
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Indeed, inadequate skills would likely become a much more significant constraint in 
the eventuality of more rapid manufacturing output growth. 
 
Figure 5.5: Reasons for underutilisation of production capacity (%), 2013 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Statistics South Africa (n.d.) 
 
5.5 Economic performance: putting the brakes on the engine of growth 
 
South African manufacturing has performed poorly relative to peer middle-income 
countries over the post-apartheid period, as discussed in Chapter 1, reflected by 
lower levels of fixed investment, share of manufacturing in GDP and growth of 
manufactured exports. Within the South African economy manufacturing was the 
fourth slowest-growing broad sector between 1990 and 2015 after electricity, 
agriculture and gold mining (South African Reserve Bank n.d.). Weak manufacturing 
growth has been accompanied by a large reduction in employment, from 1.63 
million workers in 1990 to 1.14 million in 2015 representing a loss of 30% of the 
manufacturing workforce (South African Reserve Bank n.d.). 
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Figure 5.6: Index of sectoral manufacturing value added (MVA) growth (Rm 
2010), 1990-2015 (1990=100) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the South African Standardised Industry Indicator Database 
(Quantec n.d.). 
 
Figure 5.6 demonstrates that manufacturing was only 50% larger in real terms in 
2015 than it was in 1990. By contrast the steel sector has grown by over 140% over 
the same period while the Machinery sector has slightly outperformed 
manufacturing as a whole. Both Metal products and Transport equipment have 
grown more slowly than the manufacturing average, with the latter slightly smaller 
than it was in 1990. These overall patterns however, mask variations over the post-
apartheid periods including both pockets of success and fundamental weaknesses. 
A longer term perspective indicates that the engineering sector, comprising Metal 
products, Machinery and Transport equipment peaked in the early 1980s and 
collectively has yet to recover these levels as reflected in Figure 5.7. This reflects, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, the reliance of engineering on demand from large and lumpy 
fixed investments in mining and heavy industry and associated electricity and 
transport infrastructure and its limited subsequent reorientation. In South African 
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historical context, thus, Machinery and equipment stands out as the only 
engineering sector to have recovered and surpasses its peak of the early 1980s. 
Machinery achieved a robust period of growth over the 2000s coinciding with a 
boom underway in parts of the South African mining sector, notably platinum, and 
elsewhere on the continent. The steel sector was more than twice as large in 2008 
than its sub-peak in the early 1980s. As elaborated in Chapter 7 this reflects the 
state-supported expansions of the 1990s and the boom in international steel prices 
from the early 2000s, with the latter driven by large increases in price even as 
absolute levels of steel output were falling and inefficiencies setting in. 
 
Figure 5.7: Steel and Engineering sector value added (Rm 2010), 1970-2015 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the South African Standardised Industry Indicator Database 
(Quantec n.d.). 
 
Figure 5.7 reflects a number of more detailed patterns in steel and engineering. In 
all but Transport equipment wages and unit labour costs have moved in tandem 
with labour productivity outstripping growth in both wages and value-added. 
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However, in all but Machinery there has been a large decline in employment levels, 
most starkly in Steel. 
 
Figure 5.8: Index of Steel and Engineering value added, unit labour costs, wages, 
labour productivity (Rm 2010) and employment, 1990-2014 (1990=100) 
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Machinery and equipment 
 
 
Transport equipment 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the South African Standardised Industry Indicator Database 
(Quantec n.d.). 
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An influential argument seeking to explain the divergence between relatively high 
labour productivity and falling employment returns to the nexus of relatively high 
wages for low-skilled workers hypothesising that employment has fallen because 
manufacturers have replaced workers with machines (Nattrass 2003, 2014; 
Nattrass and Seekings 2010; Bhorat et al. 2014; Kaplan 2015a, 2015b). However, 
this “overinvestment” hypothesis is difficult to reconcile with actual investment 
rates in steel and engineering demonstrated in Figure 5.9, with no obviously 
dramatic increase over the last two decades. Machinery, the sector which has raised 
its investment rate from around 5% of value-added in 1995 to over 20% in 2012 has 
been the single sector which has retained and slightly grown employment levels. 
Conversely, Steel which has shed 50% of its workforce since 1990 has been 
characterised by a dramatic fall in its investment rates. As discussed in Chapter 7, 
the fall in investment rates in the steel sector has been associated with escalating 
inefficiencies under foreign ownership, which were masked for a period of time by 
rising steel prices during the global commodity boom of the 2000s. 
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Figure 5.9: Steel and Engineering investment rates: Gross domestic fixed 
investment to value added (Rm 2010), 1970-2015 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the South African Standardised Industry Indicator Database 
(Quantec n.d.). 
Note: Investment rate is calculated as the percentage of Gross Domestic Fixed Investment to Value 
Added 
 
Notwithstanding obvious problems with estimates of the level of import 
penetration, which appear to overstate levels of import intensity, Figure 5.10 
reflects that import penetration has risen substantially in the engineering sector 
over the post-apartheid period, most dramatically in the Machinery and equipment 
sector. This is reflective of a generalised trend across manufacturing as a whole in 
which import penetration doubled between 1990 and 2014 from under 20% of 
domestic demand to over 40% as trade liberalisation advanced (Quantec n.d.). 
Machinery and equipment imports, already at 50% by 1990 are recorded to have 
grown to 90% of domestic demand by 2015. Similarly, import penetration in 
transport equipment grew exceptionally rapidly from 30% in 1990 to over 90% 
before settling into a range of 60–70%. Import penetration in metals products 
tripled from 10% to 30%. Furthermore, since 2003 basic iron and steel, historically 
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manifesting relatively low levels of import penetration, saw its share of demand 
supplied by imports rising dramatically to a peak of 40% in 2008 before levelling off 
at around 25% by 2014.  
 
The evident anomaly of an import penetration ratio in excess of 100% in the case of 
machinery and equipment in 2007 strongly suggests the inclusion of imports for re-
export in these estimates, biasing upwards the estimated levels of import 
penetration. The likely inclusion of re-exports is further reflected in estimates of the 
export-output ratio, which in the case of Machinery and equipment also exceeds 
100%. Therefore, the trend in these ratios should be considered as indicative of 
developments in these sector rather than the levels themselves. 
 
Figure 5.10: Imports to domestic demand ratio in Steel and Engineering (%), 1990-
2015 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the South African Standardised Industry Indicator Database 
(Quantec n.d.). 
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Not only have imports of final goods risen but the import intensity of production in 
steel and engineering, with some fluctuations, has also risen substantially over the 
post-apartheid period as reflected in Figure 5.11. These increases have been most 
dramatic in Steel and Transport equipment. The dramatic rise in the import 
intensity of steel production is at face value counter-intuitive. The bulk of primary 
steel production has historically drawn overwhelmingly on domestic goods and 
services such as iron ore, electricity and transport services with coking coal the 
major imported input. Thus, the particularly large increase in import intensity since 
2001 reflects three main factors associated with the shift to foreign ownership of 
Iscor, as elaborated in Chapter 7. First, the transition from Iscor to ArcelorMittal 
South Africa (AMSA) has seen large increases in the levels of imports by AMSA itself 
from its own global parent, reflected by a dramatic increase in related party 
purchases. These purchases have in turn reflected the need to import due to 
multiple plant failures as well rationalisation of product lines produced in South 
Africa. Second, it is reflective of the shift by second-tier primary steel producers, to 
import steel rather than purchase domestically from AMSA due to high domestic 
prices. Third, and relatedly is the escalation of Chinese steel imports by second-tier 
producers as China’s growth and steel consumption has slowed. 
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Figure 5.11: Intermediate import ratio in Steel and Engineering (%), 1990-2015 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the South African Standardised Industry Indicator Database 
(Quantec n.d.). 
 
Manufacturing in general, and the steel and engineering sectors have become 
substantially more export oriented since 1990 as indicated in Figure 5.12. Metal 
products and Transport equipment exports have also risen substantially over the 
period to 30% of output. The Machinery and equipment sector has become the most 
dramatically export oriented over the post-apartheid period rising to a recorded 
level of production of around 80%. While almost certainly an overstatement of its 
level (due to the apparent inclusion of re-exports this increase is indicative of a 
process of hollowing out of the breadth of the capital goods sector (with the bulk of 
the domestic market served by imports) with international competitiveness 
circumscribed to a limited niche linked primarily to mining capital equipment. This 
is in turn indicative of the loss of engineering capabilities outside of mining capital 
equipment over the post-apartheid period, as reflected most dramatically in Chapter 
8 by the destructive unbundling of South Africa’s largest ever engineering firm: 
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Dorbyl. Furthermore, and notwithstanding niche export success in mining capital 
equipment, the unbundling of Scaw and Boart dismantled two global scale South 
African mining engineering firms, albeit embodying inherited weaknesses.  
 
Figure 5.12: Exports to output ratio in Steel and Engineering (%), 1990-2015 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the South African Standardised Industry Indicator Database 
(Quantec n.d.). 
 
In constant Rand terms there has been little aggregate transformation of the 
composition of the trade balance in steel and engineering between the apartheid 
and post-apartheid periods with the capital-intensive upstream Steel sector 
generating a significant trade surplus while engineering, and machinery and 
equipment in particular, generating a large trade deficit (Figure 5.13. 
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Figure 5.13: Trade balance in Steel and Engineering (Rm 2010), 1990-2015 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the South African Standardised Industry Indicator Database 
(Quantec n.d.). 
 
From the perspective of cumulative causation theory an integrated and dynamic 
steel and engineering sector has been identified as critical for development due to 
its potential to stimulate both forward and backward linkages, and develop a denser 
and more specialised production structure (Hirschman 1958; Toner 1999; Storm 
2015) as for instance Korea did in developing a steel industry to catalyse the 
production of sectors such as ship building and automotives (Amsden 1989). 
Notwithstanding elements of success, notably a robust export-oriented mining 
capital equipment industry, the restructuring of steel and engineering reflects a 
range of weaknesses with negative consequences for broader manufacturing 
performance and its potential stimulatory effect on the rest of the South African 
economy. More than three decades since its 1981 peak, the engineering sector 
(Metal products, Machinery and equipment and Transport equipment combined) in 
2015 was still only 85% of its 1981 level whereas steel had grown by 364% 
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(Quantec n.d.). Low growth and limited investment has been associated with large 
declines in employment in all but Machinery and equipment. Trade liberalisation 
has led to large increases in import penetration in both final and intermediate 
products. There has been a hollowing out of the capital goods sector, with the bulk 
of capital goods imported amid a pocket of export success chiefly in mining 
equipment. Furthermore, one of the erstwhile success stories of apartheid heavy 
industrialisation: steel has been the subject of profound deterioration of its capital 
stock and capabilities under foreign ownership, resulting in a deep crisis in the 
domestic steel industry since the global crisis. 
 
A range of empirical studies are supportive of the hypothesis that manufacturing 
has been and remains the predominant “engine of growth” amongst developing 
countries in general (Dasgupta and Singh 2005; Szirmai et al. 2013). Wells and 
Thirlwall (2003) find evidence for such a relationship across African countries, 
including South Africa. Support for the proposition also been found for South Africa 
specifically (Wittenburg 1997; Millin and Nichola 2005). The faltering of post-war 
apartheid growth was a consequence of the underdevelopment of linkages, 
particularly forward linkages out of heavy industries but also linkages backward 
from consumer goods and with a particular failure to develop the capital goods 
sector and deepen intermediate production (Macroeconomic Research Group 1993; 
Fine and Rustomjee 1996). However, the post-apartheid period has seen the 
perpetuation and deepening of these weaknesses rather than their reversal. This 
failure is manifest in the increasing import intensity of steel and engineering sector 
final demand and production, combined with the limited growth and diversification 
of engineering exports. Tregenna (2008) estimates that the stimulatory growth 
effect of an increase in demand for manufacturing transmitted to the rest of the 
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economy is significantly lower when intermediate inputs are factored in than would 
otherwise be the case (notwithstanding this effect the growth impetus of a unit 
increase in demand for manufacturing is larger than that for services, even factoring 
in intermediate inputs). This implies that the significant increase in import intensity 
of manufacturing production reflected in the analysis above has weakened the 
growth-inducing multiplier effects through the economy. This has a knock on effect 
on employment, with weak growth transmission from manufacturing to services 
limiting employment growth in services which has a higher employment multiplier 
than manufacturing. 
 
The weakening of growth multipliers (and by extension employment multipliers) in 
the South African economy is supported by the estimates produced by Burrows and 
Botha (2013). They find a consistent weakening between 1980 and 2010 across all 
sectors of the economy of "total GDP multipliers" that estimate the combined direct, 
indirect and induced effect of an increase in sectoral output. Table 5.5 illustrates that 
regardless of period engineering sector multipliers are consistently higher than 
those for either total manufacturing, finance and insurance or the total economy. By 
contrast steel has seen a disproportionately large fall in the strength of its multiplier 
effect. 
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Table 5.5: "Total GDP multipliers", economy, manufacturing, steel and 
engineering and finance and insurance, 1980-2010 
Source: Burrows and Botha (2013) 
 
Displaying significant cognitive dissonance Burrows and Botha attribute the decline 
in the strength of these multipliers to two major factors: increasing trade 
liberalisation and the unbundling of apartheid-era conglomerates and their greater 
ability to shift capital abroad but conclude that "the economy has become more 
specialized towards its comparative advantages, and hence more efficient and 
competitive" (Burrows and Botha 2013: 30).  
 
5.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has set out key policies and institutional arrangements flowing from 
South Africa’s post-apartheid political economy bargains, within a context of major 
shifts within the global economy. Specifically, it reflects how these policies and 
institutions of industrial restructuring have not delivered the virtuous economic 
outcomes conjectured by their advocates. In particular, they have not delivered the 
promised high levels of fixed investment, in non-traditional manufacturing sectors 
in particular. 
 
Orthodox policies and the deepening of Anglo-American style capital market 
institutions have instead facilitated the outflow of long-term investable capital and 
Column1 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Economy - Total 1.82  1.87  1.78  1.71  1.67  1.58  1.60  
Manufacturing 1.85  1.89  1.80  1.72  1.68  1.58  1.62  
Basic iron and steel 1.83  1.90  1.85  1.75  1.62  1.50  1.49  
Metal products excluding machinery 1.95  1.99  1.89  1.79  1.72  1.65  1.69  
Machinery and equipment 2.01  2.02  1.90  1.86  1.78  1.66  1.73  
Other transport equipment 2.02  1.89  1.91  1.95  1.83  1.74  1.83  
Electrical machinery and apparatus 1.88  1.93  1.84  1.78  1.63  1.60  1.63  
Motor vehides, parts and accessories 1.96  2.11  1.88  1.73  1.68  1.58  1.60  
Finance and insurance 1.95  1.79  1.71  1.70  1.64  1.65  1.61  
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replaced it with a reliance on volatile short-term inflows with large-scale rents 
flowing to institutional investors in particular. The conglomerate legitimation 
mechanism of BEE asset transfer, has similarly given rise to large-scale rent flows 
without a demonstrable contribution to fixed investment in general, and 
manufacturing in particular. Trade liberalisation has placed intense pressure on 
sectors such as engineering, without ameliorating the constraint of monopolistic 
steel pricing while competition policy has not had the power to deal with pre-
existing uncompetitive structure. Industrial financing dispensed by IDC, despite 
some reorientation, remains concentrated in capital intensive sectors. Furthermore, 
the primacy ascribed to labour market rigidities as the pre-eminent explanatory of 
weak manufacturing performance and high unemployment, is cast into doubt.  
 
Consequently, and notwithstanding some positive elements, engineering 
performance has been disappointing and indicative of a number of weaknesses and 
lost opportunities. While a pocket of relatively high growth exports has emerged in 
relation to mining equipment, the broader capital equipment sector has been 
hollowed out by imports amid the destructive unbundling of large engineering 
subsidiaries. The uncritical embrace of foreign ownership in steel has been 
associated with the entrenchment of monopolistic pricing combined with chronic 
underinvestment, leading to a deep crisis in the sector following the global financial 
meltdown. 
 
The next three chapters set out in detail how these institutional arrangements have 
shaped a destructive process of corporate and industrial restructuring of the steel 
and engineering interests of the three large business groups that have dominated 
sectors at the dawn of democracy: Iscor, Anglo American and Rembrandt.  
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Chapter Six 
Corporate restructuring of Anglo American and Rembrandt 
 
The strategic orientation of a country’s big business groups exerts a profound 
influence over its developmental trajectory (Amsden and Hikino 1994; Chandler 
1994; Chandler et al. 1999; Nolan 2001; Chabane et al. 2006). The three business 
groups that dominated South Africa’s iron ore, steel and engineering sectors by the 
early 1990s, comprising the two largest private conglomerates: Anglo American and 
Rembrandt and recently privatised Iscor, have been instrumental in shaping 
apartheid industrialisation and exerting a deep influence over the direction of post-
apartheid economic policy. As reflected in Chapter 4, Anglo and Rembrandt, 
together with the other largest business groups, secured policies amenable to as 
much “freedom of movement” to restructure capital domestically and shift capital 
abroad under the rhetorical banner of the superiority of neoliberal policies over 
alternatives. In doing so they embraced the “benign disciplines” of an increasingly 
demanding shareholder value movement over possible “interventionist” demands 
of a post-apartheid state. To secure policies favourable to maximum autonomy to 
restructure, they initiated the mechanism of BEE as a legitimation mechanism. This 
chapter and the two that follow deal with the consequences of these political 
economy bargains, neoliberal policy orientation, and consequent institutional 
arrangements on conglomerate restructuring in steel and engineering and the 
resultant impact on post-apartheid industrialisation.  
 
Section 6.1 deals with the post-apartheid domestic restructuring and 
internationalisation of Anglo American. It highlights how increasing demands from 
institutional investors on Anglo to raise shareholder value have led to the demise of 
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its primary industrial subsidiary AMIC, the deleterious unbundling of its South 
African steel and engineering assets and ultimately to Anglo’s own immiserisation 
as a global business group. Section 6.2 considers the complex restructuring of 
Rembrandt and its transition to Remgro involving an increasing financial 
orientation, an effective bargain with institutional investors to preserve family 
control in exchange for high shareholder returns, and consolidation of Remgro’s 
investments in sectors amenable to the assertion of one or other form of market 
dominance. It also reflects how Remgro has engaged with BEE through the careful 
and strategic introduction of BEE partners and the influence of Remgro’s investment 
holding company model on emerging BEE investment groups. Section 6.3 concludes 
that, rather than reflecting the operation an efficient market for corporate control, 
the decisive shift of these groups’ strategic orientation amid demands to deliver 
short term shareholder value resulted in the loss of accumulated engineering 
capabilities, which might otherwise have been reoriented and developed. 
 
6.1 Restructuring of Anglo American and the demise of the Anglo 
American Industrial Corporation (AMIC). 
 
Anglo American entered the 1990s as the largest of South Africa’s conglomerate 
groups, accounting for 43.3% of the market capitalisation of the JSE in 1994 
(McGregor’s various years). Anglo, as with other mining houses, straddled both the 
real and financial sectors of the economy with its mining finance operations at the 
apex of its structure and control of one of the largest commercial banks, First 
National Bank (FNB). Despite direct ownership of only 8.1%, the Oppenheimer 
family exerted ultimate control through a pyramid ownership structure and 
interlocking directorships and executive positions (Goldstein 2010). Anglo’s 
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presence in manufacturing was extensive, accounting for around 30% of its 
revenues in the early 1990s (Ashman et al. 2013b). In 1994 Anglo’s interests 
straddled mining: including gold, uranium, diamonds, coal, platinum, ferrous 
metals; industry and commerce; and financial services and property. Industrial and 
commercial holdings included: 
 
Agriculture, aluminium products, bricks, carbon black, chemicals, 
computers, construction, electrical engineering, electronics, engineered 
materials; explosives, fertilisers, food, beverage and wine, forestry, 
freight, gas, heavy engineering, iron, milling, motor assembly 
components and distribution, oil, paint, paper and pulp, packaging, 
petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, plastics, retailing, shaft-sinking, steel, 
sugar, textiles, timber products, trading, travel and tourism, and 
vanadium. 
(Anglo American Industrial Corporation 1994: 6)  
 
6.1.1 Domestic restructuring and offshore listing of Anglo American 
 
As Anglo sought to redefine its post-apartheid form in relation both to the state and 
institutional investors, it began a process of fundamental restructuring and 
unbundling. Anglo consciously sought to establish whether its most definitive act of 
accommodation with Afrikaner capital, its sale of General Mining in 1964 to Federale 
Volksbeleggings, could be used as a model for the unbundling of non-core assets into 
black hands (Cargill 2010). Concluding that it could, in 1996 Anglo initiated the 
unbundling of its Johannesburg Consolidated Investments (JCI) subsidiary into 
three entities. Amplats, comprised JCI’s platinum assets, was retained by Anglo. 
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Johnnic, made up of stakes in industrial activities including South African Breweries, 
food and beverage manufacturer Premier, Toyota (South Africa), engineering group 
Lenning and Times Media newspaper group, was sold to a group of black investors, 
the National Empowerment Consortium headed up by former trade-unionist leader 
and ANC Secretary General Cyril Ramaphosa. The remainder of JCI, comprising gold 
and coal mining, ferrochrome and other base metals was sold to a consortium 
headed by former Robben island political prisoner Mzi Khumalo. This deal collapsed 
under controversial circumstances with Khumalo accused of enriching himself and 
with Anglo ultimately buying back JCI’s gold assets (Chabane et al. 2006; Cargill 
2010). Despite a widespread consensus of the failure of the JCI deal as emblematic 
of the broader failure of a “first wave” of BEE deals, Anglo continues to celebrate it 
as “the biggest black empowerment deal in South African corporate history” (Anglo 
American 2016). The collapse of deals such as the JCI unbundling in turn ushered in 
intense pressure for the ultimate entrenchment of BEE in policy, legislation and 
regulation, which in turn has exerted a profound subsequent influence on Anglo’s 
South African mining operations. 
 
Anglo sought to anticipate and respond to long-standing dissatisfaction by 
institutional investors of the discount at which its shares were estimated to trade 
relative to their net asset value. This pressure from investors, particularly after 
listing on the London Stock Exchange, has seen Anglo undertake a series of 
restructurings to remove pyramidal ownership structures and cross-holdings and 
to define and focus on its “core” mining business and dispose of its “non-core” 
businesses. This has seen it dispose of its industrial and other non-mining 
businesses including its steel and engineering interests. In 1997 Anglo consolidated 
its gold and platinum interests under AngloGold and Amplats respectively which, 
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together with De Beers became the three main subsidiaries of a reconstituted group 
focused on mining and metals production. In 1998, Anglo merged its financial 
service interests in FNB and Southern Life with RMB to create FirstRand in which it 
held a 15.3% stake. It then swapped its FirstRand stake with Rembrandt in exchange 
for 7.1% of Billiton and 11.3% of Goldfields in 2000 consolidating Anglo’s presence 
in mining and Rembrandt’s in finance respectively (Chabane et al. 2006). In 1998 
the Anglo American Industrial Corporation (AMIC) was reabsorbed into the parent 
company. Between 1997 and 2001 Anglo disposed of its stake in a range of “non-
core” businesses including automotive assembly and distribution, and chemicals 
business AECI. As discussed in Chapter 7 Anglo acquired the majority stake in 
Kumba Resources in 2003, Iscor’s erstwhile mining division separated out during 
Iscor’s 2001 unbundling. In 2009 part of Kumba’s iron ore deposits became the site 
of intense conflict over which set of interests would benefit from the lucrative rents 
these deposits embodied in the context of rising iron ore prices. 
 
Anglo secured the state’s approval to shift both its primary listing and domicile to 
the UK, arguing that such a step would allow it to raise capital more cheaply inter 
alia to raise its levels of investment in South Africa (Walters and Prinsloo 2002). In 
1999 Anglo merged with its offshore sibling Minorco and listed on the London Stock 
Exchange as Anglo American PLC (Anglo plc), shifting its domicile to the United 
Kingdom (Goldstein 2010). Anglo also separately listed South African Breweries 
(SAB) on the London Stock Exchange in 1999, selling off its remaining holding in 
SAB in 2002. No conditions were attached to these offshore listings, in contrast to 
Australian mining company BHP’s London listing, with the Australian government 
insisted that BHP remain headquartered in Australia (Godsell 2016). Despite the 
initial fillip to Anglo’s share price upon listing on the LSE, initial restructuring efforts 
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were not deemed adequate by institutional investors (Carmody 2002).30 As Anglo’s 
shares continued to trade at a lower price to earnings ratios than peers such as Rio 
Tinto and BHP Billiton, it continued to come under pressure to institute further 
unbundling amid pressure to raise its share price and deliver higher dividends to 
shareholders (Chabane et al. 2006). Thus in 2000 Anglo announced its intention to 
make further disposals. In 2001 it removed its historic cross holding with De Beers, 
facilitating the purchase, delisting and distribution of De Beers holding in Anglo to 
shareholders with Anglo increasing its direct interest in De Beers to 45 percent 
(Goldstein 2010). 
 
6.1.2 Anglo’s decline: “mugged by the shareholder value maximisers” 
 
In line with rising pressure from institutional investors for Anglo to become a 
focused mining company it made a series of acquisitions, in iron ore (Brazil and 
Australia), coal (Australia, Canada and Columbia) and copper (Chile and Peru) 
(Anglo American 2014). Following a strategic review in 2005 Anglo recommitted to 
becoming a “more focused mining Group” and embarked on a period of returning 
“surplus capital to shareholders” through share buybacks and special dividends 
(Anglo American 2005a).  
 
Between 2006 and 2009, and excluding normal and special dividends, Anglo 
transferred approximately $12.2bn or around R90.3bn (based on an annual average 
exchange rate of R/USD 7.4) to its shareholders through share repurchases (Thomas 
2014). This period coincided with an intensification of unbundling of non-mining 
                                                        
30 Anglo received a boost to its share price because its debut on the LSE was large enough to place it 
within the FTSE 100, in which various tracker funds automatically invest (Carmody 2002). 
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assets and pressure to maximise payments of “surplus” capital to shareholders 
(Hannemann 2014). In 2005 it disposed of Boart Longyear and Samancor Chrome 
and in 2006 initiated the process of selling Highveld steel to Evraz which was 
completed in 2007. Also in 2006 Kumba Resources was split into separately listed 
entities: Kumba Iron Ore with Anglo holding 64% and Exxaro which became a Black 
Economic Empowerment mining company based on coal and heavy minerals. In 
2007 paper and packaging subsidiary Mondi was demerged with around $3.7bn in 
Mondi shares distributed to shareholders. Also in 2007 Aluminium extruder 
Hulamin was split off from Anglo subsidiary Tongaat-Hulett. As elaborated in 
Chapter 8, Scaw was “corporatised” in 2008 and ultimately sold to the IDC in 2012 
(Anglo American various years). 
 
In 2007 Anglo initiated a process of exiting the gold mining industry it had 
dominated for over a century as it began selling down its holdings in AngloGold 
Ashanti, a process concluded in 2009. By 2008 Anglo accounted for the single largest 
share in global production of platinum and diamonds (via its 45% shareholding in 
De Beers), accounting for 40% of the output of both minerals and was also a major 
global producer of copper, ferrous minerals: iron ore, manganese, metallurgical coal 
and nickel; thermal coal and other minerals (Anglo American 2009). Anglo has been 
far more adversely affected by the downturn in global commodity prices following 
the global financial crisis than competitor global commodity groups Glencore, Rio 
Tinto and BHP Billiton. A major factor in its relatively poor performance has been 
its largest strategic bet made on the troubled Minas-Rio iron ore project in Brazil 
which has exhibited massive cost and time overruns and brought the group into 
financial distress (Wilson 2015). 
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Anglo’s re-domiciling and relisting on the London Stock Exchange has culminated in 
the severe loss of industrial capabilities in steel and engineering and has been a 
failure in its own narrow financial terms. Whereas Anglo set out in 1999 to eliminate 
the estimated 25% discount at which its shares traded to net asset value, by 2016 
this discount had widened to 60% (Gapper 2016). In the words of Bobby Godsell, 
former Anglo director and advocate of Anglo’s corporate emigration from South 
Africa, Anglo’s listing on the LSE has seen it “mugged by the shareholder value 
maximisers” and “has been disastrous for Anglo and disastrous for South Africa” 
(Godsell 2016). 
 
6.1.3 The demise of the Anglo American Industrial Corporation 
 
As described in Chapter Three, Anglo's steel and engineering interests were 
consolidated and expanded under the Anglo American Industrial Corporation 
(AMIC) since its establishment in 1969 as a vehicle for expanding from gold mining 
into manufacturing, predominantly into heavy industry. AMIC reflected the single 
largest concentration of Anglo’s industrial holdings with other important stakes 
lodged in JCI. Within AMIC these were concentrated in three industry groupings: 
Iron, steel and engineering (comprising its Highveld, Scaw, Boart and Dorbyl 
holdings): 42.5%; Chemicals and explosives (largely AECI): 17.3%; and Pulp, paper 
forestry and timber (dominated by Mondi): 12.6%.  
 
The contradictions between Anglo and AMIC’s advocacy of orthodox economic 
reforms and the implications of these reforms for AMIC’s own manufacturing 
operations, particularly in steel and engineering rapidly became evident. AMIC 
argued vociferously that the measures proposed in the conglomerates’ Growth for 
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All (South Africa Foundation 1996) manifesto should urgently be implemented to 
establish “an investor-friendly environment” (Anglo American Industrial 
Corporation 1995: 10). The fiscal deficit needed to be contained but the corporate 
tax rate should be lowered with the introduction of incentives for capital intensive 
projects in particular: “South Africa, like emerging economies in South America and 
Eastern Europe, needs to offer investors something special – whether in the form of 
tax or other incentives” (Anglo American Industrial Corporation 1995: 11). Social 
spending on housing, education and health must be kept within the bounds of fiscal 
discipline but “it is expected that the Reconstruction and Development Programme 
will have a positive impact” (Anglo American Industrial Corporation 1995: 22). 
AMIC supported trade liberalisation but found it “inexplicable that the government 
volunteered concessions on tariffs agreed at GATT without obtaining improved 
access to foreign markets in return” (Anglo American Industrial Corporation 1995: 
12). Anglo and AMIC had been supportive of changes to legislation which allowed 
the formation of black trade unions to alleviate the difficulties of negotiating with 
multiple informal worker bodies and a proliferation of wildcat strikes. It expressed 
broad satisfaction with the emerging labour relations legislative framework: “[t]he 
draft Labour Relations Bill that has recently been published satisfactorily addresses 
a number of employers’ concerns in regard to the existing legislation” (Anglo 
American Industrial Corporation, 1995: 10) yet simultaneously supported the 
Growth for All line on the need for a two-tier labour market.  
 
Reflective of the impact of low public investment and trade liberalisation, AMIC’s net 
profit margin declined from 12.3% in 1988 to 4.1% in 1997 (Table 6.1) associated 
with the halving of its Iron, steel and engineering contribution to AMIC’s income 
between 1990 and 1997 to 20.3% (Figures 6.1 and 6.2). By 1997 the contribution of 
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Highveld, Scaw and Boart to AMIC earnings had all experienced substantial declines 
(Figure 6.3). 
 
Figure 6.1: AMIC profitability measures (%), 1988–1997 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Anglo American Industrial Corporation (various years) 
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Figure 6.2: AMIC earnings by industry group (%), 1973–1997 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Anglo American Industrial Corporation (various years) 
 
Figure 6.3: AMIC earnings by major company (%), 1973–1997 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Anglo American Industrial Corporation (various years) 
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liberalisation, the absence of a national strategy to reorient the engineering sector 
and tepid international steel prices. It also revealed the failure over the 1980s and 
early 1990s of AMIC to develop any significant diversified manufacturing operations 
outside of heavy industry, despite a number of attempts to do so. Efforts both at 
forming joint ventures with foreign OEMs and developing entirely new businesses 
proved failures, ranging from car alarms to syringes (Anglo American Industrial 
Corporation various years; Wood 2014). Despite rising calls over 1994 and 1995 
from AMIC for labour market deregulation there is little specific indication that the 
failure to develop diversified capabilities was primarily related to labour costs. 
Rather AMIC’s primary problem was weak domestic demand and its inability to 
supplement this with exports outside heavy industry (Anglo American Industrial 
Corporation various years). 
 
Colin Wood, former deputy chairman of AMIC, chairman and LTA and Boart 
Longyear attributes AMIC’s failure to diversify and develop new industrial lines of 
business to the poor quality of management appointed to AMIC and in turn the 
manner in which such appointments were made. In contrast to Anglo’s mining 
business which “ran on a highly professional basis” senior positions within Anglo’s 
industrial subsidiaries were often dependant on personal connections with 
Chairman Harry Oppenheimer (Wood 2014). Whereas in mining Anglo appointed 
the best executives it could find, the industrial subsidiaries were often chaired by 
friends of Oppenheimer and “were the kind of people Harry Oppenheimer played 
tennis with” or had been to Oxford University (as Oppenheimer had) (Wood 2014). 
Sometimes these positions were a sinecure for Anglo executives who were more 
engaged in politics than Anglo business, such as Zach de Beer who was for a period 
the Chairman of AMIC’s construction subsidiary LTA (Wood 2014). 
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As elaborated in Chapter 7 Anglo embarked on a final round of steel expansion in 
1991 when Samancor (itself a joint venture between Anglo and Gencor) and 
Highveld Steel acquired Barlow Rand’s Middelburg Steel and Alloys stainless steel 
operations as the basis for the large-scale Columbus Joint Venture in 1991. The 
Columbus Joint Venture benefited from a great deal of public support including the 
37E tax incentive and the introduction of IDC as a one-third equity partner in 1993. 
 
Under increasing pressure from its parent to raise profitability, AMIC committed to 
greater capital discipline for projects “in which the group holds a sustainable 
competitive advantage” (Anglo American Industrial Corporation 1997:12). AMIC 
anticipated that it would absorb all Anglo’s industrial interests. However, as Anglo 
management prepared for its London listing AMIC itself was reabsorbed into the 
Anglo group and its assets distributed across various divisions, subsequently to be 
unbundled.  
 
6.2 Rembrandt’s restructuring and transition to Remgro 
 
Since the late 1980s Rembrandt has undergone extensive restructuring in response 
to shifting political and corporate imperatives. Johann Rupert, son of founder Anton 
Rupert has been instrumental in setting the terms for Rembrandt’s and its successor 
Remgro’s engagement with the new democratic government and institutional 
investors. This has included ring-fencing lucrative offshore tobacco assets, driving 
Remgro’s shift towards a sectoral focus on financial services, cementing Remgro as 
an investment holding company without operational activities and shaping 
Remgro’s engagement with Black Economic Empowerment (Rembrandt various 
years; Remgro various years; Dommisse and Esterhuyse 2009). 
 241 
6.2.1 Preserving the family silver offshore, moving into finance at home 
 
Johann Rupert, who worked as an investment banker in New York before succeeding 
his father at the helm of Rembrandt, initiated the 1988 separation of Rembrandt’s 
South African and international interests through the establishment of Swiss-based 
tobacco and luxury goods group Compagnie Financière Richemont (Richemont) 
which acquired Rembrandt’s international stake in Rothmans International. This 
split was undertaken to place Rembrandt's most profitable business: tobacco, 
beyond the reach of a new democratic government and to head off increasing 
pressure exerted by anti-apartheid activists on London-listed Rothmans 
International over the direct shareholding of the South African Rembrandt group 
and the presence of Rupert senior on its board (Dommisse and Esterhuyse 2009). In 
1995 Rembrandt and Richemont consolidated their tobacco interests into 
Rothmans International, which in turn merged with British American Tobacco Plc 
(BAT) in 1999, creating the world’s second largest cigarette group. Rembrandt and 
Richemont held a one-third and two-third stake respectively in the investment in 
BAT. As of 2014 Richemont was the second largest luxury group in the world after 
Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton (LVMH) (Chabane et al. 2006; Goldstein 2010; Remgro 
2015; Zaczkiewicz 2015).  
 
Domestically Johan Rupert was instrumental in the creation of Rand Merchant Bank 
Holdings (RMBH) in 1985 which in turn became the holding company of Rand 
Merchant Bank. RMBH expanded into life insurance, acquiring control in 1992 of 
Momentum Life from ABSA another of the “big four” South African banking groups. 
Momentum in turn formed what is now the country’s largest private health and 
financial services group Discovery Limited. RMBH also founded what is now one of 
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the biggest short-term direct insurers: Outsurance. In 1998 RMBH acquired Anglo’s 
financial services business in exchange for Rembrandt’s mining assets. RMBH 
separately listed its joint financial services arm as FirstRand (Chabane et al. 2006; 
Goldstein 2010; Remgro 2015; RMB Holdings n.d.). 
 
6.2.2 The creation of Remgro, the bargain with institutional investors and 
the demise of Dorbyl 
 
The 1999 name change from Rembrandt to Remgro ushered in a fundamental 
restructuring which sought to balance increasing demands to “unlock shareholder 
value” with preservation of historical Rupert family control. Rembrandt collapsed 
its four tier pyramid structure into Remgro, focused on established interests in 
tobacco, financial services, mining and industry and VenFin focused on 
telecommunication and technology interests with VenFin ultimately reabsorbed 
into Remgro in 2009. In the process Remgro became “a pure investment holding 
company” with no operational activities (Remgro 2015).  
 
Effectively a bargain was struck in which the Rupert family retained control of 
Remgro through retaining 42.6% of voting rights, far higher than its shareholding, 
in exchange for the delivery of high levels of “shareholder value” to institutional 
investors. This bargain has involved, in addition to share price growth and payment 
of dividends, extensive use of the share repurchase mechanism. Thus Remgro has 
been the third largest user of the mechanism on the JSE between 1999 and 2009, 
buying back R11.2bn from shareholders (Table 6.1) (Wesson 2015).  
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Table 6.1: Share repurchases and dividends (R), top 10 and total,1999-2009 
Source: Author’s calculations, based on Wesson (2015) 
 
As detailed in Chapter 8, this bargain coincides with the period over which Remgro 
was effectively dismantling Dorbyl, the largest engineering group in South Africa’s 
history, and accelerating the process of “releasing value to shareholders” between 
2003 and 2007 from Dorbyl’s unbundling. As discussed in detail below Dorbyl’s 
demise reflected the confluence of a number of mutually reinforcing factors: the 
failure (under Rembrandt ownership) to develop internationally competitive 
engineering capabilities by the late 1980s; weak public investment expenditure and 
the failure of RDP social infrastructure expenditure to materialise; the disavowal of 
the need for any serious national strategy for restructuring engineering; trade 
liberalisation; managerial ineptness and self-interest; and pressure from 
increasingly demanding institutional investors to deliver “shareholder value”. 
 
6.2.3 Remgro’s continued significance in the South African economy and 
manufacturing sector 
 
Although Remgro’s share of JSE stock market capitalisation has fallen significantly 
from its peak of 15.5% in 1993, in 2014 it accounted for close to 10% of the JSE 
Company name Rand value of 
dividends paid
Company name
Rand value of 
shares 
repurchased
Company name
Dividends plus 
share 
repurchases
1 Sasol Ltd 44 784 000 000   Sasol Ltd 37 904 300 000   Sasol Ltd 82 688 300 000   
2 Telkom SA Ltd 20 313 000 000   MTN Group Ltd 21 226 000 000   MTN Group Ltd 31 782 000 000   
3 Remgro Ltd 19 728 000 000   Remgro Ltd 11 138 000 000   Remgro Ltd 30 866 000 000   
4 MTN Group Ltd 10 556 000 000   Netcare Ltd 8 959 900 000     Telkom SA Ltd 26 870 030 425   
5
Pretoria Portland 
Cement Company Ltd
8 414 100 000     
Telkom SA Ltd
6 557 030 425     
Netcare Ltd
12 270 400 000   
6 Barloworld Ltd 8 039 000 000     Imperial Holdings Ltd 4 530 000 000     Barloworld Ltd 12 238 000 000   
7
The Bidvest Group 
Ltd 7 677 448 000     
Aveng Ltd
4 204 357 873     
The Bidvest Group 
Ltd 11 662 274 532   
8 Tiger Brands Ltd 7 322 900 000     Barloworld Ltd 4 199 000 000     Imperial Holdings Ltd 10 036 000 000   
9 Imperial Holdings Ltd
5 506 000 000     
The Bidvest Group 
Ltd
3 984 826 532     
Pretoria Portland 
Cement Company Ltd
9 167 100 000     
10 Nampak Ltd
4 772 700 000     
Woolworths Holdings 
Ltd 3 677 377 919     
Tiger Brands Ltd
8 468 800 000     
Total - Top 10 137 113 148 000 106 380 792 749 236 048 904 957
TOTAL 247 148 767 838 136 886 511 758 384 035 279 596
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(McGregor’s various years), the largest single corporate group (as reflected in Table 
5.1 above). Taking into consideration the span of Remgro’s holdings in South Africa, 
the dramatic increase in the share of domestic and institutional ownership on the 
JSE and the declining share of Anglo American in particular, Remgro is certainly the 
single most important business group in South Africa.  
 
The transition from Rembrandt to Remgro has been represented at face value as an 
exception to the general trend of an increasing focus on a single “core business”, with 
Remgro continuing to hold stakes across multiple sectors (Chabane et al. 2006; 
Goldstein 2010). However, this surface appearance masks a decisive shift towards a 
far greater financial orientation. Remgro’s direct investments in banking and 
insurance account for 48% of its assets with an additional indirect exposure through 
its investment in Kagiso-Tiso Holdings (Financial Mail 2013; Remgro 2015). 
 
Remgro continues to hold important stakes in manufacturing. These include 78% of 
poultry-dominated food group RCL Foods, 31% of wine and spirits group Distell, a 
26% holding in a joint venture with consumer goods transnational Unilever and 
38% of automotive and building glass producer PGSI. They also include the 
remnants of stakes in former Metkor subsidiaries: 50% of industrial gas producer 
Air products and 100% of aluminium extruder Wispeco. Other “Industrial” holdings 
have little to do with manufacturing and include Remgro’s 35% stake in Kagiso Tiso 
Holding (KTH) and a 25% joint venture in petroleum distribution with Total 
(Remgro 2015). Remgro also has a major interest in private hospital group 
Mediclinic and investments in logistics group Grindrod, fibre optic cable groups CIV 
and Seacom, and media and sporting interests. Although Remgro does not disclose 
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a detailed geographic breakdown of its earnings, however its investments on the 
rest of the African continent have been a particular area of focus (Remgro 2015).  
 
Rembrandt and Remgro’s post-apartheid restructuring is reflective of a broader 
trend of “unbundling and rebundling” in which South African business groups have 
shed businesses not deemed part of their core sectoral focus and consolidated 
ownership and control within core sectors (Chabane et al. 2006). Rembrandt and 
Remgro have been particularly active on the “rebundling” side of this equation, 
consolidating control in sectors in which rents can are secured through a variety of 
mechanisms. This has included securing control over one of the four largest banking 
groups Rand Merchant Bank. Rembrandt, as the second largest member of the South 
Africa Foundation, championed the widespread post-apartheid trade liberalisation 
that has taken place across both manufacturing and agriculture However, the two 
most significant sectors in which Remgro retains strong interests in agriculture are 
those that have managed to retain significant tariff protection. Poultry-dominated 
food producer RCL displays both a high degree of horizontal market concentration 
and vertical integration along the poultry value chain, holding an approximate 46% 
share of the domestic poultry market (Ncube et al. 2016). Producers in the poultry 
sector have managed to retain significant post-apartheid tariff protection and 
secured anti-dumping duties on poultry imports. Anti-dumping duties on imports of 
poultry have in turn drawn South Africa into a damaging trade dispute with the 
United States, which posing risks to market access for exports of products ranging 
from automotives to citrus under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) 
(Sender and Cramer n.d.; Chipanda 2016). A second area of agriculture that retains 
significant protection is sugar, with Remgro having consolidated its long-standing 
holdings in TSB Sugar into RCL in 2013. Wine and spirits producer Distell controls 
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around 21% of the domestic spirits market in a joint venture with SABMiller, while 
Distell and KWV have a joint market share in excess of 70% the domestic wine 
market (Shand 2016). Remgro’s joint venture with consumer goods transnational 
Unilever comes with exclusive rights for domestic production and distribution of a 
range of Unilever’s brands. In sectors in which it has not been possible for Remgro 
to consolidate or secure control it has generally chosen to dispose of its holding. As 
discussed in detail in Chapter 9, the manner in which Remgro exited the engineering 
sector, in which it was the largest single investor emerging out of the apartheid 
period, was undertaken in ways which destroyed industrial capabilities. 
 
6.2.4 Remgro’s engagement with Black Economic Empowerment 
 
Remgro has had to navigate mounting pressures to introduce BEE partners in its 
various investments, particularly in sectors dependant on government licencing 
such as finance and liquid fuels. The manner in which Remgro has engaged with BEE 
reflects apparent continuity with Rembrandt’s long-standing practice of 
“partnership” in which it forged low-key joint ventures with domestic interests in a 
range of countries formally antagonistic to the apartheid state, that allowed it to 
operate and grow its international tobacco empire. Remgro has carefully cultivated 
a range of, often politically connected, individuals and consortia as BEE partners. 
This has included the Royal Bafokeng Holdings (RBH) in RMBH and FirstRand, 
Calulo (Total and Grindrod), Solethu Investments (Grindrod and Racec Limited), 
Reatile (Air Products). BEE deals have involved prominent ANC members such as 
Tokyo Sexwale (Transhex) and Mathews Phosa (RCL, Mediclinic). Mediclinic 
includes amongst its BEE beneficiaries Mamphela Ramphele’s and Hlumelo Biko, 
respectively partner and son of murdered anti-apartheid activist Steve Biko. 
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6.3 Conclusions 
 
This chapter describes the post-apartheid restructuring of South Africa’s two largest 
conglomerates in the context of policies and institutions they had been so 
instrumental in influencing, and the consequences for post-apartheid 
industrialisation. Restructuring occurred in the context of increasing exposure to 
the expectations of shareholders to raise returns, the absence of a national strategy 
for steel and engineering reorientation and development, a legacy of managerial 
weaknesses in effecting engineering development, and the negative impact of 
orthodox policies on engineering in particular. 
 
Anglo, following its listing on the LSE, has been most directly exposed to the 
incessant demand of institutional investors to raise its share price and shareholder 
returns, predicated on the idea that to do so required Anglo to become solely focused 
not only on mining but a limited range of mineral commodities. This prompted 
multiple rounds of restructuring and unbundling of “non-core” businesses. Rather 
than being used as a vehicle to deepen industrialisation, its longstanding industrial 
subsidiary AMIC was reabsorbed into Anglo, setting the stage for the unbundling of 
its steel and engineering businesses. Even assessed on the narrow terms of its 
financial performance Anglo has lagged its global mining peers and is a shell of its 
former self in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. As reflected in the 
discussion of the battle over Sishen iron ore rents in the following chapter, BEE 
which Anglo was so instrumental in introducing as a legitimation mechanism, has 
morphed a form which is now an impediment to Anglo’s South African mining 
operations. 
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Financially Rembrandt and successor Remgro have weathered the post-apartheid 
period far more successfully than Anglo. Remgro’s shift to a “pure investment 
company” has seen it take on a far greater financial orientation and is withdrawal 
from manufacturing activities over which it cannot secure rents of a variety of forms. 
The early offshore ring-fencing of its lucrative tobacco and luxury goods holdings 
have meant they have played no meaningful role in post-apartheid industrialisation. 
A large proportion of Remgro’s earnings are based on its direct and indirect 
exposure to financial sector. Reflective of post-apartheid corporate “unbundling and 
rebundling” Remgro has consolidated control in sectors where rents can be 
preserved, including remaining pockets of tariff protection, and shed non-financial 
businesses over which it cannot exert control, as reflected by the discussion in 
Chapter 8 of its destructive unbundling of the country’s largest engineering group. 
In the process of its restructuring Remgro has skilfully cultivated politically 
connected and otherwise influential BEE shareholders, and its investment holding 
company structure has served as an influential model for emerging BEE investment 
groups.   
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Chapter Seven 
Corporate and sectoral restructuring of the steel industry 
 
South Africa’s GEAR policy framework envisaged the role of foreign direct 
investment and ownership in the post-apartheid economy in the following terms: 
 
Foreign direct investment plays an important part in encouraging growth in 
several ways: 
 modern technology is frequently transferred through investment flows; 
 skills, management expertise and high level training accompany 
international investment projects; 
 access to international sources of finance is enhanced; and 
 access to global markets is facilitated. 
(Department of Finance 1996: Appendix 12) 
 
This chapter explores the consequences of the shift of South Africa’s largest steel 
producer from public to private ownership and subsequently to foreign ownership 
and control by large transnational corporations, especially for the downstream 
steel-consuming engineering sectors. In particular it assesses the extent to which 
the benign outcomes associated with foreign ownership, in conjunction with other 
orthodox policy reforms, have transpired in the South African steel sector. 
 
Section 7.1 locates the evolution of the post-apartheid iron ore and steel sectors 
within a process of rising global concentration. It highlights the implications of the 
debt-fuelled consolidation process from which ArcelorMittal emerged as the world’s 
largest steel group, as South Africa’s largest steel plants shifted to transnational 
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ownership. Section 7.2 describes the restructuring of Iscor amid rising post-
privatisation inefficiencies and concomitant pressure to “unlock value” by 
unbundling its mining assets and introducing a foreign equity partner into its steel 
operations. Section 7.3 demonstrates how the transition from Iscor to subsidiary of 
ArcelorMittal has been marked by the extraction of a range of rents derived inter 
alia from monopolistic steel pricing and access to concessional iron ore supply amid 
underinvestment and rising inefficiencies. Section 7.4 discusses the three-way battle 
for control over lucrative Sishen iron ore rents as reflective of broader fault-lines in 
South Africa’s political economy. Section 7.5 briefly deals with Anglo’s unbundling 
of Highveld to foreign ownership under Evraz, reflecting similar patterns of 
underinvestment and rent extraction to Iscor’s transition. 7.6 deals briefly with the 
recent crisis in the South African steel industry as rising inefficiencies have collided 
with falling steel prices. Section 7 assess the extent to which the beneficial outcomes 
of foreign ownership assumed by orthodox scholarship and policy makers have 
materialised in the South African steel sector. 
 
7.1 Global restructuring of the steel and iron ore industries 
 
The global steel sector has gone through three distinct phases since the Second 
World War with an associated impact on international steel demand and prices 
(Jourdan 2012). The first phase spanning roughly 1950 to 1970 witnessed relatively 
high steel prices as the advanced capitalist economies engaged in post-war 
rebuilding and expansion of their infrastructure and manufacturing industries. 
Despite a low share of global population these economies represented the bulk of 
global purchasing power for iron ore and steel. A second phase from around 1970 
to 2000 was characterised by considerably weaker demand for commodities like 
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iron and steel, with the plateauing of demand in advanced capitalist countries, 
representing a minority of the global population, of infrastructure installation and 
the onset of deindustrialisation with a shift to far greater services-orientation. 
Despite the very rapid growth of the first- and second-tier east Asian Newly 
Industrialised Countries (NICs), their relatively small collective share of world 
population did not dramatically raise global demand for iron ore and steel over this 
period. The third phase dating from 2000, until cut short by the global financial crisis 
of 2008, has been characterised by more rapid industrialisation of some large and 
populous developing countries since the early 1990s, overwhelmingly dominated 
by China. China has disproportionately accounted both for the increase in global 
demand, and installation of the world’s new steel production capacity. The locus of 
global steel production thus shifted decisively from the “Triad” economies of the US, 
Europe and Japan to China. Between 1992 and 2014 the “Triad’s” share of global 
steel production fell from 30% to 14% while China’s share increased from 11% to 
49%! (World Steel Association, various years). Steady consolidation of the global 
steel industry outside of China during the 1990s gave way to a far more intense 
process of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) from the early 2000s, with 
privatisation playing a significant role.  
 
[W]ith the turn of the century, world steel markets began to reshape based 
on globalization. Energized by industry liberalization and privatization in 
many parts of the world, and supported by information technology and 
managerial innovations that increased spans of control, managerial agency 
manifested itself in the form of aggressive M&A to create the first large-scale 
steel MNCs. 
(Giarratani et al. 2012: 30) 
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These developments have been consistent with the global big business revolution 
(GBBR) phenomenon, underway across many sectors of the global economy. This 
process has been fuelled by a confluence of liberalisation of trade and capital flows, 
privatisation of formerly state-owned steel plants, and the preference of 
institutional investors for a narrow sectoral focus of business groups and large pools 
of global debt financing (Nolan and Zhang 2008; Giarratani et al. 2012). Rapidly 
rising steel prices from 2000 (Figure 7.1) accelerated a process of debt-fuelled 
acquisitions in the global steel sector. The global value of M&A deals in the steel 
industry rose dramatically from $6.9bn in 2003 to a peak of $78.6 in 2006 declining 
thereafter to $11.3bn in 2011 (Giarratani et al. 2012). The 2006 peak reflected the 
mega-merger of the world’s two largest steel groups: Mittal Steel and Arcelor to 
form ArcelorMittal, with other groups compelled to follow suit. By 2011 the top 20 
steelmakers had debt to equity ratios averaging 88% compared with average levels 
of 55% amongst the top 20 companies within the similarly capital-intensive oil and 
gas industry (Ernest & Young 2016). High levels of debt relative to assets had been 
falling amongst the top 30 steel groups, leading up the global financial crisis in 2008. 
However, debt levels rose again as steel demand and prices fell after the onset of the 
crisis (Figure 7.2) A strategic priority of highly indebted groups like ArcelorMittal 
and Evraz has therefore been to find mechanisms to service and reduce high levels 
of debt under far weaker post-crisis product market conditions. 
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Figure 7.1: Steel prices (real $ 2010/mt), hot rolled coil sheet, wire rod and 
rebar, 1970–2013 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Development Indicators Global Economic Monitor 
(GEM) Commodities database (World Bank n.d.-c). 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Total debt as a percentage of total company assets (average of the 
top 30 steel companies) (%), 2003-2015 
 
Source: Ernest & Young (2016) based on data from S&P Capital IQ and EY analysis. 
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7.1.1 The rise of ArcelorMittal 
 
The origins of Mittal Steel and ultimately ArcelorMittal lie in the establishment in 
1979 by Indian national Lakshmi Mittal of a small steel plant in Indonesia called 
Ispat. A decade later Ispat embarked on a trajectory of enormous global expansion, 
which has taken place virtually exclusively through acquisition, to become the 
world’s second largest steel group by 2005. Ispat’s growth was predicated on the 
acquisition of recently privatised steel plants in developing and transition 
economies as well as of smaller European and North American operations (Mathews 
2002; Murphy 2008; ArcelorMittal various years). 31  In 2001 Mittal Steel (then 
named LNM) took a large minority stake in Iscor followed by the acquisition of a 
majority stake in 2004. By 2005 it had to become the second largest steel group in 
the world and in 2006 Mittal Steel launched a successful hostile bid for its next 
biggest rival Arcelor. Arcelor had itself been recently established and grown through 
a recent spate of mergers and acquisitions and was created in 2002 through a 
merger of three major European steel companies: Arbed (Luxembourg), Aceralia 
(Spain) and Usinor (France) (ArcelorMittal various years). 32  Mittal Steel’s 
successful takeover of Arcelor created the largest steel group in the world in 2006, 
ArcelorMittal (Table 7.1). 
 
                                                        
31  After establishing operations in Trinidad and Tobago in 1989 major acquisitions included 
Siderurgica del Balsas (Mexico) in 1992, Sidbec (Canada) in 1994, Karmet (Kazakhstan) and 
Hamburger Stahlwerke (Germany) in 1995, Thyssen Duisburg (Germany) in 1997, Inland Steel (US) 
in 1998, Unimetal (France) in 1999, Sidex (Romania) and Annaba (Algeria) in 2001, Nova Hut (Czech 
Republic) in 2003, BH Steel (Bosnia), Balkan Steel (Macedonia), PHS (Poland) in 2004, ISG (US), 
Kryvorizhstal (Ukraine), and a significant stake in Hunan Valin Steel (China) in 2005, and Stelco Inc. 
subsidiaries (Canada) in 2006 (ArcelorMittal n.d.). 
32 This brought a number of steel facilities under Arcelor’s umbrella in a range of countries including 
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Brazil and Argentina. Arcelor in turn acquired a controlling interest in 
Companhia Siderurgica Tubarao (now a part of ArcelorMittal Brasil) in 2004, Huta Warszawa 
(Poland) in 2005, a controlling interest in Sonasid (Morocco), as well as Dofasco (Canada) in 2006 
(ArcelorMittal n.d.). 
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Table 7.1: World’s 50 largest steel-producing companies (tonnage), 2015 
Rank Company 
Tonnage 
2015 
Rank Company 
Tonnage 
2015 
1 ArcelorMittal 97.136 26 
Steel Authority of India Ltd. 
(SAIL) 
14.339 
2 Hesteel Group 47.745 27 IMIDRO 14.105 
3 
Nippon Steel and Sumitomo 
Metal Corporation (NSSMC) 
46.374 28 Rizhao Steel 13.999 
4 POSCO 41.975 29 Fangda Steel 13.214 
5 Baosteel Group 34.938 30 JSW Steel Limited 12.42 
6 Shagang Group 34.214 31 
Magnitogorsk Iron & Steel 
Works (MMK) 
12.236 
7 Ansteel Group 32.502 32 Baotou Steel 11.863 
8 JFE Steel Corporation 29.825 33 Severstal 11.451 
9 Shougang Group 28.553 34 Jingye Steel 11.317 
10 Tata Steel Group 26.314 35 
Liuzhou Steel (part of 
Wuhan Steel Group until 
2014) 
10.827 
11 Wuhan Steel Group 25.776 36 Anyang Steel 10.74 
12 Shandong Steel Group 21.692 37 Zongheng Steel 10.38 
13 HYUNDAI Steel Company 20.481 38 Taiyuan Steel 10.256 
14 Nucor Corporation 19.624 39 
Jinxi Steel (also known as 
China Oriental, partly owned 
by ArcelorMittal) 
9.768 
15 Maanshan Steel 18.82 40 Metinvest Holding LLC 9.654 
16 thyssenkrupp AG 17.339 41 Sanming Steel 9.575 
17 Gerdau S.A. 17.033 42 Zenith Steel 9.082 
18 Tianjin Bohai Steel 16.269 43 ERDEMIR Group 8.93 
19 Novolipetsk Steel (NLMK) 16.049 44 Xinyu Steel 8.644 
20 Jianlong Group 15.141 45 Nanjing Steel 8.59 
21 Benxi Steel 14.991 46 Techint Group 8.4 
22 Valin Group 14.874 47 Guofeng Steel 8.292 
23 China Steel Corporation (CSC) 14.821 48 voestalpine Group 7.762 
24 United States Steel Corporation 14.521 49 Jiuquan Steel 7.685 
25 EVRAZ 14.35 50 CITIC Pacific 7.612 
Source: World Steel Association (n.d.) 
 
Notwithstanding the hyperbolic characterisation of ArcelorMittal as a “Dragon 
Multinational”, a term coined by Mathews (2002) to describe high growth 
transnational corporations that have emerged out of developing countries, 
ArcelorMittal is not a developing country corporation. It is domiciled in the low 
taxation jurisdiction of Luxembourg and headquartered in London, and has made 
limited new investments in its developing country operations, as elaborated below.  
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The ArcelorMittal group contains two broad categories of steel plants, distinguished 
both by geographic location and technology, with a differentiated strategic approach 
to each. The first is comprised chiefly of formerly state-owned plants in developing 
and transition economies based on older technologies and less sophisticated 
products. The second comprise more modern plants based predominantly in Europe 
and North America producing more sophisticated products (ArcelorMittal various 
years). ArcelorMittal’s research and development expenditure is concentrated on 
the latter with the single largest area of technological effort around product 
development related to the automotive industry. Ten of ArcelorMittal’s 11 R&D 
laboratories are located in Western Europe and North America (one is in the Czech 
Republic) with 55% of R&D expenditure on automotive steel. Resident engineers 
are concentrated in industrialised markets: North America (14), Germany (6), 
France (3) and Japan (3). The UK, Spain, Italy, Brazil, India, China and South Korea 
each have one resident engineer. South Africa has none (ArcelorMittal 2013). The 
need to sustain R&D expenditure and technological effort in a range of advanced 
economy plants is in turn driven by increasingly stringent emissions limits in the 
United States and the European Union and consequent competition with the 
aluminium sector to develop lighter and stronger metals to lower vehicle weight 
without compromising safety (Wright 2014).  
 
By contrast developing and transition country plants have largely been focused by 
ArcelorMittal on commodity steel products, with minimum investment and 
numerous plant failures. Underinvestment and multiple plant failures at 
ArcelorMittal’s South African operations are discussed in detail in Section 7.3.2 
below, but are by no means unique. ArcelorMittal’s Kazakhstan operations have 
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been the site of a series of mining accidents with large-scale fatalities.33 There has 
been a reported legacy of underinvestment in environmental management in South 
Africa, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine (Bankwatch 
2009). Thus the role of (often formerly state-owned) plants in developing and 
transition economies within ArcelorMittal’s global strategy appears to be to secure 
as much free cash flow to the parent to assist in debt service, while making as little 
investment as possible.  
 
7.1.2 Restructuring of the global iron ore industry 
 
The global iron ore industry has demonstrated an even more pronounced process 
of consolidation. This is in significant part due to the fact that four countries 
dominate global iron ore production: Australia, China, Brazil and India, collectively 
accounting for 73% of global production of 1,923Mt in 2011. Russia accounted for 
an additional 5.4% despite having 17.5% of global reserves. South Africa accounted 
for 2.8% world iron ore with reserves of 0.8% (Jourdan 2012).  
 
Consolidation of global iron ore production and exports has culminated in the 
predominance of three companies: BHP Billiton, Vale and Rio Tinto (Jourdan 2012). 
Together with Anglo American and Fortesque Metals Group, they form the “Big Five” 
of mining companies in the iron ore sector (Anglo American 2014). Within South 
Africa, Anglo American via its subsidiary Kumba Iron Ore (KIO), comprising the 
former iron ore mining assets of Iscor, is by far the largest iron ore miner. When iron 
                                                        
33 In Kazakhstan 23 miners were killed in a methane coal blast in ArcelorMittal’s Abaiskaya coal 
mine in 2008. 41 miners were killed in a methane explosion at its Temirtau mine in 2006, the worst 
in Kazakh history. In 2004 23 miners died in a gas blast at ArcelorMittal’s Shakhtinskaya mine 
(Industriall 2008). 
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ore prices increased dramatically since 2000 (Figure 7.3) these operations have 
proved extremely lucrative, triggering a process of intense contestation over who 
should benefit from these mineral rents, discussed in Section 7.4 below. It is argued 
that this contestation reflected conflicting strategies of accumulation, namely 
whether these rents should continue to accrue narrowly to one or other set of 
formerly South African internationalised interests (either Anglo or ArcelorMittal), 
domestic politically-connected Black Economic Empowerment interests or be 
deployed to advance South African industrialisation. 
 
Figure 7.3: Iron ore (real 2010 and nominal $/dmtu), 1960–2014 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, Global Economic Monitor (GEM) Commodities (World 
Bank n.d.-c). 
Note: DMTU refers to dry metric tonne units which is a measure that standardises for the iron (Fe) 
content of dry iron ore. 
 
7.2 The privatisation of Iscor 
 
As reflected in Chapter 3, Iscor’s privatisation in 1989 reflected the culmination of 
efforts by its directors and management to secure increasing autonomy from the 
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state who had been advocating its own privatisation from the early 1980s (Iscor 
various years) Anticipating expectations of future private institutional investors 
Iscor committed itself to limiting its debt to equity ratio, resumed the payment of 
dividends in 1986 (for the first time since 1972) and announced a dividend policy 
of one third of profits in 1989. In 1988 it hastily abandoned its long-standing policy 
making annual provisions for capital replacement, which artificially served to boost 
its apparent profitability. Iscor management positioned themselves to benefit 
handsomely from a public listing through allocation of shares to themselves at 
nominal prices (Iscor various years). 
 
The major economic justifications for privatisation, as reflected variously in the 
outgoing government’s Normative Economic Model (Central Economic Advisory 
Service 1993), the conglomerates’ Growth for All (South Africa Foundation 1996) 
and the new government’s GEAR (Department of Finance 1996) included financial 
sustainability; increased managerial and operational efficiencies and technological 
upgrading; access to capital for net new investment; and a reduction of claims on 
the fiscus for funding and lower government debt. There was a recognition that the 
privatisation of a public natural monopoly required regulatory mechanisms to 
prevent abuse of dominance. Trade liberalisation and competition policy were 
meant to be the market mechanism to discipline such abuse (Department of Finance 
1996). 
 
Figure 7.4 illustrates that Iscor was profitable for most of the years of the decade 
1978 to 1988, notwithstanding softening global steel prices, weakening domestic 
demand and the introduction of sanctions on South Africa by the United States in 
1986. Losses in 1983 and 1986 coincided with the 1982/3 and 1985/6 recessions. 
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It had reduced its debt ratio from the unmanageable levels of the 1970s down to 
29% by 1989 (Iscor 1989). Thus Iscor did not appear to be financially unsustainable 
leading up to privatisation. Furthermore, because McGregor’s BFA (n.d.) data is 
compiled using published financials, pre-privatisation profit levels are probably 
understated because they include the provision for investment that was removed 
immediately prior to privatisation. 
 
Figure 7.4: Iscor/AMSA profit ratios (%), 1972–2014 
Source: Author’s calculations based on McGregor’s BFA (n.d.). 
 
Frequent arguments made in favour of privatisation include that management is 
incentivised to reduce costs (often through reductions of the workforce) and to 
improve quality and productivity, were indeed made in the case of Iscor (Iscor 
various years; Industrial Development Corporation 2000; Roberts & Rustomjee 
2009). Iscor embarked on a programme of massive job cuts immediately after 
privatisation (Roberts and Rustomjee 2009; Iscor various years). As reflected in 
Figure 7.5 Iscor cut its workforce, including both its mining and steel-making 
operations, from 58,000 in 1989 to 48,506 in 1994 with employment slashed further 
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to 27,700 by 2000. An ex-post assessment by Iscor itself in 2000, however, indicates 
that job reduction appears to have been its only and an unsuccessful strategy for 
lowering costs and raising efficiencies. This assessment identified two phases of 
restructuring that Iscor had fully or partially passed through between 1994 and 
2000. The first phase was a period of "downsizing" of "headcount" between 1994 
and 2000. The second phase, which only commenced in 2000, was aimed at 
benchmarking its operations against world best-practice and the reduction of 
"compressible costs" by 40% while a third phase, not yet underway, was aimed at 
stabilising steel production at its Saldanha and Vanderbijl plants (Iscor 2001).  
 
A number of indicators suggest that, rather than increasing efficiencies Iscor’s 
employment retrenchment programme in fact coincided with a substantial 
deterioration in efficiencies. Fewer than 40% of deliveries were met on time in the 
mid-1990s and as much as 15% of deliveries rejected on quality grounds (Industrial 
Development Corporation 2000). Major downstream customers of Iscor report 
being negatively impacted by a rapid deterioration in Iscor steel quality and service 
over the period immediately after privatisation the early 1990s. Former Boart 
Longyear Chair Colin Wood recounted how in the early 1990s Iscor lost “a huge 
number of their senior executives and a huge amount of expertise”. Boart was 
negatively impacted due to the dramatic deterioration in the quality of the steel rod 
supplied to it by Iscor which resulted in a considerable loss of market share in drill 
rods (Wood 2014). Similar sentiments were expressed by a former director of 
Dorbyl (Anonymous 2015). Profitability also declined dramatically between 1989 
and 1993. Although this occurred over a period of weakening international steel 
prices, it is also the period over which Iscor began to increasingly exert its domestic 
pricing power as outlined below. Although tariffs were reduced from 30% in 1994 
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to 5% in 1996 this was offset by Iscor’s implementation of import parity pricing, that 
is the inclusion of notional transport and logistics costs a customer would incur if 
they were to turn to imports, as elaborated in Section 7.3.1 below. 
 
Figure 7.5: Iscor employment 1973–2000 (including both mining and steel 
making operations) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Iscor (various years) 
 
Similarly to other steel and engineering groups AMIC and Dorbyl, Iscor in 1994 
expressed optimism that the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 
would stimulate domestic demand “in favour of those depressed sectors which now 
require special attention especially in the socio-economic field, with housing a top 
priority” (Iscor 1994: 10). However by 1996 it took the view that it had become 
“increasingly clear that the RDP would not generate a surge in demand for 
infrastructural materials; the realities of the South African economy simply cannot 
support the country's dreams of large-scale development at this stage” (Iscor 1996: 
10).  
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Following its privatisation, Iscor, similarly to private conglomerates like Anglo and 
Gencor, expressed its ambitions to internationalise as a major global player in the 
steel and iron ore market. With an eye to raising foreign capital it established a US 
depository receipt programme. Iscor’s mining division began to make acquisitions, 
predominantly in Australia and on the rest of the African continent. Iscor began to 
report its relative international rankings on the International Iron and Steel 
Institute (IISI) list of the largest global steel plants as well as amongst Forbes 500 
metals companies (Iscor various years).  
 
In the context of weak global steel prices, anaemic domestic demand, declining 
profitability and rising inefficiencies following privatisation, the decision by Iscor to 
construct a new integrated plant at Saldanha, which came into production in 1996 
appears commercially unjustified. Together with the co-located investment by 
Duferco for further processing of its output to cold rolled coil, the Saldanha plant 
was predicated virtually entirely on export market sales. The decision thus appears 
to reflect a combination of managerial hubris, the desire to achieve rapid 
internationalised growth as a private entity beyond the easy control of a post-
apartheid state, while simultaneously drawing on generous public support 
mechanisms to do so (including the 37E tax incentive and IDC financing). As cost 
and time over-runs became manifest, rather than catapulting Iscor into the global 
big league its Saldanha expansion increasingly became an albatross around its neck. 
Much of the risk and burden of project cost escalations and early losses fell on IDC 
as a 50% equity partner in the project. 
 
In this context a new management move became an attractive proposition: the 
unbundling of Iscor’s mining businesses including its increasingly profitable Sishen 
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iron ore operations, combined with the introduction of foreign ownership into its 
steel operations. In its early years the Sishen mining project – the largest of Iscor’s 
iron ore mines – had been plagued by low returns due to high capital costs and weak 
global iron ore prices. However, China's growing industrialisation drive began to 
transform iron ore from a "dog" to a "cash cow" commodity with prices rising from 
the mid-1990s, as reflected in Figure 7.3 above. The profitability of Iscor's mining 
division began to improve and outstrip that of the steel division as demand for iron 
ore increased. Iscor made its first iron ore shipment to China in 1989. In 1994 it 
established an office in Beijing and co-invested in a dedicated iron-ore stockpile 
handling facility in the Port of Qianwan, in Qingdao (Iscor 1994).  
 
7.3 The transition from Iscor to ArcelorMittal South Africa 
 
Unbundling of Iscor’s mining and steel-making operations was justified by Iscor 
management on the grounds of "unlocking shareholder value" and actively 
championed by Saldanha’s other major shareholder, the IDC. With Iscor 
management grappling with the low profitability of the steel operation and technical 
problems with Saldanha, introduction of the LNM (Lakshmi N Mittal) Group as 
shareholder and foreign technology partner was argued, echoing the case for foreign 
ownership made in GEAR at the start of this Chapter, to be beneficial on two 
grounds. First, Iscor would benefit from participation in the global consolidation of 
the steel industry that was underway, of which LNM was becoming an increasingly 
important player. Second, LNM would provide “world-class” technical and 
managerial know-how to improve operational efficiencies, not least at the troubled 
Saldanha operation (Industrial Development Corporation 2002; Iscor 2001). 
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Then Minister of Trade and Industry, Alec Erwin, gave the go-ahead for the 
unbundling subject to only two conditions. First that Saldanha would be refinanced 
and Iscor would take over IDC's 50% share in it. Second that Iscor retain effective 
ownership of its iron-ore requirements to support a competitive steel industry, 
albeit with no mechanism for passing the benefits of this arrangement on to 
downstream steel-consuming sectors to ensure their competitiveness. Iron ore 
supply was embodied in a 25 year supply agreement between the new mining entity, 
which became Kumba Iron Ore (KIO), and Iscor now comprising only steelmaking 
operations. KIO was obliged to supply Iscor with the bulk of its iron ore 
requirements: 6.25mtpa on cost-plus 3% terms (Zondo 2011). Iscor also had rights 
to a portion of any future expansion of the Sishen mine. IDC remained a minority 
shareholder in Iscor and continued provided further indirect support to the 
Saldanha expansion as 50% joint venture partner in a new co-located investment by 
Duferco that would purchase hot rolled coil from Saldanha and process it into cold 
rolled coil exclusively for the export market.  
 
Iscor's unbundling intersected with Anglo's restructuring as the latter came under 
increasing pressure by international institutional investors on the London Stock 
Exchange to focus on its “core business” of mining. Despite an initial attempt to use 
the unbundling to promote BEE (with Avmin and African Rainbow Minerals briefly 
holding a 13% share), Anglo acquired the mining operations of Iscor. This new 
mining company was named Kumba Resources and itself was unbundled in 2006 
with Anglo retaining Kumba Iron Ore (KIO) and Kumba Resources together with its 
remaining coal, zinc, mineral sands and industrial minerals assets merging with 
Eyesizwe Coal to form Exxaro. Notably the former head of Iscor’s mining division 
Constantinus “Con” Fauconier, became the first CEO of Kumba Resources 
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(ArcelorMittal South Africa various years; Anglo American various years; Iscor 
various years). 
 
LNM committed to invest at least $75m into Iscor, now comprising only its steel-
making operations, and entered into a business assistance agreement (BAA) with 
Iscor in terms of which it committed to reduce Iscor’s operating costs by R700m 
over three years, with remuneration redeemable partly in cash and partly through 
the issue to LNM of up to 10% of Iscor's shares. By 2004 LNM had raised its stake in 
Iscor to 47% and sought majority shareholding by exercising its option to acquire 
the 10% arising from the BAA proceeds. Mirroring developments with Mittal’s 
international consolidation Iscor’s name was changed to Mittal Steel South Africa in 
2004 and then ArcelorMittal South Africa in 2007 (ArcelorMittal South Africa, n.d.)  
 
In 2004 the Competition Tribunal approved the merger between LNM Holdings and 
Iscor (Competition Tribunal 2004). Indicative both of the limited powers embodied 
in the Competition Act to deal with pre-existing market structures and its own 
cautiousness the Tribunal effectively approved the merger on the grounds that 
Iscor’s market dominance was so extensive that matters were unlikely to get worse.  
 
We are not here to decide whether Iscor is allegedly abusing a dominant 
position – we are only called upon to decide whether the acquisition of 
control by LNM will lead to a substantial lessening of competition from 
what it is now. In a nutshell, although they have of course not expressed 
it as such, Iscor and LNM's case is that it makes no difference since it 
cannot get worse. 
Competition Tribunal (2004: 6) 
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Reflective of rising concerns expressed by the DTI over the monopolistic practice of 
import parity pricing (IPP), detailed in 7.3.1 below, Minister of Trade and Industry 
Alec Erwin intervened in the merger. He expressed support for the merger, on 
condition that a "developmental steel pricing" model adequate to address the DTI’s 
concerns with respect to the practice of IPP would be agreed between the DTI and 
LNM. A memorandum of understanding struck between the DTI and LNM prior to 
the merger committed in non-binding terms to such a pricing model. However, no 
agreement could be reached on a pricing arrangement acceptable to the DTI as 
AMSA failed to table a model which materially offered steel prices at levels lower 
than IPP (Department of Trade and Industry 2010; Roberts and Rustomjee 2010; 
Zalk 2014). Only recently, when AMSA was compelled to turn to the state for support 
in the face of the post-crisis distress of the domestic steel industry has it been 
possible to secure commitment to such a pricing model that departs meaningfully 
from IPP, as discussed in 7.6 below. 
 
7.3.1 Pricing and market conduct 
 
Under state ownership Iscor had produced a wide range of steel grades aimed at 
meeting domestic needs. Following privatisation Iscor reduced the range of 
products it produced and raised domestic prices to the full import parity levels. 
While in 1989 Iscor appears to have been exercising some domestic pricing, 
notwithstanding the abolition of price controls in 1985, it has confirmed that since 
1994 it had been pricing its steel for the domestic market at full import parity levels, 
that is up to the point that it cost users to import steel including notional transport 
costs (Iscor 2002). As Iscor lowered, and ultimately by 1995, terminated its 
shareholding in former engineering subsidiaries such as Metkor and Dorbyl, there 
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was little imperative to provide preferential pricing even to these companies, except 
in the case of specific joint ventures (such as between Scaw subsidiary Haggie and 
Iscor in the form of Consolidated Wire Industries (CWI)). As elaborated in Section 
5.4.4. above, South Africa’s geographic location and other obstacles to importing 
mean that even with tariff reductions, import parity pricing introduces a large 
premium between domestic and export prices, despite the country being a large net 
exporter of steel. Conversely the historical legacy of extensive public financial 
support, cheap electricity, dedicated infrastructure and from 2001 concessional iron 
ore prices meant Iscor and successor AMSA enjoyed numerous advantages placing 
its plants in the lowest quartile of the global steel cost curve (Figure 7.11) (Roberts 
and Zalk 2004 2004; Roberts 2008).  
 
Iscor’s privatisation transferred a natural monopoly from public to private 
ownership without regulatory oversight with respect either to pricing or decisions 
about steel investment and technologies (Fine 1997). A new Competition Act, as 
discussed in Section 5.4.4. above was meant to be the primary mechanism to address 
market dominance outside of regulated utility industries. However it has not proved 
effective in disciplining market power in steel pricing (bring in refs from 5.4.4). 
While there appears to be some rivalry in long steel products there has been very 
little overlap of flat products manufactured by Iscor and its successor ArcelorMittal 
South Africa (AMSA) on the one and hand and Highveld on the other, with 
Iscor/AMSA focussed on thinner gauges and Highveld on thicker gauge sheet and 
plate. Iscor and AMSA prevented Saldanha’s output of ultra-thin hot rolled coil from 
competing with hot rolled coil produced at its existing inland Vanderbijlpark plant, 
by directing its output through Duferco to produce rolled coil with a contractual 
arrangement obliging Duferco only to sell into the export market (Roberts and 
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Rustomjee 2010). ArcelorMittal and Highveld along with other producers have been 
found to have engaged in a range of anti-competitive practices (Competition 
Commission 2016). Similarly, in 1996 Iscor formed a joint venture with steel trader 
MacSteel for exclusive distribution of Iscor’s steel exports. Although the then 
Competition Board identified a number of competition concerns and recommended 
the joint venture be reviewed after two years, no review was conducted under the 
new Competition Act of 1998 (Roberts and Rustomjee 2010).  
 
Import parity pricing involves the addition of a range of notional costs, largely 
transport related, to arrive at a domestic price approximating what it would cost 
steel users to import. A range of calculations have found pricing premia of the order 
of 33% above the free-on-board European price (that is exports delivered to 
Europe) in 2000, and 65% above the ex-works price on exported steel (Table 7.2) 
(Industrial Development Corporation 2000). Roberts (2008) found the domestic 
price 30-40% higher than free-on-board export prices price more than 60% above 
the ex-works export prices received by AMSA. 
 
Table 7.2: Import-parity price calculations ($ and R), 2000 
Local steel prices  Export steel prices 
 Hot-rolled coil Galvanised   Hot-rolled coil Galvanised 
FOB Europe $210 $400  Ex-works local price $170 $358 
+shipping to Durban $30 $30  + railage to Durban R80 R80 
+5% duty $12 $22  +shipping to Europe $30 $30 
+railage to inland mkt R80 R80   $210 $398 
+5% local premium $14 $30     
+delivery costs R20 R20  FOB Europe $210 $400 
Ex-works local price $280 $495     
Source: ABN AMRO in Industrial Development Corporation (2000). 
 
Figure 7.6 thus reflects how AMSA’s domestic steel pricing for hot rolled coil has 
consistently been in the highest quartile of global steel pricing relative to a range of 
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regional averages between 2004 and 2016 and typically similar to the highest cost 
region of the world: North America. This pattern has prevailed even as global steel 
prices have peaked and then declined since 2011.  
 
Figure 7.6: Domestic steel transaction prices: hot rolled coil (US$ per tonne), 
2004 – April 2016 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ArcelorMittal South Africa (AMSA), CRU and MEPS 
(International) in (DTI Steel Pricing database n.d.) 
 
In the context of generally high domestic prices AMSA has been compelled to offer a 
limited range of discounts and rebates, what has been described as a “privatised 
industrial policy” (Rustomjee and Roberts 2010). Secondary export rebates have 
been provided to firms that purchase steel and manufacture a for export on 
provision of ex post proof that the product was exported. Limited “strategic rebates” 
have been extended to enable greater competition with imported products 
although, although as indicated in Chapter 5 this has hardly stemmed the tide of 
rising import penetration in fabricated metal products and machinery and 
equipment. More competitive prices have also been provided in the face of potential 
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substitution of steel with substitute products such as steel roofing tiles with cement 
tiles, but has not been extended for instance to steel used in corrugated sheet. There 
have also been industry specific deals such as for the packaging industry to prevent 
substitution with plastic or glass packaging and for the automotive industry 
reflecting the ability of original equipment manufacturers to source components 
and even assemble vehicles elsewhere in the world (Competition Tribunal 2004)  
 
7.3.2 Underinvestment and rising inefficiencies 
 
Government concurrence, specifically that of the Minister of Trade and Industry, for 
the acquisition in 2001 by Mittal (then LNM), of an equity stake in the unbundled 
Iscor and subsequently majority Mittal ownership, was consistent with the 
uncritical faith in the benefits of foreign direct investment (FDI) reflected in Growth 
for All (South Africa Foundation 1996) and GEAR (Department of Finance 1996). It 
also seen as an attractive solution to mounting post-privatisation problems in 
Iscor’s steel making operations as well as the opportunity to take advantage of rising 
global iron ore prices by a confluence of Iscor and its executives, the IDC and Anglo. 
The capital-intensive nature of steel production lies not only in the high initial plant 
and equipment costs but in ongoing maintenance and refurbishment. One of the 
most expensive recurring costs arises from the need to reline blast furnaces every 
five to six years. One of the first decisions of the unbundled Iscor steel operations 
and the introduction of LNM as a shareholder was to push the blast furnace relining 
schedule by at least two years beyond the conventional five-to-six-year reline 
programme (Iscor 2002: 43). Iscor’s investment rate, which had already declined to 
6% of turnover by 2002, declined even further as it was renamed Mittal Steel South 
Africa in 2004 after acquiring majority ownership, and then ArcelorMittal South 
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Africa (AMSA) in 2007. That is to say foreign ownership and control of Iscor has 
been associated with an unambiguous decline in levels of fixed investment relative 
to turnover, even as turnover itself rose dramatically between 2001 and 2008 
(Figure 7.7). 
 
Figure 7.7: Iscor/AMSA: Fixed investment, turnover (R) and acquisition of 
fixed assets as a proportion of turnover (%), 2001 – 2016H1 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Iscor (various years), Mittal Steel South Africa (various years), 
ArcelorMittal South Africa (various years) 
 
Since 2004 there have been multiple plant breakdowns and failures as evidenced in 
Table 7.3. Indeed, an additional risk was added to AMSA’s risk register in 2004 of 
“(u)nplanned production interruptions caused by failure/breakdown of critical 
plant and machinery” (Mittal Steel South Africa 2004: 83). In 2014 “catastrophic 
plant failure” was added as one of the top ten risks in AMSA’s risk register 
(ArcelorMittal South Africa 2014).  
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Table 7.3: Arcelor Mittal South Africa (AMSA) plant breakdowns and failures 
since 2004 
 2004: Saldanha Conarc burn-through 
 2006: "Production disruptions" at both Vanderbijl (skip hoist failure and rail 
delivery problems) and Saldanha (oxygen and electricity outages). 
 2007: unstable conditions prevailed at the Saldanha Corex unit and 
conditions of the Newcastle N5 blast furnace deteriorated. 
 2009: "Cold hearth" conditions and a burn-through on an emergency tap-hole 
of the Saldanha Corex plant 
 2010: Newcastle cold furnace and shell burn-through 
 2011: "Catastrophic failure" of the Newcastle blast furnace dust catcher and 
"blast furnace instabilities" at Vanderbijl with "chilled hearth conditions" in 
two blast furnaces. 
 2013: Fire broke out at Vanderbijl due to the failure of a controller unit, 
resulting in spillage of molten steel. 
Source: ArcelorMittal South Africa (various years) 
 
While there was undoubtedly a need to rationalise the range of products being 
produced by Iscor, this has taken place without reference to strategies for 
development of particular manufacturing sectors. For instance, there was little 
interest in upgrading domestic steel production to meet the requirements of the 
growing automotive sector, with a preference instead to supply the South African 
market with imported automotive grade steel imported from ArcelorMittal plants 
elsewhere in the world (Arcelor Mittal South Africa various years; Mittal Steel South 
Africa various years). While economies of scale are fundamental to an industry such 
as steel AMSA’s shareholding and ultimate control has been associated with a net 
reduction in steel production by Iscor and AMSA. Production volumes of flat steel 
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products were 28% lower in 2013 than in 2001 and production of long products 6% 
lower (Figure 7.8).  
 
Figure 7.8: Iscor/AMSA production flat and long products (‘000 tonnes), 
1995–2015 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Iscor (various years), Mittal Steel South Africa (various years), 
ArcelorMittal South Africa (various years) 
 
The legacy of cheap iron ore from the unbundling arrangement with Kumba for a 
large proportion of AMSA’s requirements combined with rising international steel 
prices served to mask rising inefficiencies and escalations in AMSA’s steel 
production cost as reflected in Figures 7.9 and 7.10 below. Cash costs per tonne for 
hot rolled coil (the benchmark flat product) and billet (the benchmark long product) 
grew by 74% and 142% respectively between 2001 and 2007. The unravelling of 
AMSA’s iron-ore supply agreement with Kumba (discussed in Section 7.4 below) and 
increasing electricity prices compounded but were not the primary cause of rising 
production costs, AMSA was compelled to secure new iron ore pricing arrangements 
on less favourable terms, even as international steel prices faltered after the onset 
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of the global financial crisis. As a consequence of rising inefficiencies and costs 
Figure 8.11 demonstrates how AMSA’s flat steel plants rose dramatically up the 
global cost curve between 2008 and 2012. 
 
Figure 7.9: AMSA Hot rolled coil (HRC) cash cost and export price (US$ per 
tonne), 2001-2011 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Iscor (various years), Mittal Steel South Africa (various years), 
ArcelorMittal South Africa (various years) 
Notes: Price US$ per tonne Cost & Freight (C&F), 2003 hot rolled coil (HRC) price imputed from 2004 
price and y-o-y increase figure. From 2012 AMSA stopped reporting cash costs and export prices in 
their annual reports and associated financial statements. 
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Figure 7.10: AMSA Billet cash cost and export price (US$ per tonne), 2001-
2011 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Iscor (various years), Mittal Steel South Africa (various years), 
ArcelorMittal South Africa (various years) 
Notes: Price US$ per tonne Cost & Freight (C&F). From 2012 AMSA stopped reporting cash costs and 
export prices in their annual reports and associated financial statements. 
 
Figure 7.11: Position of AMSA’s flat steel plants on the global steel cost curve 
($ per tonne), 2008 vs 2012  
Source: CRU data in Industrial Development Corporation (2014). 
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and rising inefficiencies, it has not resulted in net fixed capital inflows into South 
Africa. Extraction of rents is evident from the outflows of funds from AMSA to its 
shareholders in the face of rising inefficiencies (Figure 7.4). Substantial payments 
related to the BAA in 2003 and 2004, which exclude BAA remuneration received in 
the form of Iscor shares, supplemented dividend outflows. AMSA introduced a new 
set of fees remitted to its global parent for "Corporate Services" from 2008 and 
"Research and Development" from 2009 respectively, despite multiple plant 
failures, deteriorating efficiencies and the absence of any R&D engineers in South 
Africa. In 2009 ArcelorMittal initiated a massive capital reduction of R6.35bn 
despite large maintenance and upgrading backlogs at its South African plants. In 
total, between 2001 and 2015 the recorded flow of funds out of AMSA to its 
shareholders amounted to R21.8bn, of which 63 per cent or R13.7bn accrued to the 
ArcelorMittal global group, based on its 56 per cent shareholding in AMSA and the 
payments in terms of the BAA. 
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Table 7.4: Capital extracted from ArcelorMittal’s South African operations 
(Rm), 2001–2015 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Iscor (various years), Mittal Steel South Africa (various years), 
ArcelorMittal South Africa (various years) 
 
In addition, Table 7.5 records further large scale cash transfers to AMSA’s global 
parent, in the context of evidence of claims of extensive capital flight from South 
Africa, with trade misinvoicing in the metals sector identified as particularly 
prominent mechanism (Ashman + UNCTAD). While it cannot be established 
conclusively the scope for transfer pricing from 2008 onwards increased in line with 
a dramatic escalation in related party purchases from AMSA to its global parent. 
Furthermore, and in the context of large maintenance and upgrading backlogs, 
AMSA extend a range of loans, including capitalised interest, to its parent. A 
cumulative R36.7bn in recorded purchases by AMSA from its parent took place 
between 2005 and 2015, while AMSA also extended loans of R4.3bn to its parent in 
2014 and 2015. 
 
Dividends
Capital 
Reduction
Business 
Assistance 
Agreement 
(BAA)
Corporate 
Service Fee R&D Fee
Total capital 
extracted
Arcelor 
Mittal share 
of capital 
extracted
2001 -               
2002 -               
2003 1 070           613              
2004 1 672           731              
2005 1 516           
2006 1 261           
2007 1 948           -
2008 2 398           135              -
2009 1 627           6 352           18                187              
2010 602              39                87                
2011 221              61                98                
2012 -               120              91                
2013 -               64                99                
2014 -               124              118              
2015 - 372              145              
Total 12 315         6 352           1 344           933              825              21 769         13 707         
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Table 7.5: Related party purchases from AMSA, and loans by AMSA, to its 
ArcelorMittal group parent, 2005–2015 (Rm) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Mittal Steel South Africa (various years), ArcelorMittal South 
Africa (various years) 
 
7.4 The significance of the Sishen mining rent battle 
 
The 2001 unbundling of Iscor created the opportunity to capitalise on mineral 
resources, particularly iron ore and coal, that had historically been vertically-
integrated which had historically provided a foundation to weather the volatility in 
world steel markets over the long term. These opportunities were grasped in the 
first instance by Anglo American, Iscor mining management and institutional 
investors to “unlock value” through the formation of Kumba Iron Ore (KIO) and 
Exxaro (in coal and heavy minerals). However, the supply agreement entitling Iscor 
and its successor AMSA to 6.25mtpa of iron ore from Sishen at costs plus a 3% 
management fee became the subject of intense contestation, particularly as iron ore 
prices escalated rapidly over the 2000s (Hawthorne et al. 2005; Roberts and 
Rustomjee 2009). Against the backdrop of the failure of low input prices being 
transmitted to low steel prices for downstream industry, the contestation over the 
disputed 6.25mtpa iron ore arrangement between KIO and AMSA is indicative of a 
Purchases from AM Group Group Loan
Accumulated Interest on 
Group Loan
R'm
2005 9
2006 555
2007 222
2008 5 038
2009 3 045
2010 3 897
2011 5 691
2012 4 668
2013 4 588 8
2014 4 801 1000 132
2015 4 228 3268
Total 36 742 4 268 140
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number of tensions running through South Africa’s political economy reflected in 
and through government departments. As outlined in Chapter Five a major element 
of South Africa’s emerging BEE policy and legislative regime was the introduction of 
the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act of 2002 (MPRDA) and 
associated Mining Charter. The MPRDA effectively clawed back existing mining 
rights to the state with a process for mining companies to reapply for licences 
subject primarily to meeting black ownership targets of 15% by 2009 and 26% by 
2014. 
 
When AMSA overlooked the need to apply for conversion of its share in the old order 
mining licence associated with the iron ore supply arrangement Anglo-owned 
Kumba Iron Ore (KIO) identified this an opportunity to rid themselves of the 
obligation to supply AMSA iron ore on the concessional terms struck during the 
2001 unbundling. Thus KIO applied for a new order mining right that excluded 
AMSA. However, a previously unheard of third party Imperial Crown Trading (ICT) 
with no prior mining experience also applied for and was granted a mining licence 
over the same 6.25mtpa of iron ore by the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) 
under controversial circumstances, justified on the grounds of advancing black 
ownership in the mining sector. In court papers it was alleged that DMR officials 
alerted ICT to KIO’s application and put in an alternate application which was 
adjudicated in ICT’s favour. It transpired that ICT is a subsidiary of Oakbay 
Investments, controlled by the expatriate Indian Gupta family with controversial 
links to President Zuma, his family and associates (Faull 2013).34  
 
                                                        
34  Jacob Zuma’s son Duduzane Zuma is a shareholder in Oakbay, and was a shareholder in ICT 
(http://mg.co.za/article/2013-12-12-concourt-puts-sishen-mining-right-dispute-to-bed) 
 281 
In parallel with litigation aimed at clarifying ownership of the disputed mining 
licence, KIO cancelled its the cost plus 3% supply agreement with AMSA the two 
negotiated an interim agreement with the new supply agreement reported to be 
priced at cost plus 20% (Steyn 2013). 
 
AMSA who had previously managed to avoid making any serious commitments to 
black empowerment, entered into a cynical BEE deal with ICT in August 2010, 
conditional upon the Sishen mining right awarded in ICT’s favour being legally 
upheld after KIO appealed the decision in the courts. Had ICT been successful it 
would have paid R800m to ICT for having done nothing more than securing the 
disputed mining right.  
 
The DTI engaged with the dispute through representations to DMR arguing that 
DMR should use its licencing discretion to seek to ameliorate the long-standing 
practice of monopolistic import parity pricing by making the 6.25mtpa of iron ore 
available on concessional terms on condition that the bulk of the benefit would in 
turn be passed on to downstream steel users in the form of a “developmental” steel 
price. However, DMR resolutely sought to uphold its decision to award the mining 
right to ICT on the grounds of advancing BEE ownership, until compelled by the 
Constitutional Court to affirm that the full mining right vested with KIO, with DMR 
reissuing the mining right to KIO without any downstream industrial development 
conditions attached (Creamer 2016). 
 
In essence, the Sishen iron ore battle has been over whether a lucrative mineral rent 
should flow to Anglo and its shareholders in the context of intensifying pressure to 
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deliver shareholder value, for the ostensible promotion of BEE, or be deployed to 
advance industrialisation through supporting a developmental steel price.  
 
7.5 Highveld and Columbus unbundling 
 
In 2002 Anglo initiated a process of unbundling its steel assets which, at this time, 
consisted of Highveld Steel, Scaw Metals, and through Highveld, Columbus Stainless 
Steel (owned jointly with Samancor). By 2005, 76% of Columbus had been sold to 
the Spanish Acerinox group, with the Industrial Development Corporation holding 
the remaining 24%.  
 
Samancor, itself a joint venture between Anglo and BHP Billiton (the successor to 
Billiton), was split into Samancor Chrome and Samancor Manganese. Samancor 
Chrome was sold to the Kermas Group (Anglo American 2005a; Visser 2006; South 
African Iron and Steel Institute n.d.). The sale of Samancor to Kermas involved a 28% 
stake by a BEE consortium led by former Department of Trade and Industry 
Director-General Alistair Ruiters. However, the original deal collapsed under 
controversial circumstances with allegations that Ruiters sought to buy out some 
community shareholders at a fraction of the true value of their shares (Cohen 2008; 
Hill 2008). 
 
Following Anglo’s 2005 decision to narrow its focus to mining businesses over 
which it exercised control, Evraz acquired 80.9% of Highveld over 2006 and 2007. 
(South African Iron and Steel Institute, n.d.). Reflective of the subsequent imperative 
to extract cash from the Highveld operation, Evraz’ debt-equity levels were 
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approximately double those of ArcelorMittal’s in 2011 at close to 120% (Ernst & 
Young 2013).  
 
As with AMSA, foreign acquisition of Highveld by Evraz, has resulted in declining 
levels of investment rather than the attraction of capital for new investment and 
technological upgrading. Since 2006 investment rates, reflected by the ratio of the 
acquisition of fixed assets to turnover slumped, declining from 11.4% in 2006 to 
2.8% in 2013 amid mounting production problems and growing inefficiencies 
(Figure 7.12). Notwithstanding mounting production problems and declining 
investment rates Highveld paid out a large proportion of profits, in years in which it 
was profitable, in the form of dividends (Figure 7.13). From 2010 Evraz became loss-
making and was placed in business rescue in 2015. 
 
Figure 7.12: Highveld investment rate: fixed assets, turnover (R)and fixed 
assets as a proportion of turnover (%), 1988 - 2013 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on McGregor’s BFA (n.d.). 
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Figure 7.13: Highveld profits and dividends (R), 1988-2013 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on McGregor’s BFA (n.d.). 
 
Similarly to AMSA, Highveld Evraz reports a significant level of related party 
transactions with other companies in the global Evraz group, reflecting the potential 
for transfer pricing.  
 
Thus foreign ownership has not inevitably resulted in the running down of pre-
existing steel assets. In contrast to developments with both AMSA and Highveld 
Evraz, Columbus stainless steel under Acerinox ownership has remained financially 
sustainable.  
 
7.6 The recent crisis in South Africa’s steel industry 
 
After benefiting from buoyant global steel prices between 2002 and 2008 in 
particular, the South African steel industry entered a period of crisis following the 
onset of the global financial crisis. The proximate causes cited for this crisis have 
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been a combination of falling steel prices, weakening domestic demand, rapidly 
increasing electricity prices and a large surplus of Chinese steel production over its 
domestic consumption leading to increased Chinese steel imports. In 2015 AMSA 
approached the SA government with a plea to reintroduce tariff protection, 
reflecting how the former state owned steel company had become unable to weather 
the fluctuations of global commodity prices after over a decade-and-a-half of 
underinvestment and rent extraction. (Department of Trade and Industry 2016) 
 
7.7 Conclusions 
 
The introduction of foreign ownership of former state-owned Iscor was presented 
publically as necessary to simultaneously raise operational efficiencies through the 
presumptive benign properties of foreign investment in steel making and “unlock 
value” for investors, including the state-owned IDC. In practice it was predicated on 
realising opportunities for private business groups and Iscor management to benefit 
from rising iron ore prices and to seek a way out of increasing post-privatisation 
difficulties. Rather than delivering these putative benefits, foreign ownership of 
Iscor by ArcelorMittal has resulted in large-scale rent extraction and 
underinvestment linked to the need of its parent company to service high levels of 
debt accrued in its acquisition-fuelled ascendancy, and left it more vulnerable to 
downturns in global steel prices than before.  
 
A similar pattern has unfolded with respect to the unbundling of Anglo’s Highveld 
operations compelled by rising demands of institutional shareholders for Anglo to 
focus ever more narrowly on its core mining business and to unlock greater 
shareholder value. Highveld’s new owner Evraz, having accrued even higher debt 
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levels than ArcelorMittal in its acquisition of steel plants, similarly extracted rents 
and underinvested, leading to the demise of South Africa’s second largest steel 
group. 
 
The battle over the Sishen iron ore rents has been illustrative of key fault lines in 
South Africa’s post-apartheid economy, particularly the “pincer movement” which 
efforts to mobilise policies for industrial development and diversification have been 
caught. It also reflected the nascent shift to a particularly predatory and 
unproductive form of rent-seeking and patronage, pursued under the rhetorical 
banner of advancing BEE. 
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Chapter Eight 
Corporate restructuring of the major conglomerate engineering 
subsidiaries 
 
In 1990 the engineering industries collectively had shrunk by around one third 
compared with their 1981 peak, measured by value added in real 2010 prices. 
However, both metal fabrication and machinery were individually larger than the 
basic iron and steel sector, with transport equipment approximately half its size. 
Over the post-apartheid period growth in the capital intensive steel sector has 
outstripped that of its downstream engineering counterparts. Employment has 
declined in all but the machinery sector. While the upstream steel industry has 
consistently generated a trade surplus and engineering exports have increased, 
imports of both of final and intermediate engineering products have increased far 
more dramatically. 
 
This chapter illustrates how conglomerate unbundling of its leading engineering 
subsidiaries has contributed to a pattern of underperformance and lost 
opportunities in the engineering sector. Section 8.1 deals briefly with the process of 
global restructuring, specialisation and consolidation that has taken place in the 
engineering industry. Section 8.2 discusses the changing role of the engineering 
subsidiaries of dominant conglomerates over South Africa’s transition amid weak 
domestic demand due to orthodox reforms and limited competitiveness in export 
markets due to the legacy of limited capabilities built up under conglomerate 
ownership. Section 8.3 demonstrates the relatively successful internationalisation 
of Scaw’s grinding media business, notwithstanding significant weaknesses, which 
was destroyed by Anglo’s unbundling process. Section 8.4 deals with Boart’s 
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unbundling, reflecting how the legacy of managerial and technological complacency 
under Anglo’s apartheid-era ownership contributed to conditions for the similar 
dismemberment via unbundling of this globalised South African mining engineering 
group. Section 8.5 describes Rembrandt’s inability to render Dorbyl competitive 
over the transition, leading to ultimately to a destructive unbundling process by 
Remgro characterised by managerial enrichment and “returning value to 
shareholders”. Section 8.6 concludes. 
 
8.1 Global restructuring in engineering 
 
Engineering straddles a wide range of industries in which Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEMs) and subsidiary suppliers have consolidated as part of the 
global Global Big Business Revolution (GBBR) process. Nolan et al. (2002) record a 
range of “complex equipment” sectors where between one and four firms have come 
to hold 20% or more of global market share. These include control and automation 
equipment, machine tool controls, printing presses, farm equipment, warehouse 
forklift trucks, professional ovens, thermostats and switch-on kettles, lifts, rolling 
bearings, forest machinery and railway braking systems.  
 
Most global OEM’s producing mining capital equipment have emerged from 
economies with a long history of mining and other forms of resource extraction, 
such as the United States and the Scandinavian economies (Walker and Jourdan 
2003). Mining capital equipment has similarly come to be dominated by a handful 
of large transnational OEMs, often emerging from these former mineral-based 
economies, with sub-specialisation in various stages of mine development, 
extraction, materials handling and further processing (Figure 8.1). OEMs are 
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dominant in particular, but sometimes overlapping segments of mining include 
Sandvik, Atlas Copco and Boart Longyear which dominates drilling for exploration 
and mine development (Brunner 2014). Large vehicle producers such as Komatsu, 
Caterpillar and Volvo are lead firms in extraction and material handling, with South 
African Bell Equipment a much smaller global player (Kaplinsky). Machinery to 
separate minerals from ore bodies is dominated by firms such as Metso, FL Smidth, 
Outotec and Weir. In grinding media, Scaw Metals’ most prominent area of 
production, and in which it led world production prior to its unbundling, firms such 
as Sigdo Koppers and One Steel are preeminent.  
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Figure 8.1: Major mining capital equipment suppliers according to stage of mineral extraction process 
 
Source: Berenberg Equity Research (2013) 
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8.2 The changing roles of conglomerate engineering subsidiaries over 
the transition 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3 the engineering subsidiaries under the control of the three 
large conglomerates: Anglo, Rembrandt and Iscor played three major, albeit shifting, 
roles during apartheid industrialisation. First, they provided the heavy engineering 
capabilities necessary for the installation, expansion and maintenance of mining, 
heavy industry and associated infrastructure required by MEC sectors. Second, 
conglomerate engineering subsidiaries acted as major conduits for the steel output 
of Iscor and Highveld. However, as private and public megaproject investments 
dried up over the 1980s, both of these functions came under severe pressure. Thus 
thirdly, engineering subsidiaries were used to bolster conglomerate profitability 
through acquisition of competitors within stagnant or shrinking domestic markets 
(Rustomjee 1993). In the process substantial industrial capabilities were built up. 
However, the lack of strategy and compulsions by government and the 
conglomerates to reorient these capabilities concentrated around heavy 
engineering saw the engineering sectors falling into crisis by the late 1980s. The 
need for a national strategy to build upon, reorient and develop engineering 
capabilities de-emphasised over the transition in favour of the ideological 
assumption that removal of market distortions would automatically “reveal” areas 
in which South Africa had an innate comparative advantage. Whereas the pocket of 
international competitiveness reflected by South Africa’s mining capital equipment 
sector has been uncritically celebrated as an example of such revealed comparative 
advantage (Kaplan 2011; Morris et al. 2012), the restructuring of Scaw and Boart in 
particular reflect important limitations and lost opportunities, in the context of 
increasing global specialisation and scale in mining capital equipment. 
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8.3 Scaw’s restructuring and disposal 
 
8.3.1 Responding to weak domestic demand 
 
The scope and depth of Scaw’s capabilities developed by the early 1990s are 
reflective of the functions it had served under conglomerate ownership since its 
acquisition by Anglo in 1964. Scaw developed substantial capabilities that straddled 
a wide range of primary mini-mill steel production and value-added engineering 
products serving three main markets: mining, rail and general construction. Rolled 
products included reinforcing and engineering steels, profile sections, flats, coiled 
bar and wire rod. Its foundry products included castings for power generation, 
cement, railroad, automotive, general engineering and mining. Grinding media, the 
product line in which Scaw has proved most successful, is used in gold, platinum and 
copper mining and for coal-based power plants. Scaw’s Haggie subsidiary produces 
wire, rope and strand products for mining and other applications. A large proportion 
of its rolled products output of bar and rods feed into grinding media and wire rope 
for mining. Scaw also developed significant capabilities in castings, particularly 
related to the rail sector including frames, bogies and wheels (Anglo American 
Industrial Corporation various years; Innes 1984; Hannemann 2014).  
 
Over the 1990s Scaw continued the pattern of domestic acquisitions initiated in the 
1980s, aimed chiefly at consolidation in the context of low domestic fixed 
investment and weak demand. In 1993 it acquired 60% of McKinnon Chain and the 
remaining 40% in 1998. In 1999 it bought out the remaining 64% of Haggie and 
delisted it from the JSE. In 2008 Scaw acquired the Ozz Foundry Group consisting of 
Eclipse West Foundry, Eclipse East Foundry, Eclipse Boksburg and Dimbaza 
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Foundry. However, of the four foundries only two still remain operational (Eclipse 
East and Eclipse Boksburg) with weak performance of Scaw’s foundry operations 
reflective of a broader trend of slowing post-apartheid foundry sector growth. Scaw 
also invested to secure and more efficiently process its single most important input: 
ferrous scrap, installing a mega-shredder in 2003 capable of dealing with processing 
“poor quality light scrap” and separating non-ferrous material. It also purchased 
scrap merchant Leo Scrap in 2008 to ensure greater security of supply of scrap metal 
(Hannemann 2014; Scaw 2014).  
 
Scaw entered the 1990s adversely affected by two trends in the South African 
economy. First, the long-term decline of the gold mining industry which adversely 
impacted its wire rope and chain operations in particular. Second sustained declines 
in fixed investment from a 1976 peak of 32% to 21% in 1990 and which remained 
below 20% thereafter until 2002 (Reserve Bank n.d.). Historically Scaw had been 
the predominant supplier to the South African Transport Services (SATS) (Transnet 
since 1990) of various cast products for rail, particularly wheels, bogies and frames. 
The collapse of SATS investment in the late 1980s thus had a strongly negative 
impact on Scaw’s foundry operations as did weak domestic demand from general 
engineering and construction. (Hannemann 2014; Scaw 2014). 
 
Demand for wire rope and chain products, used in particular for mine hoists in South 
Africa’s increasingly deep gold mines, was adversely affected by the long-term 
decline of the domestic gold mining industry. In the context of weak domestic 
demand for its rolled products Scaw sought to deepen vertical integration by placing 
as much as possible of its rolled products with “internal clients” for further 
processing into higher value products particularly grinding media and rope and 
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wire products. Scaw has aimed to sell as much as possible of remaining rolled 
products to the domestic construction industry and only thereafter on the export 
market (Hannemann 2014; Scaw 2014). 
 
Declining demand from mining has been only partially offset by seeking out new 
areas of export demand such as the provision of high strength chain to the oil and 
gas sector in markets such as the Gulf of Mexico, the North Sea and South East Asia. 
Scaw also developed an export market for PC strand, used on large construction 
projects as an alternative to reinforcing bar (rebar), has been developed with 80% 
of production exported to “prime destination” markets such as Germany, the UK and 
the US.  
 
However, Scaw has not become an effective exporter of products other than grinding 
media. This is ascribed in large part to the “weight-to-value problem”: the high ratio 
of transport costs relative to sales price involved in the export of heavy and bulky 
semi-fabricated steel products. Thus although Scaw has consistently exported over 
many decades, a significant but variable proportion of its output has been treated as 
a last resort to maintain production volumes. In CEO Markus Hannemann’s terms, 
outside of grinding media, Scaw has been an “unhappy exporter” (Hannemann 
2014). Furthermore Scaw has not managed to develop or acquire its own 
proprietary technology, particularly in its most successful area of production, 
grinding media. This is notwithstanding its production of grinding media dating 
back at least as far as the 1960s. 
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8.3.2 Internationalisation of Scaw’s grinding media business 
 
From the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s Scaw engaged in a substantial programme of 
internationalisation through acquisition, concentrated predominantly on grinding 
media. The most significant of these acquisitions were in North and South America 
including its 1996 acquisition of cast grinding media operation Proacer in Chile, a 
50:50 joint venture with Scaw’s long-term technology partner in high chromium 
grinding media: the Belgian Magotteaux group. In 2003 Scaw acquired further 
grinding media interests through the acquisition of Moly-Cop from the US group GSI 
Industries. This acquisition included all of Moly-Cop's Latin American operations, 
50% of Moly-Cop Canada, 30% of Italian firm GSI Lucchini and Australian Donhad. 
Managed from South Africa, Scaw’s grinding media business proved extremely 
profitable, fuelled by the growth of the copper mining industry in Chile and Peru. 
Scaw thus constructed a second grinding media plant in Chile and invested 
significantly in raising capacity in Peru and Mexico. In 2006 Scaw acquired Canadian 
AltaSteel which held the 50% of Moly-Cop Canada that it did not already own. Scaw 
subsidiary Haggie set up Haggie Rand North America in Canada in 1996. Scaw also 
acquired Australian chain manufacturer PWB Anchor in 2002 (Hannemann 2014; 
Scaw 2014). In parallel Scaw expanded its South African grinding media operations, 
opening its second high chromium grinding media line in 1994 and its third in 2003 
based under licence to Magotteaux foundry group.  
High chromium grinding media is used in platinum, copper, cement and power 
generation industries, while less sophisticated forged grinding media is used 
predominantly in gold and copper mining. Grinding media sales were supported in 
particular by the buoyancy of platinum mining in South Africa and copper mining in 
Zambia, Chile and Peru. Buoyant platinum and copper prices boosted domestic and 
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export sales from Scaw’s South African operations and its Latin America plants over 
the commodity boom from the early 2000s until the onset of the global financial 
crisis in 2008 (Figure 8.2 and Figure 8.3). 
 
Figure 8.2: World platinum prices (US$ nominal and real 2010 prices per 
troy ounce), 1960-2014 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Development Indicators Global Economic Monitor 
(GEM) Commodities database (World Bank n.d.-c). 
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Figure 8.3: World copper prices (US$ nominal and real 2010 prices per 
metric tonne), 1960–2014 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Development Indicators Global Economic Monitor 
(GEM) Commodities database (World Bank n.d.-c). 
 
Figure 8.4: South African platinum group metals (PGMs) production (‘000kg) 
and prices (R/kg), 1980-2014 
Source: Department of Mineral Resources (n.d.) 
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Bolstered to some extent by its participation in collusion in scrap metal and long 
steel products (Competition Commission 2016),35Scaw was profitable, financially 
viable and had low levels of debt prior to its “corporatisation” by Anglo in 2007. In 
CEO Markus Hannemann’s terms the company was "cash-flush" and "stood on its 
own feet" (Hannemann 2014b). When reabsorbed into Anglo, Scaw was consistently 
significantly important to Anglo’s Ferrous Metals division profits until its ultimate 
unbundling (Anglo American various years). 
 
8.3.3 Anglo’s corporatisation and unbundling of Scaw 
 
Prior to its “corporatisation” in 2007 Anglo’s approach to Scaw under CEO Tony 
Trahar (from 2000 to 2007) was characterised neither by any particular strategic 
vision for the development of the engineering subsidiary nor control of its 
management. Rather benign neglect prevailed in the context of an “old boys club” 
involving a close relationship between Trahar, Tony Harris (Scaw CEO and 
Executive Chairman from 1996 until 2008) and Graham Boustred (who had risen to 
Deputy Chairman of Anglo and Chairman of AMIC Chair) (Hannemann 2014; Wood 
2014). By the early 2000s Scaw contemplated a possible acquisition of its long-term 
technology provider Magotteaux. However Magotteaux rejected the offer, 
apparently due less to any commercial considerations than the abrasiveness of the 
senior Anglo and Scaw executives involved in the approach (Hannemann 2014).  
 
                                                        
35 “The Commission’s investigation found that AMSA, CISCO, Scaw and Cape Gate (Pty) Ltd (Cape 
Gate), being competitors in the manufacturing of long steel products, engaged in collusion by fixing 
prices and discounts, allocating customers and sharing commercially sensitive information through 
the South African Iron and Steel Institute (SAISI) and the South African Reinforced Concrete 
Engineers’ Association.” (Competition Commission 2016). 
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Whereas prior to 2007 Anglo had adopted a "hands-off approach" to Scaw, under 
newly appointed CEO Cynthia Carroll "overnight Anglo were all over us" in a process 
described as "bringing value to Scaw" (Hannemann 2014). In 2007 Anglo 
“corporatised” Scaw into Scaw SA using private equity type mechanisms. 
“Corporatisation” involved Anglo raising loans against Scaw’s balance sheet with the 
proceeds of the loan flowing to Anglo and Scaw responsible for servicing the debt. 
Anglo initially raised a loan of R3.3bn against Scaw’s balance sheet which had the 
effect of lowering Scaw’s net asset value to R5.3bn to facilitate a debt-based Black 
Economic Empowerment deal placing 26% of Scaw’s ownership with a consortium 
of BEE investment holding companies: Inzingwe (8.16%), Southern Palace (7%), 
Shanduka Resources (5.83%) and a 5% employee share ownership scheme. ANC 
luminaries in this consortium included Sipho Pityana (Inzingwe) and Cyril 
Ramaphosa (Shanduka) (Creamer 2007).  
 
The three BEE investment companies contributed a small amount of equity with 
repayment of debt over 10 to 12 years reliant on dividend flows from Scaw. All three 
groups exhibit a common structure amongst emerging BEE entities: investment 
holding companies without operational subsidiaries holding a wide range of 
(generally) minority BEE interests across multiple businesses and sectors. One of 
the advantages expected to flow to Scaw as a consequence of the introduction of 
26% BEE ownership was that: 
 
… the BEE investors believe they are well placed to support Scaw SA’s 
ambition to position itself … [as] … significant suppliers into South 
Africa’s R400-billion-plus public-infrastructure investment plan. Much 
of this capital would be invested by State-owned enterprises, such as 
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Eskom and Transnet, whose procurement rules incorporate strict BEE 
criteria. 
(Creamer 2007) 
 
The bulk of Scaw’s “corporatised” value of R5.3bn flowed immediately to Anglo upon 
its corporatisation in 2007. That is Anglo received the proceeds of the loans raised 
against Scaw, leaving Scaw to service repayment of the debt capital and interest. In 
2009 Anglo publically announced its intention to dispose of Scaw with the process 
taking three years during which Scaw "was crawling with consultants" (Hannemann 
2014). Ultimately it is estimated Anglo indebted Scaw by around R6.3bn. In 2011 
Anglo separately sold off Moly-Cop, embodying most of Scaw’s international 
grinding media interests, for $1bn to OneSteel Canada. Leading up to the sale Scaw’s 
global sales of grinding media amounted to around 885,000 tonnes or 42% of the 
world market share for grinding media (Hannemann 2016). 
 
Overlapping with the three-year unbundling process a combination of factors began 
to detrimentally affected Scaw’s revenues and profitability. This included a decline 
in domestic infrastructure investment expenditure after 2010, the fall in prices and 
demand for mineral commodities after the onset of the global financial crisis and 
industrial unrest in South Africa’s platinum sector linked reflected most brutally in 
the Marikana massacre.36 
 
                                                        
36  “On 16 August 2012, the South African Police Service opened fire on a crowd of striking 
mineworkers at Marikana, some 100km northwest of Johannesburg in the North West Province. The 
fateful event left 34 mineworkers dead, 78 wounded and more than 250 people were arrested. The 
protesting mineworkers were demanding a wage increase at the Lonmin platinum mine. The event 
was the biggest incident of police brutality since the advent of democracy and it revived memories 
of the brutality suffered under Apartheid security police.” (South African History Online 2017). 
 301 
Scaw found it increasingly difficult to service the debt that Anglo had saddled it with. 
In a “gun-to-the-head” transaction the Industrial Development Corporation bought 
out Anglo's stake in Scaw for R3.5bn amidst fear by the Department of Trade and 
Industry and the Economic Development Department that Scaw’s capabilities to 
provide localised inputs into the rail infrastructure programme would be lost, 
together with between six and seven thousand jobs. It is estimated that Anglo’s 
process of “bringing value to Scaw” culminated in the extraction of an estimated 
R17.1bn or $2.23bn from Scaw to Anglo (Table 8.1). It is notable that this process 
coincided with Anglo’s share buyback programme of 2006–2008 described in 
Section 6.1.2. above. 
 
Table 8.1: Total value extracted by Anglo American in its process of “bringing 
value to Scaw” (Rm) 
 Rm $ 
Debt placed on Scaw’s 
balance sheet by Anglo 
(2007-2009) 
R6.3bn $0.8bn 
Sale of Moly-Cop (2011) R7.3bn $1bn 
Sale of Scaw SA to IDC 
(2012) 
R3.5bn $0.43bn 
 
Total R17.1bn $2.23bn 
Sources: Author’s calculations based on Hannemann (2014), Creamer (2007) 
Note: Transaction prices converted at average annual R/$ exchange rates from South African Reserve 
Bank 
 
Upon the conclusion of Scaw’s divestiture Anglo CEO Cynthia Carroll stated: 
 
The sale of Scaw brings the total announced proceeds from our 
divestments of non-core assets to $3.7 billion since 2010, maximising 
value from these businesses for our shareholders. I am particularly 
pleased that the manner in which we conducted this divestment 
reinforces our ongoing commitment to South Africa. This acquisition will 
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contribute positively to the South African government’s industrial 
development objectives by enabling the IDC to play a meaningful role in 
the strategically important steel industry. 
(Anglo American 2012) 
 
8.3.4 Scaw: lost opportunities 
 
Subsequent developments with MolyCop and Scaw’s long-term Belgian technology 
partner Magotteaux, provide an indication of a possible alternative trajectory for 
Scaw and the opportunities missed. Magotteaux, one of the world's technological 
leaders in grinding media was acquired by a Nordic private equity group IK 
Investment Partners in 2006. In 2011 IK sold Magotteaux to a large Chilean 
industrial group, Sigdo Koppers which now owns Proacer (Scaw and Magotteaux’s 
erstwhile Chilean joint venture) (Magotteaux 2011). In 2012 MolyCop, formerly 
Scaw’s international subsidiary, had become the largest grinding media group by 
sales volumes. Magotteaux, under Sigdo Koppers’ ownership was the second largest, 
with Scaw having slipped to sixth place (Figure 8.5). Thus, despite various 
weaknesses and missteps, including not securing ownership of Magotteaux, Scaw 
had by the mid-2000s built itself into the largest grinding media group in the world. 
Anglo dismantled a valuable national asset that was a major exporter and earner of 
foreign exchange, financially viable and embodied important industrial capabilities. 
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Figure 8.5: Grinding media capacity of leading suppliers (kilop-tonnes per 
annum), 2012 
Source: OneSteel (2012) 
 
8.4 Boart’s restructuring and disposal 
 
8.4.1 Introduction 
 
Boart International (Boart) entered the 1990s as an exception to Anglo’s and AMIC’s 
general inability to develop manufacturing exports outside of capital-intensive 
resource-processing industries. Boart had developed and acquired substantial 
capabilities focused on hard rock drilling, and associated cutting and abrasive tools 
and exploratory drilling (Innes 1984; Rustomjee 1993; Howard 1996). In 1990 
Boart employed around 10,000 people, was a consistently profitable contributor to 
AMIC earnings with 67% derived from exports and foreign operations from Boart’s 
wide network of international subsidiaries (Anglo American Industrial Corporation 
1990).  
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However, this apparent success concealed major and long-standing technological 
weaknesses, which would rapidly manifest themselves from the early 1990s. Boart 
had engaged in its own proprietary research and development (R&D) from the 
1930s in conjunction with the University of the Witwatersrand's Minerals Research 
Institute. However, from as early as the 1950s Boart’s R&D efforts begun to wane in 
favour of a strategy of securing technology by acquiring competitors, with the 
exception of an R&D facility it established in Klerksdorp, near Johannesburg, in 
1978. In 1991 the Klerksdorp facility was closed down and all R&D shifted to a new 
Boart Group Technology Centre in Limerick, Ireland where Boart had established 
manufacturing operations and De Beers had set up synthetic diamond production in 
1960 (Rustomjee 1993; Howard 1996; Brunner 2014; Wood 2014).  
 
8.4.2 Domestic shifts in demand, global technological shifts 
 
By the early 1990s Boart’s activities were focused on percussion drilling for mining 
and construction; exploration drilling and geotechnical equipment; safety products 
and materials handling; and industrial diamond and carbide tools. Its South African 
plants were focused on handheld pneumatic rockdrills, with a domestic market 
share of around 90% (Mining Magazine 1995), integral steel, steel bits and carbide 
products. Production of pneumatic drills was overwhelmingly for the domestic 
market. A limited number of drills were exported, mainly to Canada and Peru. These 
countries have similar thin-vein mineral deposits to South Africa that requiring 
hand-held drilling for blast holes. North American sanctions on South African 
products, in place since the mid-1980s, proved an impediment to exports but not an 
absolute obstacle, with the export of Boart drills to Canada “made to appear clean” 
(Brunner 2014). However, outstanding indictments by the US anti-trust authorities 
 305 
in relation to both De Beers’ and Boart, related to price fixing and market sharing, 
made it difficult for Boart to operate effectively in the US market (Brunner 2014). 
 
Historically Boart’s South African operations were both the largest and most 
profitable of the global group. Profitability was driven by the pervasive use of 
Boart’s hand-held pneumatic drills for blast holes as part of the labour-intensive 
extraction techniques used in South Africa’s gold mines. However, from the early 
1990s the contribution of Boart’s South African operations to group profits dropped 
dramatically from around 50% to around 10% (Anglo American Industrial 
Corporation various years; Brunner 2014). This fall was a direct consequence of the 
severe decline of South Africa’s gold mining industry that saw employment falling 
dramatically from 530,000 in 1986 to less than 200,000 by 2000 (Feinstein 2005 
and Figure 8.6). The decline of this industry also saw Boart’s exploratory drilling 
activity recede, with demand for deep exploration drills going “from hundreds to 
tens” per annum over the space of about five years (Brunner 2014). Pressure on 
Boart’s hand-held pneumatic rock drills was also brought to bear from domestic 
competitors who initially began to produce “knock off bits” in competition with 
Boart’s own drill bits and then shifted to the production of competing drills 
(Brunner 2014; Wood 2014).  
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Figure 8.6: South African gold mining production (1,000kg) and employment, 
1980–2014 
 
Source: Department of Mineral Resources (n.d.) 
 
The decline in South African demand coincided with a longer-term technological 
shift that had been underway in the mining industry from hand-held pneumatic 
drilling to more efficient automated hydraulic drilling. By the time Boart began, in 
the 1990s, to produce hydraulic drills and the large drilling machines or "drill 
jumbos" required to operate them it had fallen technologically behind its global 
competitors. Former CEO Paul Brunner estimates that by the mid-1990s Boart was 
a “distant third” in terms of technological capabilities and world market share in 
hydraulic drilling and related capital equipment, compared to the world’s leading 
OEMs: Atlas Copco and Sandvik. Brunner was of the view that long-standing 
problems had arisen at Boart as a consequence of poor management. Quality control 
systems were poor and management made inadequate efforts to upgrade the skills 
of its workforce.  
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These [South African plants] were generally not efficient plants and 
relied heavily on low cost labour. The inability of management to 
modernize them and reduce cost lead to their demise.  
(Brunner, 2014) 
 
Boart was also adversely impacted by the loss of technical expertise in steelmaking 
after Iscor dramatically reduced the size of its workforce in the wake of its 1989 
privatisation. Severe problems with the quality of drill rods supplied by Iscor to 
Boart led it to lose significant market share in the mid-1990s which Boart was 
unable to recover (Wood 2014). 
 
8.4.3 Restructuring and unbundling 
 
The mid 1990s saw a process of restructuring and consolidation. In 1994 Boart 
merged with its longstanding United States contract drilling subsidiary: Longyear 
changing its name to Boart Longyear. In 1997 Boart established a joint venture in 
Wuxi, China to manufacture percussive drill bits and hard materials. This plant 
ultimately went on to manufacture the percussion drills themselves and continues 
to do so. Over the 1990s Boart continued multiple acquisitions both related to and 
outside of its traditional emphasis on percussion and exploratory drilling for the 
mining sector. With the exception of exploratory drilling there was little apparent 
strategic focus in these acquisitions in terms of building up world or regional scale 
capabilities to become a leading OEM in specific segments. By the 2000s Boart had 
become fragmented globally with a multiplicity of strategies. Boart operations and 
plants around the world were run “as a bunch of independent fiefdoms” (Brunner, 
2014) impeding economies of scale and other efficiencies. Notwithstanding these 
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weaknesses Boart continued to hold a significant share of the global mining drilling 
and exploration market. In the Brunner’s (2014) view, despite being a “distant third” 
in the global market for mining drills, Boart was “clearly the world leader” in mineral 
exploration drill rigs, exploration drilling tools and contracting for sample 
extraction followed by Atlas Copco.  
 
In 2000 Anglo announced its intention to dispose of Boart. During the early 2000s 
there was a restructuring which saw some of the European facilities closed and 
absorbed into the South African plants. A proposal to headquarter Boart in the 
United States was deemed too politically sensitive by Anglo. Rather they split Boart’s 
South African and international operations and sold them off separately, an 
approach that was subsequently adopted with respect to Scaw’s unbundling 
discussed above. The pneumatic drill business was sold to a Black Economic 
Empowerment group, Tranter. To make the sale more attractive Boart purchased 
Huddy, a competing domestic producer of drill bits, with the sole purpose of closing 
it down (Brunner 2014). The hydraulic drilling and capital equipment business was 
sold off in to a tri-lateral consortium of investors comprising Nedbank Capital 
Private Equity, a BEE group: Matasis and company management and was renamed 
Aard Mining Equipment (McGillivray 2015). Both the diamond saw plant and the 
carbide businesses were sold to E6 Abrasives, a subsidiary of De Beers, located in 
Ireland. Following the disposal of Boart’s South African operations there was a 
process of intense consolidation of Boart Longyear’s international operations. In 
2005 Boart Longyear was sold to an Advent/Bain private equity consortium, with a 
major subsidiary Wendt sold off separately. The combined sale netted Anglo $667m 
(R4,243bn) (Anglo American 2005b).  
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8.4.4 Boart: Lost opportunities 
 
Boart Longyear’s headquarters were moved to Salt Lake City in the United States 
with Advent/Bain selling a controlling interest to Australian bank Macquarie. In 
2007 Macquarie took Boart Longyear public for A$2.3bn in the second largest initial 
public offering on the Australian Stock Exchange. Despite the company struggling 
with high levels of debt it remains a major global OEM in mining drilling services 
and equipment (Brunner 2014; Boart Longyear n.d.). 
 
Tranter, the domestic company which purchased Boart Longyear’s South African 
pneumatic drill operations has subsequently gone out of business (McGillivray 
2015). Aard Mining Equipment produces hydraulic drill rigs and utility vehicles and 
has achieved very rapid growth off a low base, taking advantage of growth in South 
Africa’s platinum mining industry, and employing around 250 people. 80% of its 
sales are domestic and 20% are exports to markets such as Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
Canada and Poland. However, Aard faces significant challenges in competition with 
large transnational OEMs like Sandvik and Atlas Copco. In the South African market 
transnationals have gained ready market access by establishing black empowered 
sales operations. In export markets Aard needs to build the service infrastructure 
necessary to support its products and the balance sheet to do so, which 
transnational competitors already have in place (McGillivray 2015). 
 
Thus Anglo’s unbundling of Boart has involved the destruction of significant 
industrial capabilities, export markets and foreign exchange earnings and major lost 
opportunities. Anglo’s severing of Boart’s international operations from its South 
African ones and subsequent sale foreclosed the opportunity to retain and develop 
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a global South African OEM in mining drilling, exploration and services. The flip-side 
of the pocket of dynamism and innovation represented by Aard is the weaknesses 
of having dismantled Boart’s distribution and servicing network and the scale of 
financial resources to compete against large global OEMs. 
 
8.5 Dorbyl’s restructuring and disposal 
 
8.5.1 Dorbyl’s difficulty in making the switch from heavy to light 
engineering 
 
Dorbyl, as discussed in Chapter 3, was the largest engineering group in South 
Africa’s history, employing over 25,000 people at its peak in the early 1980s. Dorbyl 
was built up with a strong focus on heavy engineering required for the expansion 
and maintenance of gold, platinum and coal mining; steel and other heavy industry; 
and electricity and rail infrastructure. That is to say many of the MEC sectors on 
which post-war industrialisation was based. The dramatic reduction, over the 
second half of the 1980s, of the number of these large and lumpy capital projects 
compelled Dorbyl to restructure from 1985 onwards in an effort to shift towards a 
greater light engineering focus, chiefly involving the acquisition of competitors. 
(Dorbyl various years; Rustomjee 1993). Leading up to South Africa’s first 
democratic election Dorbyl, like Iscor and AMIC, initially anticipated an increase in 
demand from the rollout of the RDP and began reorienting itself to serve 
requirements including water reticulation, housing and community construction, 
and freight and passenger rail (Dorbyl 1994) 
 
However, its single largest new investment project, TOSA, a seamless pipe and tube 
joint venture with Iscor, proved unsuccessful and was disposed of in 1994. Dorbyl’s 
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difficulty in making the switch from heavy to light engineering is reflected in the 
steep decline in its number of employees, from 23,371 in 1989 to 10,989 in 1994 
(Figure 8.7). These job losses were accompanied by a large-scale loss of skills and 
experience that could have been redeployed into other engineering sectors if a 
coherent industry strategy had been mobilised (Rustomjee 1993).  
 
Figure 8.7: Dorbyl employment, 1980–2005 
Source: Dorbyl (various years) 
 
In 1995 Rembrandt exercised its right to acquire Iscor’s remaining 25.8% share in 
Dorbyl’s holding company Metkor, taking Rembrandt’s stake to 76%. This cemented 
Rembrandt and Anglo as the two major shareholders in Dorbyl. However, rather 
than signalling optimism about Metkor and Dorbyl's prospects it was aimed at 
establishing stronger control over Dorbyl’s restructuring. After an 18-month period 
during which it did not release an annual report, it announced a strategy for a 
"refocused Dorbyl". This involved a twin focus on the manufacturing and 
distribution of automotive components and "New Generation" infrastructure based 
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on light and medium engineering linked to RDP requirements in areas such as water, 
electrification, housing and transport (Dorbyl 1996). In automotives in particular, it 
emphasised the role of joint ventures and technological partnerships with 
international OEMs. It also stressed the need to grow foreign earnings through 
exports and offshore joint ventures. 
 
8.5.2 Reshuffling the cards  
 
The period from 1995 to 2003 was characterised by a flurry of acquisitions and 
disposals, multiple strategic reviews, announcements of restructuring and 
assurances that restructuring had been completed. Reflective of Froud et al.’s (2006) 
conception of “shareholder value” as an ephemeral narrative to convince 
shareholders that their strategies will deliver dramatic returns, this period was 
characterised by hyperbolic claims even as turnover stagnated (Figure 8.8). In 1998 
Dorbyl announced that it would supplement its manufacturing activities with 
increased import-based trading activities in two main market segments: automotive 
components and steel trading. It invested in a major automotive aftermarket spares 
retailer, Midas and indicated that its steel trading division, Baldwins would 
supplement domestic products with imports (Dorbyl 1998). Meanwhile low public 
expenditure on buses for public transport and the lowering of tariffs on buses 
resulted in the closure of its Port Elizabeth Busaf works. Dorbyl’s structural 
engineering unit was disposed of through an asset swop with Anglo subsidiary LTA 
in exchange for various engineering businesses which were folded into Baldwins 
(De Beer 2003, 2013).  
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As part of its drive to increase foreign income, Dorbyl entered into a range of joint 
ventures and acquisitions. The most significant of these was the acquisition in 1998 
of Alpine, a US roofing company. The rationale presented for this purchase was that 
it would integrate Alpine's roofing design technology and customer base in the US, 
Europe, Japan, Australia and South Africa with Baldwin's roofing products "to 
launch Baldwins' products into world markets” with “[m]ajor secondary markets ... 
identified, which included underground mining applications, highway sound walls 
and security perimeter fencing" (Dorbyl 1998: 35). 
 
In 2001 Dorbyl re-emphasised its "base strategic philosophy ... to grow export and 
offshore business" (Dorbyl 2001) targeting 50% offshore sales over the next three 
to four years from the current level of 26%, amidst signals of poor management and 
financial controls. Group results for 1999 had to be restated in 2000 due to "the 
discovery of material accounting misstatements and a series of fraudulent acts" 
(Dorbyl 2000: 10) and consequent overstatement of its operating income and 
margins. As the prospects of raising export sales rapidly receded, the distinction 
between exports and offshore earnings through acquisitions became increasingly 
blurred with a shift to the latter. A slew of disposals followed as operating income 
fell by 40%, but shareholders were reassured that "major problems have ... been 
resolved through sale or closure" (Dorbyl 2001: 8).  
 
Dorbyl management’s ineffectiveness in sustaining and growing either domestic or 
exports sales and profits were not restricted to its manufacturing businesses. In 
2002 Dorbyl announced that it would be disposing of Midas, distributor of parts for 
the automotive aftermarket of which at least 50% were imported. The failure of 
Midas was attributed to all manner of factors including "macro economic issues of 
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crime, AIDS, unemployment, consumer price and fuel price increases" (Dorbyl 2002: 
22). The inability of management to improve the financial performance of either its 
manufacturing or import-based businesses, even as the conditions for the latter 
became increasingly favourable as trade liberalisation progressed, points towards 
management as the primary cause of failure. 
 
8.5.3 “Releasing value to shareholders” 
 
Figure 8.8 indicates that from 1996 Dorbyl generated no growth in turnover, not 
even in nominal terms. The effects of various disposals are evident from plummeting 
revenues from 2003 (Figure 8.8) and further declines in employment (Figure 8.7).  
 
Figure 8.8: Dorbyl turnover (Rm), 1989–2012 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on McGregor’s BFA (n.d.). 
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group decisively dismantled. The sale of automotive aftermarket distributor Midas 
was concluded and other major subsidiaries were sold off including Dorbyl 
Engineering, Global Roofing Solutions, Dorbyl Transport Products and Dorbyl 
Automotive Technologies. 
 
Figure 8.9: Dorbyl profits, dividends and directors' remuneration (Rm), 1989 
– 2012 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on McGregor’s BFA (n.d.). 
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thereafter. Between 2003 and 2007 R1.2bn was paid out in dividends to Remgro and 
other shareholders and R146m in executive remuneration (Dorbyl various years).  
 
US roofing company Alpine was one of the businesses sold off under the MPS. In 
2005 it was sold to a consortium led by US private equity firm Stonebridge for 
$158.3m which "released significant value to shareholders" (Dorbyl 2005: 4). Of the 
R991m accrued R882m was distributed to shareholders as a special dividend 
(Dorbyl 2006). Seven months later Stonebridge sold Alpine for US$250m. It 
transpired that Cooper was part of the Stonebridge consortium and received 2.5% 
of the profits from the sale (Mantshantsha 2006). Cooper and Orwin resigned in 
2006 and the Remgro and Allan Gray directors in 2007. From 2008 to 2012 Dorbyl 
incurred annual losses, peaking at R238m in 2009. Dividends continued to be paid 
out: R3.4m in 2008 and R50.9 in 2011 despite these losses. Directors' remuneration 
remained within a band of R3.7m to R5.7m over this period. Dorbyl's listing was 
suspended in November 2012 and was ultimately delisted on 1 July 2014. 
 
Thus Dorbyl, South Africa’s largest ever engineering group, after its management 
failed to render either its manufacturing or import-based trading businesses 
profitable was dismantled through a collusive alliance between major shareholders 
Remgro and Allan Gray on the one hand and a coterie of senior executives.  
 
8.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has illustrated how conglomerate unbundling of the largest 
engineering subsidiaries has contributed to a pattern of underperformance and lost 
opportunities in the engineering sector. This has occurred in the context of a 
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growing gap between leading and follower global firms as a consequence of 
increasing consolidation, specialisation and scale as part of the GBBR process 
dominated by transnational corporations based in advanced economies. Thus there 
is a particular premium on developing countries being able to develop firms of 
international scale in segments of global value chains. 
 
In the absence of a national strategy and policy instruments to support the 
reorientation and development of the capabilities that had been built up over the 
better part of a century within the engineering sector, restructuring was placed in 
the hands of the same conglomerates, and their increasingly vocal shareholders, that 
had been unable to render them partially or fully internationally competitive. The 
policies advocated by the large conglomerates entrenched the domestic demand 
constraint over the transition, through low fixed investment expenditure and 
increasing import competition. 
 
Rather than transferring the three largest engineering or their constituent 
businesses to more capable ownership and management, the conglomerates 
pursued an effective strategy of short term asset stripping to “release shareholder 
value”. Anglo’s unbundling of Scaw and Boart effectively destroyed two of the largest 
engineering firms that had indeed developed global capabilities and scale, albeit not 
without significant weaknesses. The dismemberment by Remgro of the component 
parts of Dorbyl, foreclosed the possibility of a more orderly restructuring and 
reorientation, contributing to the hollowing out of the domestic engineering sector. 
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusions 
 
The birth of a democratic South Africa in 1994 came with high hopes that its 
remarkable peaceful transition to a constitutional democracy would be matched 
with an economic revival led by a more dynamic, diversified and jobs-rich pattern 
of industrialisation. Over the intervening two decades South African 
industrialisation performance has been mediocre, characterised by low levels of 
fixed investment in general and in “non-commodity” manufacturing in particular, 
weak export growth and declining manufacturing employment. 
 
This thesis has critically interrogated and found wanting, through the prism of 
corporate and industrial restructuring in the steel and engineering sectors, a 
dominant orthodox consensus that gives pride of place in accounting for poor post-
apartheid manufacturing performance of the continuity of extensive product and 
factor market distortions, compounded by skills deficits. Rather an alternate 
political economy framework emphasises how core political economy bargains gave 
rise to policies and institutions that have undermined prospects for the deepening 
of post-apartheid industrialisation. Specifically, it has traces largest conglomerates 
and increasingly influential institutional investors, secured policies as favourable as 
possible to unfettered capital restructuring, with narrow Black Economic 
Empowerment ownership transfers as the chief legitimation mechanism for this 
arrangement. In the absence of any national strategy for the development of forward 
linkages out of steel and to reorient and develop engineering, the three largest 
business groups were effectively placed in charge of the restructuring of the steel 
and engineering sector. In the absence of any national strategy for the development 
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of forward linkages out of steel and to reorient and develop substantial, albeit not 
fully internationally competitive capabilities up in engineering, low public fixed 
investment, trade liberalisation, offshore listings and the uncritical embrace of 
foreign ownership contributed to a process of destructive restructuring and 
unbundling of engineering and the subordination of steel to the global strategies of 
new foreign owners. Emerging Black Economic Empowerment groups have shown 
little interest in fixed investment in manufacturing sectors such engineering, 
favouring ownership transfers of existing assets in more profitable sectors. Both 
mining policy and the procurement practices of SOEs have favoured shallow tie-ups 
between foreign OEMs and “empowered” sales operations that have facilitated 
engineering imports.  
 
Two groups in particular have benefited from rents that have flowed from post-
apartheid corporate restructuring: institutional investors and the beneficiaries of 
narrow Black Economic Empowerment asset transfers. These rent transfers have 
not been meaningfully deployed to raise levels of fixed investment or to alter their 
patterns in favour of more diversified manufacturing. Without detracting from real 
deficiencies in design and implementation, efforts since 2007 to mobilise industrial 
policies have been caught in a “pincer movement” between policies and institutional 
arrangements that have favoured these two sets of interests in particular. The battle 
over Sishen iron ore rents is illustrative of this “pincer movement” as well a 
relatively recent shift in which BEE has been invoked to legitimate a particularly 
predatory form of unproductive accumulation and associated patronage. 
 
This thesis makes a novel contribution to debates over post-apartheid 
industrialisation in significant respects. It contributes to addressing an important 
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gap in scholarship, namely the paucity of detailed studies of the influence and agency 
of large business groups in shaping the trajectory of post-apartheid 
industrialisation, notwithstanding pervasive post-apartheid corporate and 
industrial restructuring. In doing so extensive primary quantitative and qualitative 
material was collected and analysed.  
 
The thesis necessarily involved limitations imposed by the choices of which aspects 
of restructuring of steel and engineering to focus on. It excluded any detailed study 
of steel and engineering firms outside of the nexus of control of Anglo, Iscor and 
Rembrandt at the demise of apartheid. Post-apartheid statistical practices, involving 
the shift from manufacturing censi to surveys and to less granularity of industrial 
statistics also imposed limitations. An important area of investigation that was 
planned, but which was not feasible to examine in more detail was a more detailed 
evolution of the emergence of large BEE companies and the breadth and depth of 
their engagement with manufacturing in general and steel and engineering in 
particular. In addition, rapid developments with respect to the economy, the state 
and public institutions were unfolding in relation to “state capture” and new forms 
of patronage even as the research was being completed and written up. This made 
it difficult to fully incorporate in the thesis. 
 
Flowing partly from the limitations of what could be researched, a number of areas 
for fruitful future research arise. Three in particular are highlighted. First, the thesis 
implies the need for substantial research to explore whether, to what extent and 
how industrial policy ought to adapt to the twin challenges of addressing structural 
transformation and racial exclusion in an economy with very open trade and capital 
markets. Second, there appears to be fruitful scope for cross-country comparisons 
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of South Africa with other middle income developing countries simultaneously 
grappling with efforts to advance structural transformation of the economy and a 
legacy of racial exclusion, with Malaysia being one of the most obvious comparators. 
Third, the thesis suggests the need to explore the sometimes perverse or unintended 
consequences, traditionally associated with state intrusion into markets, of 
neoliberal reforms even on their own narrow terms. For instance how such reforms, 
through the mechanisms mobilised for their legitimation, may lead to the rise rather 
than decline of unproductive rent-seeking and corruption.  
 
Some tentative policy implications for South African industrialisation may however, 
be sketched. The research highlights the unproductive nature of South Africa’s post-
apartheid transition, manifested most starkly by low levels of private fixed 
investment and a failure of investment patterns to shift towards diversified 
manufacturing. This implies the need to rethink and revisit the bargains cast over 
the transition, recognising that the potential for the state to impose itself on capital 
is considerably weaker than it might have been in and around 1994. How then does 
the state strategise to advance structural transformation in the context of both a 
traditional corporate sector and emerging BEE sector oriented towards, short term 
investment horizons and a correspondingly limited appetite for long term and more 
productive fixed investment. The need to identify the potential for productive 
bargains in turn implies the development of industrial policy capabilities within and 
linked to the state to better understand, engage with and influence the orientation 
and strategies of dominant and influential business groups. 
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